Democratization and Citizenship
Discourses in the Mena Region

Michele Micheletti (ed.)
Democratization and Citizenship Discourses in the Mena Region

EDITED BY MICHELE MICHELETTI
Dedicated to the memory of Nabiha Jerad
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Preface

ARNE JARRICK & MARIANNE BOQVIST

This volume is the result of a series of workshops, organized within the framework of the Swedish Research Links Programme (MENA), a program financed by the Swedish Agency for Development Cooperation (Sida) and administered by the Swedish Research Council (VR). The program is designed to link researchers in the MENA region with Swedish researchers in collaboration projects of common interest. Although the program on the whole has been successful, it has been a disappointment that remarkably few joint applications have come from researchers within the human and social sciences (SSH). As a solution to this drawback, in 2007 Sida decided to support six workshops, which were to be hosted interchangeably by the Swedish Institute in Alexandria (Swedalex) and the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul (SRII). The aim of these workshops was to offer a platform for SSH researchers from the MENA region and Sweden to build networks around common research interests. Ideally, in due course, these networks will develop into full-flown research projects whether dealing with topics related to the MENA region or not. After a phase of trial and error, in the fourth workshop the theme “Changing Notions of Citizenship – Past, Present and Future” was introduced. It took place in Stockholm in June 2011. In a context where the Arab Spring had just opened up for this kind of discussions, this meeting turned out to be particularly fruitful and revealed new forms of discussion where a real exchange came true. It was agreed that the theme would remain the same for the next workshop, but that the participants would meet again to prepare the discussions for the next meeting. Although this meeting failed to happen, there was a very energetic and well-prepared group that gathered for the fifth workshop in Istanbul in 2012. At that time the initial euphoria of the Arab spring had developed into a more
mature approach amongst the participants and provoked many interesting discussions.

One of the most engaged persons in the first workshop, Professor Nabiha Jerad from Tunis, also attended the workshop in Istanbul. She was very inspired by this way of meeting and emphasized that this was a good way to learn from each other’s experiences, both between researchers from the MENA countries and between researchers from Sweden and the MENA region. She met with Professor Michele Micheletti in Tunis in the summer and made plans to organize a workshop on “Citizenship Discourses in the MENA region”. The aim was to prepare for the next and last workshop of the MENA Links series. This volume is the result of this workshop, which took place in Istanbul 20-23 February 2013.

Professor Nabiha did not make it to that meeting. She was the victim of a hit and run accident in August 2012, from which she never recovered. She passed away a few months later. We miss Nabiha badly, her unstoppable energy, intellectual curiosity and compassion with those in need. This volume is dedicated to her and her continuous fight for human rights and democracy in the MENA region and for high level research within the Humanities. Although Nabiha is no longer with us, her idea about the role of education for the changing notions of citizenship remains with us and will be the overarching theme of the very last workshop of this series that will be held in Lund in November 2013.

Stockholm September 23, 2013

Marianne Boqvist, Deputy Director, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul

Arne Jarrick, former Secretary General for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Swedish Research Council (VR), and professor of History, Stockholm University
In its broadest sense citizenship concerns debates on the relationship between individuals and their state and the relationships among individuals, groups and institutions within one nation and transnationally. Within the citizenship framework are a wide variety of discourses and practices that deal with the norms, rights, arenas, actors, institutions, and actions of states, civil society, corporations, and individuals. These discourses and practices are associated with many different societal matters—both big and small—in several formal and less formal venues and fields of life. Citizenship is, therefore, not only about the formal relationship between the state and its inhabitants and simply about obeying laws, though these relationships indeed are of high importance. Of equal importance is the quality of a country’s social fabric, how individuals and groups relate to each other, and conversations in the public sphere. Citizenship thus also involves thinking and acting beyond voting, joining political associations, and using available means to gain political influence. It concerns how citizens view the state, how the state views its citizens, how citizens view each other, and now even how they relate to nature and the environment. At times and not infrequently citizenship also includes efforts on the part of states, groups, and individuals to impede how others participate in society and politics. Hence there is a clear relationship between the quality of citizenship and democratization processes.

This volume is a collection of most papers presented at the workshop “Citizenship Discourses in the MENA Region” that was held between February 20-23, 2013 at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul. The inter-disciplinary
workshop gathered scholars from Egypt, Iraq, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States who engaged in lively and interesting academic discussions about how people (politicians, protesters, the youth, women, etc.) and institutions (political agencies, public policy, the military, NGOs, the media, international and regional organizations, etc.) are involved in the making of democratic citizenship. The contributions in this volume and during the workshop ponder how actors and institutions engage in or support/impede democratic citizen practices and what they believe is necessary for democracy to develop and mature in the MENA region. The workshop’s general focus was identifying and analyzing the on-going citizenship discourses in this region.

This conference proceedings volume begins with a chapter that reminds us of the feeling of hope for democratic citizenship when the Arab Spring was developing. Daniel Ritter argues in “From Rhetoric to Revolution: The Role of Human Rights in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions” that Tunisia and Egypt succeeded in nonviolently overthrowing their dictatorial leaders because they for decades had relied on the liberal rhetoric espoused by the authoritarian regimes to further their goals. Not only does their use of this political rhetoric on human rights explain the global fascination with the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. It also gave protesters and others leverage into government and good political protection for their demands and actions. Thus, the governments were forced in one way or another to attempt to live up to their own rhetoric—otherwise they would be ridiculed as hypocrites in international circles and tarnish their global reputations even more. Ritter proposes the innovative idea that domestic human rights activism, as conducted by our deceased colleague Nabiha Jerad before and after the Arab Spring, was the midwife of the revolutions. His discussion on this matter offers a detailed chronological study of the two countries’ developments and also helps explain the importance of a vibrant civil society with transnational contacts and commitments in nurturing the democratization processes in these two countries.

The next chapter “The Post-Revolutionary Tunisian Subject: Citizen or Believer?” is a reflective essay on the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Tunisia. Nejet Mchala, who was a close colleague and old friend of Nabiha Jerad, gives us a societal commentary on the post-revolutionary Tunisian subject. She reminds us that while a revolution is one kind of process, democratization is another very hard and long struggle. This is the case because it is not easy to change entrenched political ways of being, whether they concern the vertical citizenship relationship between the state and its inhabitants or the horizontal citizenship
relationships in civil society, local community, and daily inter-personal contacts. Her contribution gives witness to the strong sense of disappointment felt by many Tunisians about the current quality of their politicians and government, a topic discussed in other contributions as well (see Mansour, Weaver and Barsalou, and Micheletti). She reminds us that democratization is a long-term process with positive developments, such as greater freedom to protest and nascent pluralism, but also negative ones, including the banalization of violence by the governing political party and a backlash on equal rights for women.

We turn then to the situation in Iraq, a country at the sidelines of the Arab Spring. Renad Mansour's contribution "Citizenship in Iraq: Prospects for a Cross-Ethnic Polity" puts the events in Tunisia and Egypt in a larger regional perspective. He stresses that issues of democratic self-definition and self-realization in post-revolutionary settings take time. Iraq also underwent a societal revolution, though more brought on by outside forces than the internal ones in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, and is to this day struggling with inter- and intra-ethnic, cross-religious, and communal conflict and cooperation. He views cross-group cooperation as the key to genuine democratic citizenship because it has the capacity to bind Iraqis under one federal state. Simply put, if cross-group conflict is minimized, a spirit of national identity can develop within the Iraqi people. To analyze the strength of cooperation and genuine citizenship as an ideal he focuses on the five Iraqi elections since the overthrow of political power in the 2000s. His analysis of public opinion and election data shows that the electoral arena frequently has been dominated by sectarian-based interests, which have fragmented cooperation and, therefore, hindered the development of a federal state for all Iraqis. However, at times, electoral politics has forged together the different groups into a spirit of sameness. This "spell of good citizenship" in 2008-2010 was followed by a more difficult period of democratization, with shrunken political space for citizens to voice their opinions and politics as defined by identity. The year 2013 saw another "spell of good citizenship" when all groups focused on using the elections as a vehicle for addressing their common political grievances in the field of economic, social, and political life. Again, this contribution to the conference proceedings volume emphasizes that democratic development is a painful and long process characterized by setbacks and frustrations.

A political rhetoric that stresses equality, rights, and democracy, a "spell of good citizenship," and protests that are followed and supported globally are important developments on the road to democratization. However, as R. Kent
Weaver and Judy Barsalou contribute in their chapter “Barriers to Democratization: A Behavioral Perspective,” there can and often are underlying conditions that promote democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors. They argue persuasively that underlying conditions that prohibit good democratic development need to be understood better and changed. Their discussions on the elements of behavioral change at the individual and institutional level reveal how complex democratization processes really are and specifically how important it is to target the beliefs, inducements, and capacities of both individuals and governments. As in Renad Mansour’s chapter, they focus on the electoral arena and the kinds of macro- and micro-strategies necessary to improve election regimes. They also penetrate the large problems of political corruption, lack of democratic transparency, and how political efficacy at the civil society and individual level can be nurtured. Their discussions and comprehensive tables clearly show that, without such systematic and meticulous change efforts, democracy-reinforcing behavior is unlikely to come about. Why? Their answer is simple: beliefs, inducements, and capacity must be aligned for the march toward democratization. Their detailed policy analysis thus points to the need for better compliance and enforcement institutions and regimes in terms of both the vertical relationship of citizenship and the horizontal one of civil society and inter-personal networks and trust. Democratic stability, they conclude, requires that a complex set of “good” behaviors be carried out frequently and consistently by broad populations, including politicians, civil servants, ordinary citizens, and others. In other words, everyone must be convinced to march to the tune of democratic development.

Emma Lundgren Jörum reminds us that another possible element in developing capacity for democracy-enforcing behaviors may be to allow citizens abroad (diaspora countrywomen and —men) to play a role in democratization processes and development. The participation of returning dissenters and migrants can, therefore, be an important way to infuse new norms and new behaviors in their home of origin. These returnees may, in short, become role models for other citizens by just living the values and norms they learned and practiced in more democratized foreign societies. The chapter “End of Exile: Returning Diaspora Members and Political Leadership in the Arab World” discusses how citizens in the diaspora have contributed to protests, donated money to family and causes, and in different degrees are now helping to form the new political elite in the MENA region. Jörum discusses the need for good constitutional policy regarding the diaspora and returning citizens in order for
this to take place more effectively and fully. She also offers a preliminary analysis of emerging constitutional documents to begin to establish how well Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are welcoming home their diaspora citizens.

Another way of approaching the need for democracy-enhancing behavioral change for democratization processes in the MENA region is through education and schools. Two contributions offer insights from two different political cultures on the role of education in promoting democratic citizenship. Tuba Kanci’s chapter entitled “Citizenship and the Pedagogical State in Turkey” focuses on Turkish education policies, educational documents, curricula, and textbooks that have been used in public schooling since the 1920s. She motivates her focus by pointing out that Turkey is considered a role model for MENA countries and that public mass education is generally considered to be an important mechanism for political socialization. Education has been used worldwide as an instrument for creating social change and realizing the nation-building process. However, she too cautions that this process can be full of stumbling blocks and that education has been used to discipline people in different countries into merely accepting the interests of not so democratic states. She offers examples from Turkish history. Her analysis of Turkish textbooks from different decades shows a clear change from the 1920s, which focused on patriotic loyalty, sacrifice, debt to the nation, and the ideal citizen portrayed as a middle class husband-father. Once Turkey underwent globalization processes and actively sought to become a member of the European Union a new portrayal of citizenship appeared in textbooks. Nationalism and “duty citizenship” are still emphasized but democracy and respect for human rights (solidary and enlightened citizenship) are too (see use of terms in Micheletti’s contribution). There is, however, concern that the new curricula and textbooks embrace the neoliberal ideology and global capitalism, a worry also raised in other countries and discussed as problematic in the MENA region. She concludes that to advance democratization it is necessary to further change the discourses and portrayals of citizenship and citizenship expectations; a holistic change embracing human rights, equal rights, and freedoms among diverse identities is needed.

Much focus in civic and citizenship education concerns getting young people to participate actively in politics. Policy-makers state that young people should vote, join organizations, and volunteer. In “Walking the Tightrope: The Case of Swedish Civics Education” Johan Sandahl approaches the societal engagement of young people in a different way. At least for Sweden, he argues that it is just or perhaps more important that young people learn how to know when they should
participate actively or not. Therefore, participation should have a moral or democratic normative foundation and young people need to be taught this. He believes that the goal should be to teach pupils what he terms “a space between critical thinking and legitimization.” Teachers must be able to walk the tightrope of teaching civics to legitimate society (the need for national unity as discussed in Mansour’s contribution), on the one hand, but also, on the other, encourage young people’s emancipation from severe duty citizenship through critical thinking. Obviously this is not an easy task; the chapter discusses how civic teachers active in the classroom deal with this challenge. The goal is pupils who also can balance on the tightrope or dilemmas of democratic citizenship, that is, learn how to interpret, analyze, critique, and discuss society in the abstract without losing their sense of political commitment to their polity and concern for their personal well-being. They must also be able to apply this abstract knowledge in specific and concrete situations and decide when, where, and how to participate actively and democratically in societal affairs. Sandahl’s general conclusion is that teaching can have an impact on students’ engagement in democratic life if we approach teaching through more abstract or disciplinary second-order concepts that teach pupils to learn about democratic norms as well as teach them how to develop a critical distance from their own experience and self-interested expectations on politics.

The final chapter by Michele Micheletti, “Learning and Teaching Citizenship,” also emphasizes the role of education. However, unlike Kanci’s and Sandahl’s contributions, she stresses the need to more systematically consider how individuals and institutions use, teach, and learn a series of good citizenship expectations aiming at promoting duty, enlightened, solidarity, and sustainable citizenship. She argues for using conventional and new citizenship expectations to help scrutinize formal and everyday venues for practicing citizenship (including schools), thus agreeing with Weaver and Barsalou that good citizenship behavior must be carried out frequently and consistently across various venues and fields of life. The chapter discusses briefly available results on the quality of citizenship in the MENA region and then turns to the challenges facing civic/citizenship education globally. It employs the citizenship expectations to argue for a more pivotal role of civic education in the making of democratic citizenship. Together with Sandahl she stresses the need for the teaching and learning of active and critical skills in media literacy and political literacy, as well as the importance of toleration training to bridge the problems of sectarian interest articulation raised in Renad Mansour’s chapter.
The eight contributions to this volume offer empirical proof of an important conclusion drawn by political theorist Robert Dahl decades ago. He stated in 1990 that replacing undemocratic ideas and practices with democratic institutions requires new ideas about authority and new practices. His book *After the Revolution. Authority in a Good Society* reminds us that revolutions only open the door part way towards democratic development, and that through these doors undemocratic elements also sneak in. Democratization is a long march that requires both sweeping changes and incremental learning on the part of individuals, groups, and institutions. Human and social science scholars have an important role to play in this process. Our research can identify and explain mishaps on the march to democratization, instill democratic patience in citizens, and even offer policy advice that is derived from experience with studying similar developments across the world. Cross-national research cooperation can, therefore, further democratic dialogue through the exchange of ideas, analytical tools, and examples.

Our deceased colleague professor Nabiha Jerad understood the significance of cross-national research cooperation for the Tunisian march toward democratization. Her goal was for human and social science to help build democracy in her country. She generously gave of her precious time to attend the workshops on citizenship arranged by Swedish funders and to help craft the call for papers for the Istanbul workshop reported in this volume. She instilled us with enthusiasm for joining together to find innovative ways to study citizenship discourses in the MENA region. I observed her commitment to democratic development in Tunisia while visiting her, civic educator Zouheir Azaouzi, and wonderful Tunisian youngsters in August 2012. Her death is a great loss for the academic community. We miss her intellect, her dedication, and her smile.
CHAPTER 2

From Rhetoric to Revolution: The Role of Human Rights in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions

DANIEL P. RITTER

The early months of 2011 saw two of the Arab world’s most entrenched dictatorships fall at the hands of nonviolent protesters. Armed primarily with slogans and various forms of communication technology, the people of Tunisia and Egypt caused their authoritarian regimes to collapse within a matter of weeks through the use of largely spontaneous and unorganized demonstrations and other peaceful tactics. Scholars, both area specialists and theorists of revolutions and democratization processes, have sought to explain why these two movements succeeded against seemingly overwhelming odds.1 Perhaps due to the relatively short duration of the revolutions, some commentators abandoned the established practice of viewing revolutions as long-term processes, and have instead viewed them as events. These events, some have argued, have their causal origins in highly temporal matters, in particular widespread discontent, the decline of the

1 See for example the 2011 special issue of the Swiss Political Science Review 17(4).
economy, and high rates of unemployment among the youth (Alimi & Meyer 2011, 476). The proposition put forth in this paper, which is admittedly a work in progress, is that while structural strains contribute to a revolutionary situation, they hardly predict the revolutionary outcome (Tilly 1978). To understand why Tunisia and Egypt could nonviolently overthrow their dictatorial leaders while other countries in the region failed to do so, it is necessary to examine other, historically contextualized factors as well.

The thesis of this paper is that Tunisia and Egypt completed successful nonviolent revolutions because the predominantly peaceful protests resonated with the liberal rhetoric that the two regimes had publicly espoused for decades. In particular, the notions of human rights, freedom, and democracy constituted powerful arguments against both government repression and international support for the regime at its time of crisis. An unarmed revolution, it can certainly be argued, is by definition a human right. What made the Tunisian and Egyptian displays of discontent so appealing to the rest of the world was precisely the fact that the protesters seemed to embrace everything the democratic West holds dear.

Indeed,

_They were young. They spoke English or French. Their voices dominated Twitter and Facebook. They looked and sounded like people might on the streets of London or New York. They were not chanting religious slogans. They did not carry weapons. They drew satirical cartoons and penned sardonic raps about their leaders. The Western media adored them. They all voiced similar aspirations for freedom of expression, for decent jobs and pay, for better opportunities, for the right to choose their governments. (Noueihebd & Warren 2012, 6)._

In short, the democratic world was hard pressed to find a reason to oppose these movements, which seemed to remind Europe and North America of their own pasts, and the demonstrators’ liberal aspirations prevented Western leaders from expressing their previously whole-hearted support for the regimes. This development, in turn, discouraged domestic elites from resorting to repression while it encouraged the masses to venture into the streets.

It might be tempting to assume that the movements’ embrace of human rights was the result of divine inspiration or of modular learning (Beissinger 2007), but such interpretations are contradicted by the historical record. Instead, human rights emerged as a potent dissident discourse over several decades. However, it was only when that discourse was combined with compatible
nonviolent tactics on a wide scale that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes collapsed. I suggest that in order to understand why Mubarak and Ben Ali fell it might be helpful to approach domestic human rights activism as the revolutions’ midwives. This paper begins to tell the story of the Tunisia and Egypt’s human rights movements, starting with the former.

Tunisia

Tunisia’s historic relationship with France and other Western nations allowed “unprecedented numbers” (Alexander 2010, 46) of young Tunisians to receive their education abroad in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Those students who happened to be in France in 1968 were naturally influenced by the developments of that historic year as their “university experience politicized them in ways that made them more inclined to protest” (Alexander 2010, 46), but also students in Tunisia found out about the strikes and protests through ready access to French media. Combined, “these developments produced a society that was more willing to question the government, to demand that it become more responsive to the people, and to protest perceived inequities” (Alexander 2010, 46). While Tunisian students abroad did not drive the human rights movement, they played an important role by being among the first to raise Western awareness about the situation at home. As Susan Waltz explains the expatriate students’ “principal contribution to both the domestic and the international human rights movements was to make abuses more visible” (Waltz 1995, 195).

Domestic human rights group emerged in the Maghreb in the mid-1970s in response to increasingly repressive governments (Gränzer 1999, 118-120). The region’s — and the entire Arab world’s — first such organization officially came into being in Tunisia in 1977 (Perkins 2004, 165). Founded by self-proclaimed liberals, the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH — Tunisian League for Human Rights) used a tactic similar to the one used by Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. By pointing to the government’s public commitment to human rights — in particular the signing of various international human rights treaties — the LTDH demanded that the regime live up to its undertakings. In the mid-1970s human rights assumed increased international importance. In 1975, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established the centrality of human rights through the Helsinki Accords as the Soviet Union agreed to raise the profile of human rights on the international scene in exchange for Western recognition of the post-World War II European landscape.
Inadvertently, the Helsinki Accords caught Moscow, but also Washington and its allies, in a new reality that made human rights an unquestionable norm. A child of his times, Jimmy Carter ran his presidential campaign on a foreign policy platform based on human rights. Not surprisingly then, both the Tunisian government and its Western-educated opponents sensed the opportunity, or risk, that the human rights discourse seemed to offer. Evidence of the rising popularity of the human rights narrative is provided by the fact that in the year preceding the LTDH’s establishment, fifteen different applications were submitted to the government requesting the permission to form human rights organizations (Dwyer 1991, 165-6).

Many Tunisian’s were skeptical of the concept of human rights, which they perceived to be both “bourgeois” and “dangerously American.” (Waltz 1995, 135) Nonetheless, a small group of intellectuals created the National Council of Public Liberties, which, in time, developed into the LTDH (Waltz 1995, 134). Constrained by a Tunisian legal framework that required explicit government recognition of any association seeking to come into existence, the LTDH founders struggled to have their organization approved by the state when filing for legal status in 1976. The regime’s commitment to human rights made it difficult to deny the LTDH legitimacy, especially since the League’s founding document made frequent references to Tunisia’s Constitution and thus, indirectly, to its human rights commitments. The government was now “caught in an awkward position” (Waltz 1995: 135) — it could not claim to defend human rights while at the same time preventing the creation of an independent human rights organization, that is, the concrete manifestation of the regime’s commitment. Hesitant to reject the LTDH’s application, the government instead resorted to stalling tactics, and soon sought to counter the LTDH’s move by creating its own human rights organization (Waltz 1995, 136).

Discontent with these developments, the LTDH stepped up its pressure on the regime. In March of 1977, the regime arrested 30 dissidents affiliated with the banned political group Movement of Popular Unity (Mouvement d’Unité Populaire — MUP) for distributing leaflets and circulating a magazine. LTDH activists used this obvious violation of human rights to pressure the government by presenting it with a formal statement signed by 168 notables. The document, which was circulated widely and came to attract further signatories, demanded that amnesty be granted to political prisoners and that the government authorize the LTDH’s creation. Furthermore, the statement announced that a national conference on civil liberties would be held. To promote that conference, one of
the organization’s leaders, Hassib Ben Ammar, traveled to Europe and the United States to raise awareness about the situation in Tunisia. The government tried to prevent the conference, but in the end realized that the best way to avoid international embarrassment was to grant the LTDH legal status. Thus, on May 7, 1977 the Arab World’s first human rights organization saw the light of day after a compromise was struck: seven of the 22 members of the LTDH’s inaugural executive committee would be drawn from the the ranks of the ruling Socialist Destourian Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien, PSD) (Waltz 1995, 135-6). Still, the compromise was a small price to pay for the LTDH. While the creation of the organization was the result of domestic activism and ingenuity, the international context also played an important part. A high-ranking LTDH official later underscored this component by conveying his belief that the LTDH was finally approved because “the Tunisian government wanted to put a human rights association into operation at that time to respond to US President Carter’s ‘human rights offensive’” (Dwyer 1991, 166).

Notwithstanding its new legal status, matters were far from uncomplicated for the LTDH. The government had only reluctantly agreed to permit the League’s formation, and the new organization’s officials knew that measures were necessary in order to maintain its autonomy. To that end, the LTDH established firm rules that institutionalized the political independence both of the organization and its officers. From the very beginning, the League proclaimed its apolitical character in a series of public statement. Only by resolutely declaring its disinterest in political power could the LTDH hope to be left alone by the government. In addition, the League’s by-laws asserted the organization’s independence from the regime by stating that no government official could hold a position of power within the organization and that no state funding would be accepted (Waltz 1989, 217). While the LTDH’s stated mandate was to monitor and protect human rights in Tunisia, the organization was careful to avoid more precise definitions of its objectives. This way, its members reasoned, the League could repel charges of partisan interests (Waltz 1997, 84). To protect itself from a government backlash, the League quickly affiliated itself with the International Human Rights Federation (Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme, FIDH), and secured ties with the Geneva based International Commission of Jurists.

The League’s task was made easier by the fact that Bourguiba’s regime never contested the validity of human rights. Having committed to several international human rights accords, the government was caught by its public
statements. Still the, LTDH knew better than to push the envelope. Thus, rather than actively pursuing human rights claims against the government, it initially preferred to maintain a relatively low profile. Just as the regime had permitted the emergence of Islamists groups in the years preceding the League’s establishment with an eye to combatting the Left, the government now figured that human rights groups could be of use in efforts to restrain the Islamists. Specifically, the regime benefited from the LTDH’s bashfulness when Islamists were taken to court. Since the League did not want to challenge the government over the sensitive Islamist issue, Bourguiba could point to the absence of complaints from the human rights organization as proof that his campaign against the Islamists was not only justified, but also followed human rights protocol (Waltz 1989, 219; 1995, 162-3).

The LTDH grew rapidly in the early 1980s. In 1982, the League held its first national congress while boasting of more than a thousand members in 24 local sections. During the congress, the organization opted to reduce the size of the executive committee from 22 to 15 members, with only two officers of the new board being members of the PSD. By 1985 the League had grown to 3,000 members and four years later its membership had expanded to more than 4,000 divided over nearly 40 sections (Dwyer 1991, 166-7). Until the spring of 1987, when Tunisia appeared on the verge of complete collapse, the League maintained a tense but stable relationship with the government. It would be tempting to assume that this was due to the fact that the League did not advocate revolt against the state, but neither did the Islamists until later in the decade, and yet the latter were resolutely repressed. How can the government’s divergent treatment of the two groups be explained?

One way to approach this particular puzzle is to assume that in an “ideal world” the government would have opted to repress both groups. However, due to its international commitments, the LTDH became difficult for the government to control. Because Bourguiba could not, and did not, reject the validity of human rights after having signed various international agreement, the LTDH found itself free to observe trials, make inquiries in response to human rights complaints, conduct studies, and inspect prisons. In addition, the League made numerous public statements about press freedoms, unconstitutional legislations, and similar issues. In going about its business, it always maintained a respectful and professional tone, thereby preempting any government charges of treason or sedition (Waltz 1995, 137). As a result, the organization established itself as credible not only in Tunisia, but also abroad with many foreign news
outlets, French ones in particular, relying on the League for information about the Tunisian human rights situation (Waltz 1997, 83). Careful never to overstep clear boundaries, the LTDH was content to only raise its voice in response to blatant human rights violations, such as those occurring during the bread riots of 1978 and 1984, when the security forces responded with excessive violence (Grânzer 1999, 125-6). Every measured response by the LTDH served to heighten its international reputation and make future repression of the group increasingly costly for the government.

The Islamist on the other hand did not represent a fashionable ideology in the 1980s. Following Khomeini’s triumph in 1979, the Islamists became the new communists and were now fair game. Thus, while the LTDH was protected by its ideology, the Islamists were persecuted for theirs. Nonetheless, the extreme political situation of 1987 meant that no opposition group was safe from government attacks, and in the spring of 1987 the regime founded a new, government-controlled human rights group called the Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Public Liberties (L’Association pour la defense des droits de l’homme et des libertés Publiques, ADDHLP) after the League decided to speak up on the behalf of persecuted Islamist. With the ADDHLP in place, the League’s unique societal function had been coopted. Government charges of slandering the prime minister directed the at League’s secretary-general ended the LTDH’s relatively sheltered existence. The message to the organization was clear: stay quiet while we deal with the Islamists (Waltz 1989, 223; 1995, 138-9).

**Human Rights Activism in the Ben Ali Era**

Following his removal of Bourguiba, Ben Ali struck a bargain with virtually all opposition groups that allowed him to rapidly consolidate power. His call for national unity, as formalized in the National Pact of 1988, rested on a foundational respect for human rights (Anderson 1991; Murphy 1999, 174-5; Perkins 2004, 187-9; Tessler 1990, 172). The advantage of this strategy was that as soon as the Islamists, who initially welcomed the new president’s power grab, grew frustrated with the slow pace of liberalization and resorted to calls for violence, Ben Ali could justify repression against these “backwards” elements of society that ultimately wanted to do away with Tunisia’s enlightened view on women’s rights and the virtues of a secular state (Dalacoura 2007, 175). The disadvantage consisted of the state’s implicit legitimation of human rights groups. Repression of these social actors was consequently not a viable option for
the president, and alternative approaches were therefore required (Gränzer 1999, 127).

Ben Ali’s earliest attempt to control the human rights movement took a familiar shape. The government had for decades employed corporatist policies in order to bring competing power centers under its wings, with the previously potent labor unions standing out as the most important historical examples. Now Ben Ali looked to strengthen his international and domestic image by incorporating the human rights movement and appointing some of the LTDH’s leading advocates to his cabinet in 1988 and 1989. Presented as evidence of Ben Ali’s commitment to human rights, the move was in fact little more than an effort to coopt the human rights movement and its most important representative, the LTDH (Waltz 1991, 37; 1997, 84). As a result, many feared that the League “would simply collapse” (Waltz 1995, 139).

These concerns increased as the LTDH passively observed the government’s repression of the Islamists in the early 1990s. Many liberals shared the government’s distrust of the Islamists and privately agreed with Ben Ali’s forceful approach. Nonetheless, its docility did not spare the organization the government’s wrath once the Islamists had been defeated. Although the League had largely remained loyal to the government, some of its members had spent the years following Ben Ali’s rise to power documenting and publishing the regime’s human rights violations, both at home and abroad. Due to the weakness of Tunisia’s opposition parties, these individuals, and by extension the human rights movement, emerged as the most credible challenger to the regime in the aftermath of the Islamists’ collapse. The moral trump the League held thanks to its identification with human rights only amplified its threatening potential in the eyes of the government. Furthermore, the human rights movement, unlike the polarizing Islamists and the Left, symbolized the disturbing prospect of a unified opposition based on universal values. Such a powerful discourse, the regime reasoned, must not only be coopted — its alternative articulations had to be destroyed (Murphy 2001, 7).

But the destruction of the LTDH had to be handled with care. Ben Ali’s regime depended on trade agreements and support from the West to feed its population and keep powerful elite interests in check, which meant that measures likely to upset its international allies were out of the question. Violent repression, which had been applied to the Islamists and tolerated by the West, did not pass the litmus test in the case of the human rights movement. Instead, Ben Ali relied on legislation. In March 1992, a new law was passed that prohibited the
accumulation of positions in parties and “general organizations,” meaning that no individual could simultaneously chair a political party and hold a leadership position within the LTDH. The law also prevented organizations from restricting its membership, which allowed the regime to flood the LTDH and have a large say in all organizational matters decided through elections. The new law promised to accomplish two government objectives: limit the League’s unifying potential and at the same time water down its substance (Erdle 2010, 109-10). Following internal disagreements that prevented the organization from complying with the new law, the League had no choice but to dissolve itself later that year (Gränzer 1999, 127). However, “with international condemnation hotting up over what was seen as a blatant attempt by Ben Ali to contain legitimate criticism” (Murphy 1999, 206), the regime soon saw fit to capitulate, and in March 1993 a Tunis court declared the government’s move illegal (Murphy 1999, 206; Waltz 1995, 84-5). Far from a nod of approval aimed at the LTDH, the regime’s acceptance of the court’s ruling was “motivated by a desire to deflect widespread international condemnation of the government’s moves” (Murphy 1999, 206). Despite its new lease on life, the resurrected League resigned itself to a lower public profile when its reemerged in 1994. The government’s message had been heard, and for a while self-censorship seemed prudent (Gränzer 1999, 127).

Even with the League temporarily subdued Ben Ali could not escape the human rights narrative he had helped create. Throughout the mid-1990s international human rights organization published “highly critical” reports in response to the regimes ongoing persecution of dissidents (Wood 2002, 98-9). For example, in 1995 Amnesty International leveled charges of “widespread and systematic human-rights abuse” (qtd. in Wood 2002, 98), which complemented the LTDH’s annual report that “included accounts of violations of freedom of the press, the illegal detention of suspects, the banning of political parties, and poor conditions inside prisons” (qtd. in Wood 2002, 98). Similarly, between 1996 and 1998,

Amnesty International, the Arab Commission of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the U.N. Committee Against Torture all criticized Tunisia’s record and commitment to human rights, citing cases of torture, harassment of government critics, physical abuse of prisoners and severe restrictions on the freedom of the press (Wood 2002, 98-9).
The international press, once again with the French outlets leading the way, then relayed the negative publicity to the wider public (Garon 2003, 153; Sadiki 2002, 75-6). By 1995, it had become “commonplace in both the United States and Europe for major newspapers to run summary accounts of reports issued by international human rights watchdog groups with established credibility” (Waltz 1995, 24). In short, Ben Ali’s campaign to silence Tunisia’s human rights movement turned out to be a more complicated task than he could possibly have imagined.

The regime’s image continued to deteriorate over the next few years. The arrests of high profile opposition leaders, including Mohamed Moadda and Khemais Chammari contributed to this development, as did the continued reporting by the international media. European governments responded to politically motivated arrests with outrage, “political disappointment,” and anything in between (Murphy 1997, 119-20). Meanwhile, the LTDH scored a major victory in May 1996 when a Tunis court decided that the League should be considered a private, not public, association, and that the law of 1992 therefore should not be applied to the organization (Murphy 1999, 207). Tellingly, this decision coincided with some of the most damaging European criticisms directed at Ben Ali’s government: May 1996 was also when the European Parliament’s passed an unprecedented resolution chastising the regime for not living up to its human rights commitments established in the 1995 association agreement (Pinfari 2011, 33-5). Between 1995 and 1997, European governments, more specifically Switzerland and France, made their displeasure known to Ben Ali as they treated his visits with less fanfare than they had in the past (Garon 2003 152-3), and in 2000 the European Parliament passed two more resolutions “alerting its member governments to abuses of human rights in Tunisia and urgently demanding a meeting of the European Union-Tunisian Association Council to discuss the situation” (Murphy 2001, 14).

Because of the regime’s “obsession … with the country’s ‘image abroad,’” the late 1990s gave new rights-based organizations a chance to emerge. The National Council for Liberty in Tunisia (Conseil National pour les Libertés en Tunisie, CNLT) is perhaps the best known of these groups. The CNLT operated as a complement to the LTDH by assuming a more outspoken and confrontational role, thus offering the League some much needed respite (Erdle 2010, 252). The CNLT was however not the only group to come into being in this period. In the years surrounding the millennium shift, civil society groups such as the Rally for an Alternative International Development (RAID), the Tunisian Center for
Judicial Independence (CTIJ), the Bar Association, the Democratic Women’s Association, and the Tunisian Association of Young Lawyers all either recommenced their activities or came into existence. In addition, four opposition parties decided to combine forces under the new umbrella of the Democratic Alliance in late 2001 (Erdle 2010, 122; Sadiki 2002, 72-3). While all of the aforementioned groups struggled to make meaningful progress over the next decade (International Federation for Human Rights 2005; Powel and Sadiki 2010, 74), “this shift from parties and unions to human rights activists, and from traditional socio-economic demands to rights and liberties issues, reflects a pragmatic understanding of the current political landscape” (Alexander 2010, 65). By embracing the human rights narrative legitimate claims could be made against the government, if not at home, then at least abroad (Hibou 2011, 102). This realization spared human rights activists the fate of the Islamists, who largely vanished from domestic politics after 1992, and allowed them to set the tone of dissent in the years leading up to the revolution. In fact, recognizing that human rights constituted the most effective approach to challenging the government, the Nahda leadership-in-exile “routinely condemns violence and is committed to using only democratic and nonviolent means to achieving a democratic and tolerant Islamic state” (Human Rights Watch 2009), and the organization sought to improve its relations with the secular West (Allani 2009, 267). Following their respective bouts with the government, it was the Islamists who learned from the human rights activist — not vice versa (Waltz 1995, 162). That the human rights-based discourse established its superiority over the Islamist counterpart, I argue, contributed to the possibility of a broad-based coalition emerging against the regime by the end of the new century’s first decade.

Egypt

As in Tunisia, concerns about human rights emerged more or less simultaneously among both state and opposition actors in the late 1970s. At that time Sadat accelerated his liberalization agenda “as a response to international pressures stemming from the shift in Egyptian foreign policy to the West and in particular to the United States” (Dalacoura 2007, 121). Both keen to show Carter his respect for liberal values and worried that reports of human rights abuses might jeopardize the new relationship, Sadat sought to control Egypt’s human rights scene. To that end, the government established the country’s first two human
rights organizations, the Partisans Association of Human Rights in Cairo (PAHRC) and the Partisans Association of Human Rights in Alexandria (PAHRA), in 1977 and 1979 respectively. Far from monitoring the regime's human rights performance, the two organizations instead functioned as a "government mouthpiece" charged with the task of defending it when "accused of human rights violations in the international arena" (Kassem 2004, 119).

Sadat had hoped that the embrace of liberal values such as human rights would enshrine his government with international legitimacy, and although this tactic worked at least in part, it also entailed certain side effects. Simply by putting the human rights issue on the domestic agenda the regime stimulated the emergence of an independent human rights movement in the early 1980s (Hicks 2006, 66-7). Still, it was not until 1985 that an autonomous Egyptian human rights organization began to take shape, initially operating as a branch of the Arab Organization of Human Rights (AOHR). The Egyptian Organization of Human Rights (EOHR) broke free of the AOHR in 1987 and applied for legal status. The organization's applications were repeatedly rejected by the government in accordance with Law 32 of 1964 on the grounds that Egypt already had human rights protecting agencies in place and that the EOHR was therefore superfluous (Hicks 2006, 75; Kassem 2004, 119-20). The EOHR's battle for legal status would last for a decade, and although the lack of formal recognition made the early years difficult, it did not prevent the organization from criticizing the state through "hard-hitting reports on torture in prisons, electoral fraud, and violations of basic civil liberties" (Moustafa 2007, 114). In addition to the problems posed by its lack of legal status, the EOHR also struggled financially. Because Egyptians were weary of donating to organization with any sort of anti-government platform, the EOHR's only option was to accept foreign funding. While this helped keep the organization afloat, it also made it susceptible to accusations of being a tool of foreign interests (Moustafa 2007, 116-7), which naturally reduced its credibility within Egypt.

By the early 1990s, over 16,000 non-governmental organizations and associations occupied Egypt's civil society landscape. Out of this number, roughly 200 had "an active political (mostly human rights) agenda" (MacQueen 2008, 84). These groups were closely controlled by the government through the Interior, Justice, and Foreign Affairs ministries, and many topics were off-limits to human rights groups, including Egypt's relationships with the United States and Israel. But besides these externally imposed restrictions, the human rights groups faced a more existential obstacle: human rights issues were not salient for
most Egyptians. To remedy this and increase their own relevance, human rights organizations pursued connection with the Muslim Brotherhood (MacQueen 2008, 84-5). When the regime stepped up its harassment of the Brotherhood in the early 1990s, the relationship between Islamists and human rights activists assumed mutually beneficial characteristics: human rights issues increased in importance as the regime persecuted political dissidents, and those dissident, often Islamists, benefited from third-party protection and advocacy on human rights grounds.

According to Tamir Moustafa, “the 1991-1997 period was marked by a significant increase in the activities of human rights organizations, making them perhaps the most important element of the judicial support network” (Moustafa 2007, 145). This upswing can be explained by the wave of repression unleashed by the regime in its struggle against the Islamist and made human rights concerns highly relevant, but an alternative, or complementary, explanation emphasizes the international context. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc caused international human rights organizations to lobby Western governments “to monitor and punish autocratic regimes” (Rutherford 2008, 19) and thereby promote democracy and liberal values throughout the world. With the threat of communism seemingly averted there was no longer any reason to allow Cold War policies to trump human rights concerns (Rutherford 2008, 18-9). The global community’s attention to human rights benefited Egyptian organizations such as the EOHR as their international standing rose in unison with their foreign funding. Through the successful distribution of its critical reports the EOHR established links with organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, the United Nations, the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Organization for the Freedom of Expression, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Federation for Human Rights, as well as foreign embassies inside Egypt (Moustafa 2007, 146). As a result, the organization became more difficult for Mubarak to control, as he complained that “most of these [international] human rights organizations abroad get their information from a so-called human rights organization here, which is controlled by members of the former [Nasser] regime, and is stacked with people from the Muslim Brotherhood” (Weaver 2000, 166).

Inescapably, it was the link between the human rights movement and the Muslim Brotherhood that put the former on a collision course with the regime.
Until the early 1990s “human rights NGOs were viewed favorably by the regime as they helped buttress its position vis-à-vis the Islamists” (MacQueen 2008, 82), but this arrangement changed dramatically when the human rights groups turned against the regime in response to the indiscriminate repression of all Islamists, regardless of whether they advocated violent or nonviolent opposition to the state (MacQueen 2008, 82). The politicization of human rights in the 1990s caused the human rights movement to fracture as some EOHR leaders disapproved of the organization’s siding with the Brotherhood (Hicks 2006, 77) and as a result “over a dozen more Egyptian human rights associations were established in the 1990s, focused on a variety of issue areas” (Moustafa 2007, 146). Table 1 depicts the expanding human rights stage of the 1990s.

Table 1. Major human rights organizations by year of establishment (Moustafa 2007, 147)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Egyptian Organization for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Ibn Khaldun Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Legal Research and Resource Center for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Nadim Center for the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Center for Human Rights Legal Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Center for Women’s Legal Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Group for Democratic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Land Center for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Hisham Mubarak Center for Legal Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Association for Human Rights Legal Aid</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The human rights organizations’ defense of Islamists in court frustrated the regime (MacQueen 2008, 82), but arguably in a more indirect manner than one might assume. Islamists were generally found guilty, especially in the military courts the regime began using in the mid-1990s (Esposito 1999, 56; Moustafa

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2 For details about the human rights organizations’ relationship with the Islamists, see Hassan (2006, 37-48).
2007, 136-7; Roussillon 1998, 388-9; Rutherford 2008, 87), and there was relatively little human rights activists could do to prevent this. However, what the human rights organizations did accomplish was to raise awareness of Egypt’s human rights situation, domestically and internationally, by combining their advocacy with scathing criticisms of the government published abroad (Dalacoura 2003, 52; Moustafa 2007, 146). Even after Egypt signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 and thereby initiated its accession to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), human rights violations continued to take place. However, the European Union’s attention was now, at least in theory, fixed on the human rights performance of trade partners like Egypt. As a consequence, it became increasingly easy for the human rights movement to “leverage international pressure on the Egyptian government” (Moustafa 2007, 7). In response, the government, which could not utilize the repressive measures it had directed at the Islamists without appearing hypocritical to the rest of the world, sought alternative avenues to controlling the human rights groups. Thus, the regime “began to turn the screws on the human rights movement as early as 1995 through intimidation, smear campaigns in the state press, and discouraging donors from contributing to local human rights NGOs. Beginning in 1998, the regime engaged in a full-fledged campaign to undermine the human rights movement” (Moustafa 2007, 182-3).

Restrained by concerns over its international image, the regime opted to combat the human rights movement through legislation. In 1999 the government proposed Law 153, which was designed to curb the human rights movement by, among other things, making it illegal for NGOs to receive funding from international sources or even communicating with foreign organization without informing the regime of its intentions to do so (Kassem 2004, 120; Moustafa 2007, 184-5). Egypt’s civil society organizations reacted with outrage. Since they were hard pressed to raise funds within Egypt, a ban on international funding would make most groups’ survival highly uncertain. In response to the government’s proposal, eight advocacy NGOs issued what became known as the “Geneva Statement.” In it they argued that since human rights groups faced harassment in Egypt they considered moving their activities abroad and demanded a meeting with President Mubarak. Furthermore, and indicative of the internationalizing strategies that would from now on characterize Egyptian opposition, the signatories demanded a second meeting with Mary Robinson, UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, who was scheduled to visit Egypt the following month (Langohr 2005, 211). Their
courageous act of dissent caused international human rights group to condemn the proposed law and even prompted a harsh reaction from Washington. State Department spokesman James Rubin declared that the law represented “the wrong direction to go if Egypt wants to energize civil society and promote development,” and US embassy staff in Cairo “raised concerns in several meetings with high-ranking figures in the Egyptian government” (Moustafa 2007, 185). Mobilization against the law, which was ultimately thrown out (Apiku 2000), had inspired Egyptian activists and hinted at where the regime’s vulnerabilities may lay.

At the turn of the century the regime continued its efforts to silence Egypt’s human rights movement. In February 2000, the Secretary General of the EOHR, Hafiz Abu Sa’ada, was charged with receiving funding from abroad on the basis of the 1992 decree still in effect. The charges were however dropped six weeks later in the face of international outrage and condemnation (Kienle 2000, 97). International pressure on the regime increased in the wake of the 9/11 bombings as President Bush decided that democracy promotion in the Middle East would from now on be central to his administration’s counter-terrorism strategy. For the human rights organizations, Bush’s Freedom Agenda constituted an important political opportunity, as “the idea of democracy promotion now fueled the discourse and demands of the Egyptian opposition” (Albrecht 2007, 63).” As Table 2 shows, in the four years following 9/11 Egypt witnessed another expansion of rights-emphasizing NGOs.

Table 2. New rights organizations by year of establishment (Moustafa 2007, 207)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Egyptian Center for Children’s Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>South Center for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Egyptian Association for Supporting Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Habi Center for Environmental Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>al-Marsad al-Madani for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Egyptian Association for Developing Legal Awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Arab Penal Reform Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>South Center for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Egyptian Center for Housing Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Egyptian Association to Support Democratic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ma’at Center for Juridical and Constitutional Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concerned with this development the government once again sought to coopt the human rights discourse by creating the National Council on Human Rights (NCHR) in 2003, but this move also “had the effect, perhaps unintended, of legitimizing political activism by civil society groups” (Dunne and Hamzawy 2008, 30). Although Mubarak’s renewed commitment to human rights was far from sincere, his rhetorical posturing

did have a critically important effect on Egyptian politics. With Washington watching and Mubarak posturing as a reformer, activists who had previously worked at the margins, or who had been subject to repression, were relatively freer to pursue their agendas in new and innovative ways. Although wary of the U.S. role, seemingly overnight, political activists were organizing summits and writing reform manifestos, and those with invitations to conferences at glitzy hotels in places like Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai sharply questioned Egyptian government ministers who were on the program. Journalists and columnists, in particular, took the opportunity to unleash a torrent of criticism on Egypt’s first family. (Cook 2012, 264)

The most troubling result of the regime’s liberalization discourse, as far as the government was concerned, was the emergence of civil society organizations that went a step further than simply advocating for human rights by taking their complaints to the streets. Kifaya was perhaps the most important of these groups, but there were also others. As one commentator notes, in just one year (2004-05) more than 14 “pro-reform movements,” that beside Kifaya include Journalists for Change, the National Rally for Democratic Transformation, Intellectuals for Change, Doctors for Change, Youth for Change, Writers for Change, the Association of Egyptian Mothers, and the Movement of White Ribbons, saw the light of day (Arafat 2009, 157-8). For these groups, “‘change’ seems to be the buzzword or the common denominator,” in other words, a framework fully compatible with Washington’s call for political progress (Shahin 2005, 2). Undoubtedly, “in all this, we can see the synergy between US pressure and the debate for reform that it helped initiate at the domestic level” (Dalacoura 2005, 969).

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3 Shehata (2010, 39) makes a similar point as she explains that the NCHR’s creation came to “signify that, at least on the formal and discursive levels, the regime felt obliged to pay lip service to the human rights agenda, which had been previously dismissed as a foreign import.”
The Muslim Brotherhood and Human Rights

Ever since the mid-1990s the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) had sought to distance itself from the radical Islamists by emphasizing its commitment to nonviolent means of struggle. At that point in time, the MB began to embrace human rights norms for one simple reason: their own members were tortured and subjected to trials that fell significantly short of international standards and the raising of the human rights banner near-guaranteed international attention (Rutherford 2008, 96). The human rights organizations limited success had shown the Brotherhood the utility of the human rights frame, and in time, “democracy and human rights, issues that were initially of only instrumental importance metamorphosed into matters of principle” (Wickham 2004, 219) as it became clear that a principled stand had benefits that reached far beyond the borders of Egypt. Accordingly, the Brotherhood’s approach to politics began to transform. While its conservative outlook on social issues remained intact, its attitudes on topics such as democracy and political pluralism became increasingly moderate. The Brothers also called for free and fair elections and emphasized the importance of respecting “the fundamental principles of democracy as defined by international law” (Dalacoura 2011, 1235). Experts on the Brotherhood have debated the authenticity of the organization’s commitment to democratic values (Bowker 2010, 182; Rutherford 2006, 728; Shahin 2005, 4; 2010, 112), but there is no question that the MB’s loud and public commitment to such ideas benefited it greatly. Rather fortuitously for the MB, the group’s normative transformation coincided with President Bush’s Freedom Agenda launch, and all of the sudden the moderate Islamist opposition’s rhetoric appeared to resonate with that of the West. As Holger Albrecht notes,


notwithstanding a few isolated Islam-is-the-solution calls, the moderate Islamist current — and its single most important organization [the Muslim Brotherhood] — seems to have smoothly adapted to the current reform debate, which is centered around more civil rights and freedoms, the abolition of emergency law and human rights abuses, and free elections. (Albrecht 2007, 69)

Recognizing the advantage of aligning itself with other civil society organization, in particular those agitating on the basis of human rights, the Brotherhood intensified its “charm offensive” (Osman 2010, 101) by calling for a “dramatic expansion of civil society” (Rutherford 2008, 173), while simultaneously going “to great lengths to convince both the regime and the public that it is not
currently planning a revolution or overthrow of the existing order” (Blaydes 2011, 152). “In response to the debate initiated by US policies and suggestions, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood unveiled its own reform initiative in March 2004, which demanded democratic freedoms and the suspension of emergency law” (Dalacoura 2005, 967). In a series of interviews granted in connection to the launching of its reform program, MB leaders identified its objectives as promoting “the advancement of the Egyptian people through peaceful political participation and continued stability” (Blaydes 2011, 152), and the imposition of “a republican system of government that is democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary and that conforms with Islamic principles” (Rutherford 2008, 77).

The Brotherhood’s new rhetoric served it well in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Due to the current political climate, dominated by American pressure on Mubarak to permit greater electoral competition (Cook 2012, 189-90), the MB ran an effective pro-democracy campaign with a “particular emphasis on adopting laws that strengthen the protection of civil and political right” (Rutherford 2006, 722). When all was said and done, and despite government attempts to repress its most potent opponent, the Brotherhood’s candidates had secured 88 seats, or 20 percent of the votes (Blaydes 2011, 15; Moustafa 2007, 215). For Mona el-Ghobashy, the 2005 success represents the moment the MB “morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated, savvy professionals” (el-Ghobashy 2005, 374). With the benefits of running a Western-compatible campaign confirmed, the Brotherhood sought to exploit the momentum by establishing its moderate credential to the wider international public.

The group launched an English-language website that linked to the online sites of many Western newspapers. In 2006, some of the group’s leaders launched the “Re-introducing the Brotherhood to the West Initiative, listing and addressing many Western misconceptions about the Brotherhood.” The group’s deputy general guide wrote an article for the London Guardian tinder the title “No need to be afraid of us;” two senior members even composed an op-ed in the American Jewish newspaper the Forward. (Osman 2010, 101)

Furthermore, from now on the MB preferred to work in tandem with non-Islamist civil society organizations, especially when it came to public protest activities. By not leading demonstrations the Brotherhood made it more difficult for the regime to use the specter of Islamism to justify repression. The fact that human rights organizations enjoyed significant international support while the
Brotherhood possessed the capacity to mobilize Egyptians made it possible for the two groups to find common — and mutually beneficial — ground. For the regime, this combination would eventually spell disaster.

Conclusion

This paper has documented the rise of the human rights-based opposition movements in Tunisia and Egypt while arguing that the source of the movements’ relative power is to be found less in the characteristics of the movements themselves than in the national and international contexts in which they operated. The fact that human rights had been embraced by the countries’ authoritarian leaderships meant that liberal values eventually assumed an air of untouchability, especially when activists managed to frame their opposition to the state within an increasingly international context. Ben Ali and Mubarak simply could not use the violent tactics employed against Islamists in their efforts to control the human rights-based opposition, which allowed would-be oppositionists to correctly conclude that the regimes’ liberal rhetoric constituted a promising angle from which to attack them. Consequently, over the course of several decades the opposition underwent dramatic transformations as it shifted away from labor and Islamist foundations toward an increasing emphasis on matters of rights and freedoms. Hence, when street activists in late 2010 and early 2011 challenged their regimes before television cameras ready to relay their images to the entire globe, the dictators vacillated. Hesitant to repress unarmed protesters as the world watched, Ben Ali and Mubarak were soon overthrown by masses demanding the very same rights and opportunities the regimes had vowed to protect and provide.

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"The Arab spring" in Tunisia is an historical event or a fracture: the "fatherless" civil disobedience was a "coup de grace" for the all monopolizing and despotic patriarch. The event strikingly bore the undertones of the format advanced by Freud in *Totem and Taboo* in which the sons put to death the totemic father thus breaking the vertical and violent relationship and establishing a horizontal relationship between the sons/brothers. In this context, the revolution may be read as a moment of the birth of the *polis*, and of the individual as a subject participating in political praxis. In spite of the essentially social demand, the revolution was also a demand for the exercise of effective civil and political rights. But the advent of the egalitarian liaisons was also accompanied by a strange encounter with an otherness, long suppressed. The Muslim "brothers" (back from exile or out of prisons) who won the majority in the first free elections, questioned the fundamentals of the postcolonial constitutional democracy, the concepts of civil and human rights, as well as the modern Nation State, proposing instead a return to a pre-modern but also largely glocalized exilic conception of Islamic *Shariaa* and a transnational *Khilafa*. The problematic that I shall be examining in this paper, is the emergence of post revolutionary, postmodern plural individualities, and the re-emergence of an ancient theological
political fierce debate that now opposes citizens and believers, amongst whom no dialogue seems to be possible. Obviously, the contention is the power paradigm, but the question is what sort of performative conceptions may transcend the manichean allegories of secular vs religious, believers vs non believers, modernists vs non modernists, etc…, and how to create a post religious and a post secular position of hospitality towards the other (in the Derridean sense) and create a neutral space of translatability, i.e. mutual understanding whereby the believer will be understood and hosted by and in the idiom of secularists, and the secular hosted and seized in the idiom of the religious subject. Such status existed in the history of Islamic States, dhimmi, a non Moslem living under state protection, What if we all became outsiders, dhimmis in the private sphere, citizens in the public sphere. What if we re-learned a culture of the world of the OTHER/YOU of brotherly co-subjectivities and co-existence as mere hosts in the local and the global village; and un-learnt our cultural habits of hostility.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the most notable event was the strange encounter with the otherness of the self, long suppressed and clandestine. Political praxis and participation were shrunk as all was planned by the State and by its deep or patent executive powers. Tunisia got its independence in 1956, and for more than half a century, it has been ruled successively by the father of the Nation, Habib Bourguiba until 1987; and thereon, after a medical coup, by big brother Zinelabidine Ben Ali. In both cases the model of governance was patterned on some pre-modern patriarchal configuration that found some responsiveness among the people. The October 2011 elections will also bring to power another kind of brothers, the Muslim brothers. Schematically, we note a swing in the relationship to power from verticality towards a more horizontal pattern. This is central in my view to any sound understanding of the substantial and most significant changes brought by the revolution. The relational changes will of course bring their excesses on a daily basis; a fracture has been operated, and the people are no longer located in hierarchies as the latter are associated in the minds of people with repression, violence and injustices of all sorts. During the days of the revolution after the collapse of the former regime and its apparatuses that also brought their loads of fear and insecurity, the people experienced an incredible sense of solidarity and proximity and of civil empowerment. Social statuses relating to class, gender, or age were effaced: There was a strong sense of being out of place, in a vague somewhere laden with immense possibilities of being and infinite spaces of becoming.
The revolution was also an essentially ethical revolution against corruption and loot by the former President and his in laws. In the popular imaginary, the religious was precisely associated with the ethical. Seeking horizontality, the people believed in the brothers, not as big brothers and not as fathers. The Muslim brothers were presented as good and god fearing people. In time of doubt and defeat, there is always some kind of a return to the ancestor. Note also, that in spite of a somewhat spurious modernisation, the pre-modern has gone on, like a lifebuoy and a soothing order to the precarious social situation. In addition to local facts, global events contributed to a resurgence of religious sentiment and to its perception as a resistive ferment to domination. One such event is 9/11, which spurred public interest in the secular/religious debate. Thereafter, the debate about secularization theory and its recent critiques travelled the world, to gradually become increasingly relevant to contemporary concerns. The global debates and contentions in turn were glocalized in Tunisian towns, villages and minds.

Yet, looking at the slogans and later at the clearly defined objectives of the revolution in Tunisia: jobs, freedom and national dignity, we do not note any identitarian or metaphysical demand. By demanding jobs freedom and national dignity, people were seeking more justice, individual liberties and national sovereignty. These are essentially leftist slogans, and the left in conjunction with the national Unions of workers led the revolution that was spurred initially in 2008 by the mining basin events in Metlaoui, a small town in the south. Similarly, there was a total absence of the Muslim brothers, who in spite of massive political repression and the existence of dormant structures in some parts of the country, were totally invisible in the days of the revolution.

At a more abstract level, the people demanded a representative participative democracy and a regional or decentralised co-governance (the coastline detained 80% of the riches, and the inland hardly survived behind the black belt of oblivion), a more just distribution of income and opportunities, that individuals cease to be subjects/objects, that their relation among themselves and with the State be based on citizenship and not on a submissive obedience. The other facet of the birth of a free individual is precisely diversity.

Thus, among the excesses of the post revolutionary moment, and in addition to the birth of myriads of free individualities there was a proliferation of parties, whose number reached 150 parties, to the confusion of the people, as in 50 years, successive generations knew a single political format, the repressive uniformity of one party, one nation, and one time. After the “first free elections” in the
country, the Islamist party, the historical opponent of the all ruling RCD, which ran its campaign as a civic party, madani, patterned on the Turkish Akape, got the majority. Its members came back from exile and out of prisons, and being unprepared for governance, entered into an “unnatural” coalition with two other republican and secular parties, Attakattul and CPR now deserted by their members, including their founding members. On the other side, many other opposition parties gradually negotiated an electoral alliance to oppose the perils of the “undemocratic forces of reaction,” now led by Nida Tunis, a liberal party, with PDP, to the centre and Al Massar to the left, joined after the political assassination of Chokri Belaid, the prominent hard core leftist spokesman on February 6, by the hard left coalition the Popular Front.

Another major apposition and not oppositional force was brought to being, the civil society, which repeatedly stood up to moderate particratic effusions and excesses and also sounded its voice and made its statements. Thus in “apposition” the civil Society Forum and Attandhid movement made the following proposals: co-governance and alternate governance, a government based on competencies and not on allegiance, a social economic program that responds to the objectives of the revolution which have gradually been confiscated and obscured by identitarian debates that were never sounded during the revolution; a real inter party democracy placed above parties who now have erected themselves to the position of tutors and not of voices of the people’s expectations, parties that confiscate the state and its institutions from the citizens thereby reducing them to mere instruments of the “legitimacy of the polls” leading to monopoly of governance; and finally a government that does not “govern” but rather “serves” and protects the citizens and their rights to social, economic, cultural, and political dignity.

This nascent pluralism, in spite of its rifts and excesses, came as an expression of a public and private freedom that exploded the uniformity of an autocratic single party dictatorship. Paradoxically, all parties got entangled into the same old particratic practices placing the interest of their parties above the objectives of the revolution precisely in the name of the revolution and its objectives. The very tempting power voracity of the 50 year single party dictatorship format, of partisan loyalties, the only model we knew and grew up with were retrieved as palimpsestic practices. The result is a strong sense of delusion and mistrust in parties and in political figures of all inclinations. Elections and democracy were the means to come to power, people said. The electoral code itself, conceived to
prevent any partisan high jacking of governance, resulted by way of distortion, into greater power to the majority.

Thus, Ennahdha, the Islamist party with the majority, displayed a double discourse and a double system of governance: Democracy was a tool to gain power. The electoral campaign itself had double rhetorical strategies; one discourse was addressed to the citizens and another to the believers. Gradually, alongside solid republican, institutions and the State, were set parallel religious authorities in mosques pronouncing fatwas that often contradicted our familiar positive laws and institutions. The regular republican police corps was duplicated with a parallel militia, which named itself “the committees of the protection of the revolution.” A deeper partisan State, supplanted the State. This dubious process was named democratic transition, a Newspeak was gradually parasiting our familiar concepts and notions.

Among the effects of such discourses, there was a disturbing defacement of all neighbourhoods, which now bore unfamiliar “taliban” like glocalised undertones. The repeated attacks on the media, on academics, on intellectuals on artists, on the workers’ Unions, the closing down of “places of debauchee”, the burning down of Saints’ mausoleums, the most absurdist revisions of history, the veiling of women and children, and the unlawful 3orfí marriage that ended up in tragedies for some families, Salafi courts settling issues and pronouncing judgments in the stead of regular courts of justice were quite disturbing. These practices are perceived as systematic attempts at dismantling the republican institutions, as some kind of a strange colonisation. The violence culminated in the late assassination after repeated threats, of a major opposition leader, an “unbelieving” citizen; Chokri Belaid, his name featured first on the fearul lists posted on social networks, and more recently by the assassination of the Arab nationalist Nasserist member of the Constituent Assembly in the morrow of the Egyptian second revolution and on the 25th july; his body was riddled by 14 shots in front of his autistic daughter. The list also comprised individuals from the police corps, politicians, intellectuals, artists, and academics, miscreants to be liquidated for the sake of some mythical purity of some imagined community that never was and never will be.

In this so called transitional process, the two subaltern categories have been instrumentalized and set against each other: the dispossessed and women. Social and political insecurity, the innumerable mystifying channels broadcasting alternative infra or supra historical narratives added little to the faith of the poor and the forsaken categories and further plunged them into alienation and
mystification. Poverty marginalization and ignorance are the ferment of extremism. Ghettoised youth fell pray to indoctrination by Salafist in the dispossessed neighbourhoods, carried off by preachers “dou3at” of an obscure knowledge, that defied all logic and for them surpassed all sciences. They then tragically evolved in the closed circle of a hyper reality that further marginalised them from any sense of belonging to the city/polis. Their dispossession and anger has been tragically co-opted for as yet undisclosed agendas.

The next category to be instrumentalized is the female genre. Women and education have been the vehicles of the emancipation of the Tunisian individual. Free women bring forth free sons and daughters and free sons and daughters make free nations. Women have become a major contention placed at the heart of the citizen or believer debate. The global castration of the Arab male has resulted in some kind of a vertical violence whose immediate victims are women. Veiling is indeed a gnomorphic gesture. In the imaginary, the sanctity of the woman and the nation are one, the veil has become a shield that protects the lost honour of the Arab male, and sanctifies his imagined community. Naturally, the instrumentalisation of women is life enduring, among secular and religious brothers, and Positive laws and religious precepts protecting the rights women have not succeeded in effacing the residues of patriarchal mental configurations.

The banalisation of violence by the party in power, the conspiracy theory of wahabi salafi money being used to destroy the Tunisian assets and culture is not enough to explain the responsiveness of many Tunisians to such discourses. This problematic has to be understood, explored and solved not by repression, exclusion and violence, but by exploring routes to a deeper understanding and translatability of the experience of the other. As Hannah Arendt’s pointed out in her analyses on the rise of Nazism, it was not Hitler only who brought Nazism, ordinary people also bore the seeds of responsive exclusion. Perhaps we must explore the roots of such responsiveness to othering and to exclusion. Exclusion and violence, physical and moral, also breeds violence.

Schematically, the newly born post-revolutionary individual to freedom and diversity is the product of post-clonoliality or neo-coloniality; of postmodernity or post-humanity, and of globalization and glocalization. Any exploration of the new citizen or believer will have to take into account such historical and geostrategic facts, and the concomitant nature of the dual spiritual and earthly hungry demands of the believer and of the citizen. The newly born embryo of the citizen or believer is seeking for a place and a time, a present and a future that have long been invested and confiscated.
Today, struggling in the midst abstract particratic local debates and other high flown global facts and fallacies, the dwarfed individual has ceased to believe in Human rights and liberal democracy perorations incessantly shattered by the chaotic double standards and inconsistencies of vertical hegemony and interference. Perhaps not until the world at large has come to terms with the less violent horizontality in global relationships and re_ invented a global post of hospitality towards the other, shall we succeed in creating a neutral space of translatability in which we all become mere outsiders, *dhimmis* and hosts in a more horizontal global *polis*.
CHAPTER 4
Citizenship in Iraq: Prospects for a Cross-Ethnic Polity

RENAD MANSOUR

Introduction
Under the so-called Arab Spring, the masses discovered their voices and attempted to radically change the authoritarian political systems that governed their countries for decades. From the successful cases of post-revolution societies, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, to those that did not experience any change, issues of self-definition and self-realization in the context of democratization sprung to the forefront. For Iraq, this process is over a decade old. The US-led regime change not only rid the country of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath party, but also replaced the British-built unitary-state model with a new decentralized political system. The state-building project, which was based on the consociational (tawafuqiyah) and federal model, has been marred by inter and intra-ethnic conflict, foreign imposed Islamic fundamentalism, the absence of a middle class, and bandit lawlessness. Control over oil revenues, under a rentier state with a weak and ambiguous constitution, and subsequently over the army and the bureaucracy, have created the necessary conditions to ensure that those on top cannot be checked. Most recently, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s
consolidation of power over Iraq’s executive, its military and judiciary, its central bank, and its electoral commission, among other traditionally independent institutions necessary for a vibrant civil society, has threatened the democratization project.

To resist the rise of despotic power, in the Spring of 2012, a surprisingly cross-ethnic and cross-communal populist coalition pinned together three powerful actors: Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shi‘i al-Ahrar bloc, Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Ayad Alawi’s Sunni-dominated and secular al-Iraqiya. This was important for two reasons. First, it rejected the countless commentaries highlighting sectarianism in Iraq and the weakness of Iraqi nationalism. In this case, inter- and intra-ethnic and communal cooperation were instrumental in preventing over-centralization of power and total hegemony. Second, it demonstrated that Iraqis could express their voice via their elected officials.

This chapter focuses on the importance of voting and protesting for developing citizenship and democracy in Iraq. The argument I make is that Iraqi citizens have continued to exhibit their willingness to participate in their country’s political process, by turning out to vote during elections, supporting political leaders that oppose the Prime Minister’s monopoly over power, and turning to the streets to protest. Since regime change in Baghdad, they have gone to the polls five times in provincial and national elections (January 2005, December 2005, January 2009, March 2010, and April 2013). It will be observed that the root for genuine citizenship is hinged on the abovementioned, albeit shaky, trans-ethnic polity to bind Iraqis under one federal state.

Participating via Elections and Protests

One of the surest gauges of a participatory political culture in academic literature has been elections and voter turnout. For the liberal school of democracy, the core of citizenship is confined to voting representatives in and out of office (Sartori 1987; Riker 1982). Samuel Huntington (1991, 9) posited that “elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non.” Legitimacy derived from elections allows the leadership to make stronger claims to representation. Beyond providing legitimacy, in a post-conflict setting, elections can profoundly impact power-sharing arrangements, state- and institution-building, and citizen expectations (Brinkerhoff 2007, 12). The point of this paper is not to take elections as the single necessary condition for
democratization, but to address the importance of elections for democratization in a post-conflict setting following violent regime change.

The question, then, focuses on why it is that citizens participate in such large numbers. I extend this to include protests, which differ from elections insofar as elections cover a range of issues whereas each protest can reflect a single issue for the protestor. Participation can be contributed to two major determinants: resources and/or incentives (Teorell 2006, 797). The former includes physical resources, human (political knowledge) resources, or social capital (Verba et al 1995; Putnam 2000). All three play a role in influencing the extent of citizen participation. If the citizen can access the polling booth, for instance, is clearly integral to increased numbers of participation. Beyond the resources to vote, however, the public must all want to vote. Thus, incentives form the second explanation to why citizens participate. A moral incentive includes the obligation to vote for the perceived betterment of society. A social incentive includes abiding by voting norms, civic duty, and the influence of friends, relatives, and tribal leaders. Incentives could also be excitement, such as being part of an historic election following regime change, or it could be a test of national identity, in the process of state-building. From a theoretical analysis, citizens will participate, by voting or protesting, because they have the resources and incentives to do so. Asking why leaders chose to engage in elections, Lindberg (2006) asserted that repeated elections not only kick start the liberalization and democratization process, but also provide important incentives for the political elite. This has been true in post-civil war Iraq, and thus far its leaders have been interested in using elections for political (and personal) gains. The final important factor is perceived impact of voting – the irrational belief that one's vote will make a difference and thus is an integral ballot to cast. It has been proven that such rational calculations do not impact voting behaviour by and large.

State-formation and nation-building under America’s vision for a post-war Iraq was based on ethnic relations highlighting the Shi’i, Sunni, and Kurdish communities. Communal blocs were constructed by political actors, and each group competed for access to resources and legitimacy. This formed the main incentive for participation, in elections or in protests. Iraqis voted along ethnic lines as a result of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)’s new political scheme that reduced the influence of tribes and the middle class and brought identity politics vis-à-vis religion to the forefront. More than half of Iraq’s urban population is middle class. The property owners and professional segments of the
population, particularly doctors and engineers, were weakened. Those that did not join the new sectarian identity-based politics were left with very little choice but to leave, and an estimated 2.5 million went into exile over the span of a couple of years (Jabar 2009b, 20). The middle class, including professional organizations, such as labour unions, the chamber of commerce, the industrial league, technocrats, and other associations, were trans-communal by nature—an important anti-sectarian key. Under previous regimes, all grievances, that is, citizens addressing social, political, or economic concerns, were directed towards the albeit dictatorial state, which was the main political and economic actor. In the new Iraq, on the contrary, grievances were directed against opposing communal blocs, as each sectarian leader managed to create an external threat of the other, who was ultimately responsible for the citizen’s despair. The following is a brief analysis of how Iraqi citizens addressed their grievances and what motivated them to participate (or not) during times of a retreating and then overcentralizing state.

An Interim Period (2003-2006)

One of the main motivators (an incentive) of participation in Iraq since 2003 has been inter- and intra-ethnic grievances. Challenging the development of a strong political culture and democratic citizenship, leaders, following 2003, became representatives to communities, rather than representatives to provinces as units. In other words, ethnic nationalism (not civic nationalism) dominated as the main vehicle for political, social, and to a large extent, economic participation. The first shape of post-conflict governance in Iraq came with the CPA-backed appointment of notables to the Governing Council (GC), which consisted of 13 Shi‘is, 5 Sunnis, 5 Kurds, 1 Turkmen, and 1 Assyrian. The significance of including the same amount of Kurds, who were previously isolated, to Sunni Arabs, who were previously the ruling elite, became an initial indicator of both Kurdish empowerment and Sunni disenfranchisement. As a reaction to America’s vision of post-war Iraqi governance, the Muslim Ulema Council issued a statement, emphasizing that “the Governing Council divided the Iraqi people on a sectarian basis and gave a certain sect the absolute majority... The community that was given the majority status does not - with all due respect - represent the absolute majority” (Jabar 2009a).

In the next stage, Iraq returned to native control over its government, with Iyad Alawi’s cabinet between June 2004 and May 2005. At this point, again, a
quota system defined the consociational entity. The incentive to participate in politics was to contribute to the standing of one’s ethnic group. For the Kurds, participation was the key to survival within Iraq and the only guarantor of maintaining the autonomy the KRG had enjoyed since 1991. A similar line was followed by the Shi’i, who knew that their newfound position as the majority could be actualized in real power in Iraqi governance if the constituents participated. Allawi’s government was important because it oversaw two momentous events: the 2005 elections (January and December) and the constitutional process. Both events would shape post-war Iraq.

The 2005 general elections, first held in January, demonstrated the magnitude of ethnic politics in Iraq. The ‘winner’ of this election would be responsible for the writing of Iraq’s impending constitution, and thus, the architect of the highest law in the new Iraq. As predicted, the turnouts in the Shi’i and Kurdish regions was very high, as for both communities, this was the first chance to shape governance in Baghdad. The Sunnis, on the other hand, were disincentivized to participate, primarily based on two reasons. First, the electoral system that was chosen, a closed-list proportional representation model, used one constituency for the entire country and thus left the Sunni minority, still shocked from being stripped of their special status under the previous regime, at a disadvantage even locally (Brinkerhoff 2007, 69). Second, and as a result of grievances with the imposed electoral system, the Sunni community decided to boycott this election because of a general feeling of hopelessness, derived after the immediate socio-economic plunge from being a privileged minority.

Figure 1. 2005 Election Voter Turnout by Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>% Turnout</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad (capital)</td>
<td>49.98</td>
<td>Predominantly Arab, some 7% Christians, 7% Kurds, 1% other categories. The Sunni Shi’i divide could well be on a par (50-50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Arab Provinces</td>
<td>19.62</td>
<td>Average Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>Arab Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>32.20</td>
<td>Ethnic mix (Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen), plus a Shi’i minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninawa (Mosul)</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>Ethnic mix (Arabs and Kurds), Religious mix (Muslims-Christians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din (Tikrit)</td>
<td>27.37</td>
<td>Some pockets of Kurds and Shi’is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>% Turnout</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’i Provinces</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>Average Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>74.62</td>
<td>Pockets of Sunni tribes on the fringes of the province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>66.26</td>
<td>A considerable Sunni-Arab community (12-15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>74.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misan (Amara)</td>
<td>63.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthana (Simawa)</td>
<td>65.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>72.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiya (Diwaniya)</td>
<td>57.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi Qar (Nasiriya)</td>
<td>68.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit (Kut)</td>
<td>68.50</td>
<td>Pockets of Sunni Arabs and Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish Provinces</td>
<td>88.13</td>
<td>Average Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duhok</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>90.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymaniya</td>
<td>82.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamim</td>
<td>74.37</td>
<td>Has not been legally defined. It has a Kurdish, Turkmen and Arab mix, as well as a considerable Turkmen/Shi’i community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Jabar Unpublished Manuscript, 34).

As the table, compiled by the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies, below demonstrates, voter turnout during the 2005 elections, albeit high, varied depending on sect. Most striking is that the participation in Sunni Arab provinces was at 19.62 percent, whereas in Shi’i Arab provinces it was at 67.86 percent and in Kurdish provinces it was at 88.13 percent. The Sunni boycott was a critical misstep that was reflected in their powerlessness with the constitution-drafting process. This lesson was a tough one to learn, as much of post-conflict Iraq is based on a shaky agreement stemming from the results of these elections.

What is also noteworthy about the electoral process was that the ballots consisted of grand electoral blocs. The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which was the single Shi’i bloc containing all major Shi’i parties, included al-Hakim’s Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution, Ja’afari’s Da’wa Party, and Chalabi’s Iraqis National Congress. Out of the 275 seats, then, the UIA won 140 seats.
Second, with 75 seats, was the major Kurdish bloc, the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, or Kurdistan List, which included Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and other smaller Kurdish parties. Third, with 40 seats, was the Sunni-preferred bloc, the Iraq List, which was primarily Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord.

The Iraqi Constitution, which was legitimised by a national referendum in October 2005, was largely written by Kurdish and Shi’i groups. Each side approached the constitutional negotiations with a mandate to benefit their ethnic communities as much as possible. In fact, the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) solidified de facto veto power for the Kurds, in the form of an article that barred the passing of any Iraqi constitution if three provinces did not manage to obtain a two-third majority – effectively allowing the Kurdistan Region to use its three provinces as a veto threat. The Kurds also had an important card, that is, secession. If a minimum list of demands were not met, Kurdish independence would be used as a political tool. Looking at a few constitutional articles reinforces the Kurdish empowerment at the time. Article 121 allows the KRG to retain peshmerga forces, Article 140 offers the right to a national referendum on the status of disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk, Article 112 mandates a fixed oil revenue scheme for the Kurdistan Region, Article 121 allows Kurdish representatives abroad, and Article 115 grants authority to region law when there is a contradiction with national legislation. As the case of the Kurds exemplifies, the constitutional negotiations were largely incentives for each ethnic group to solidify its political power in post-conflict Iraq.

In December 2005, another general election was held, and although there was an increase in Sunni participation, Ibrahim Ja’afari’s UIA won. From this point onwards, a consociational-esque system of governance was set up whereby the President is a Kurd, the Prime Minister is Shi’i, and the Speaker of the Council of Representatives is a Sunni. Inter-and intra-opposition to Ja’afari, however, resulted in a general agreement by all sides for the selection of Nouri al-Maliki, who became Prime Minister of Iraq in 2006. At the time, he was perceived as a weak actor and thus a good compromise versus the outspoken and powerful Ja’afari. Maliki’s leadership would, however, prove to be decisive and pivotal as sectarianism in Iraq took a militarized form.
The Iraqi Civil War (2006-2007)

Following the bombings of the two shrines in February 2006, Iraqi sectarianism, which had thus far defined much of the political process, turned militant. Iraqi Sunni Arabs, who had decided to boycott the electoral process, emerged as the greatest losers in the post-war state-building project and thus turned to other methods to relay their grievances as citizens. They lost all trust in the state, perceived as a Shi’i-Kurd construct, and looked to another force to address concerns. The most prominent group was al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would declare a total war against the Shi’is of Iraq. Foreign fighters flooded into Iraq and found a home in Sunni neighbourhoods, launching a civil war to target Shi’i opponents. This period was the bloodiest in recent Iraqi memory. It would not take long, however, for the Sunni strategy to change, based largely on the effects of having foreign fighters with foreign visions of an Islamic state. Much of the commentary emphasizes General David Petraus’s troop surge coupled with the Sons of Iraq program as the key that resolved the civil war. The Anbar Awakening, which signalled the initial phase of rooting out militarized sectarianism, deserves the credit. It was a grassroots initiative, supported by the US, whereby the Sunnis grew weary of al-Qaeda’s stranglehold on the social, economic, political, and most importantly, moral stranglehold of their society. In terms of the latter, the Sunnis quickly realized that they were never accustomed to either the levels or the styles of Islamism that al-Qaeda was actively installing in Iraq. Life under al-Qaeda’s rule was harsh, and the targeting of symbols of Iraqi nationalism, along with the introduction of suicide bombings, was enough for a reorientation of the strategy by which the Sunnis wanted to address their grievances. The movement began in Ramadi under the leadership of Abu Risha, and as mentioned, was supported financially by the Americans, who were also growing weary of a Shi’i dominated government in Baghdad that had too much Iranian influence. As Sunnis began to oust the foreign-led al-Qaeda leadership, they fought against militarized sectarianism, which ultimately led to the end of the inter-Arab civil war.

The other element to the civil war was the intra-Shi’i dispute. This was a struggle to become the leader of Iraq’s single Shi’i bloc. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army fought battles against Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Badr Brigade, in the southern provinces. Ultimately, the once perceived weak Prime Minister Maliki was able to halt the intra-Shi’i war by crushing Sadr’s army in the Operation Knights’ Charge (Sawlat al-Fursan) of 2008. At the same time, Hakim followed Sistani’s lead by reducing his role in politics, and thus granting Maliki legitimacy over the
entire Shi’i bloc. The civil war period represents a dark chapter in Iraq’s democratization, when citizen participation based on ethnic lines spiraled out of control and resulted in grievances being addressed by extrajudicial means.

A Spell of Good Citizenship (2008-2010)

In a change of trajectory, the next two elections in Iraq (provincial in 2009 and national in 2010) weakened the sectarian-based voting hypothesis that this chapter has stressed. This new phase of good citizenship in Iraq’s post-conflict transition saw all groups come together in an effort to use elections as the vehicle for addressing economic, social, and political grievances. The Sunnis had rejected the role of foreign fighters and had realized that the best way to bring about political change, as an incentive, was by participating in the system. The Shi’i had also seen their newfound power slipping away due to intra-rivalries and had regrouped. By the end of 2009, Maliki emerged as a strong and decisive statesman, and his ‘Law and Order’ Campaign was successful in flushing out the civil war, particularly the Sadr and Hakim conflict. He gained further legitimacy by demonstrating leadership in openly challenging the Kurds in Khanaqin in 2008, and to a lesser scale, the growing influence of Iran. The Kurds had realized that the impediments to independence meant that they needed to act within the structure of the Iraqi state to address their grievances, with particular emphasis to Article 140 of the Constitution. So by the end of 2008, Iraqi citizens were well on their way to developing a democratic political culture and the country was on a democratic shift.

During this time, the number of Iraqi casualties and violence dropped dramatically. The Brookings Institute sites the following casualty numbers: 7,300 in 2003, 16,800 in 2004, 20,200 in 2005, 34,500 in 2006, 23,600 in 2007, 6,400 in 2008, 3,000 in 2009, and 2,500 in 2010 (O’Hanlon and Livingston 2012, 3). Citizens began to grow confident in their government, and as exemplified by the 2009 provincial elections and the 2010 general elections, they were incentivized to vote. In fact, voter turnout for the latter was approximately 62 percent, a figure quite high even for well-established political cultures.
Figure 3. 2010 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Iraqiya</td>
<td>24.72</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Law Coalition</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Alliance</td>
<td>18.16</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance</td>
<td>14.59</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Movement (Goran)</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Unity Alliance</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Tawafuq</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Islamic Union</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Group of Kurdistan</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (turnout)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Jabar et al. 2012, 8)

The 2010 national elections represented a major event in the post-conflict state-building process. First, as the table above demonstrates, the secular al-Iraqiya list, led by Ayad Alawi, won with 91 seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. This list included Salih al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front, Tariq al-Hashimi’s Renewal List, and Rafa’a al-Issawi’s National Future Gathering. The Sunni population, which had given up arms and decided to use the ballot as its weapon, had achieved a massive success. The State of Law Coalition (Dawlat al-Qanun), which was dominated by Maliki’s ambition to become the sole Shi’i leader, came second. The other Shi’i bloc, the National Iraqi Alliance (al-itilaf al-watani al-Iraqi), which included Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Jaafari’s National Reform Trend, Yaqoobi’s Islamic Virtue Party, and the Sadrists, finished third. The Kurdistan Alliance, headed by Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK, finished fourth. The significance of this election, first, was a realization among the Sunnis that the newfound Shi’i majoritarian state did not mean that they were to be silenced due to ethnic or sectarian motives. Second, rather than the closed-list system that had riddled the Sunnis in 2005, the electoral system was changed to an open-list, meaning that the list of candidates within each bloc was published on the ballots. Third, this was the first elections to feature the two big Shi’i blocs running separately. Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and the Iraqi National Alliance contested for votes within the same electorate and thus campaigned on security, political, and social issues, rather
than on sectarian motives. Within the Kurdish electoral as well, the emergence of the Change (Gorran) Movement sought to gain votes away from the traditional Kurdistan List by re-shifting the focus to socio-economic grievances. Fourth, by dint of a fatwa issue by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the marja’iyya (Iraqi Shi’i religious leaders) steered clear of politics to allow the Shi’i the choice to vote, or in other words, broaden the incentives. In fact, images of Sistani were prohibited at this point.

While al-Iraqiya’s Sunni-Shi’i victory represented a crucial step away from the sectarianism that had riddled the country in the previous phase, voting patterns were not completely rid of sectarian motives. The big difference was while in 2005 the main motivations were still linked to ensuring one’s ethnic community had enough votes to pursue their separate mandates, be it ensuring majoritarian governance for the Shi’is, increasing decentralization for the Kurds, or rolling back de-Ba’athification policies for the Sunnis, in 2010, a new socio-economic emphasis also guided voting behaviour.

Moreover, although Alawi’s al-Iraqiya defeated Maliki’s State of Law Coalition’s, the latter managed to form a cabinet and resumed the premiership whilst nullifying any influence from the former. He proved his brinkmanship again by re-grouping with the Shi’i Iraqi National Alliance and Sadr, persuaded by Tehran, and the Kurdistan List. As a result, and although al-Iraqiya had won, Maliki regained the premiership. This ended the democratically-healthy idea of elected regime change in Iraq. More importantly, it signaled that although the Sunnis had become part of the process and had been successful, Iraqi politics was not as transparent or accountable as the post-2008 democratic governance era led them to believe. The next stage in post-conflict governance, then, would be one marked by the PM’s overcentralization of the polity.

Maliki’s Over-Centralization of Power (2010-2013)

The 2010 elections signaled Maliki’s ascent as the sole leader of the Shi’i camp. Sistani, who was once the leading Shi’i representative, removed himself from politics, attempting to also remove the sectarian incentive that had been influencing Iraqi citizens since 2005. Sadr was still in exile after being driven out by Maliki’s forces, and both Hakim and Ja’fari had waning influences based on the SOL’s relative supremacy during the electoral process.

After solidifying his position of hegemonic power over the Iraqi Shi’is, an over-confident Maliki looked to target opposition elsewhere. As part of the
agreement that continued his premiership following the 2010 elections, Alawi was promised the chairmanship of a National Security Council. This was meant to be an executive-level position with veto power. To date, however, the post has yet to be created, and is all but forgotten about. Moreover, Maliki managed to secure both the Defense and Interior Ministries, by not offering them to any party during the negotiation phase following the elections. As a result, the million-man Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is directly under his control. The best examples of personal political targeting occurred in December 2011 with an arrest warrant issued against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who is a Sunni leader with al-Iraqiya. Hashimi is now in exile in Turkey. Then, a year later, Maliki went after another Sunni leader, Rafi al-Issawi, by apprehending his body guards and security detail. This is not necessarily a sectarian issue. The PM is targeting political rivals, although he claims that it’s not political. He uses an external threat, i.e. the Sunnis and their past injustices to the Shi‘i, to cement his legitimacy. Adding to the deterioration of trust in state institutions, Human Rights Watch released a report condemning the criminal justice system, characterized by the punishment of Maliki’s opponents and the neglect of trial rights (Human Rights Watch 2013).

Beyond the political alienation strategy, the Iraqi premier has consolidated his rule over state institutions. Independent institutions, which were created from as early as the CPA-era, were meant to monitor the executive branch by enacting various checks and balances. According to the constitution, they fell under parliamentary jurisdiction. Beginning in January 2011, however, a Constitutional Court ruled that the purview of these institutions, specifically the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the Integrity Commission, and the Human Rights Commission, among others, was now under the Council of Ministers; in other words, to Maliki’s executive (Jabar et al 2012). When the head of the IHEC, Faraj al-Haidari, was deemed to be too antagonizing, he was arrested, on 12 April 2012. This commission is important in ensuring that provinces have a means to addressing grievances by, for example, opting for greater (KRG-esque) autonomy. On several occasions, when the provincial councils of Basra and Wasit sent requests for referendums, they were ignored by the Maliki-dominated commission. Similarly, when Diyala sent a request in December 2011, the PM replied by deploying ISF troops and establishing martial law in the province. Hence, during this period of post-conflict Iraq, the Prime Minister’s consolidation of power has led to the flouting of citizen concerns. In the same light, Iraq’s Central Bank Governor, Sinan al-Shabibi, was
forced from his post while on a trip to Japan in October 2012, allowing Maliki to appoint another ally in his place. The Integrity Commission was also troubling, as it contained some sensitive 70,000 files concerning the Prime Minister and his protégés (Jabar et al 2012, 14). As a result, the chairman of the commission, Rahim al-Ugaili, resigned, citing issues with interference from the executive. During this phase of overcentralization, the number of casualties, which decreased after the civil war, rose again: 4,136 in 2011 and 4,557 in 2012 (O'Hanlon and Livingston 2012, 3).

Another area traditionally necessary for a vibrant civil society is the media. Much like the aforementioned consolidation of institutions, however, Maliki gained considerable influence over the media outlets. The state-run Iraqi Media Network (IMN) has become the target of party interests. In fact, most channels and mediums fall prey to party interests. Adding to the danger was the lack of legislation banning the broadcasting of hate speeches, which became common on television programs and on internet websites. Reporting and coverage is based on biases of the network or the financing organization. Iraq was ranked 150/175 in the 2012 World Press Freedom Index (Reporters without Borders 2013, 23). This exposes a critical problem with Iraqi citizenship. Theoretically, the populace is meant to be well-informed, and while for a large part of the country the information is there, bias in the media has hindered an informed citizenry.

During Maliki’s overcentralization period, the political space for citizens to voice their opinions shrank. Reacting to this, massive protests, particularly following the arrest of Issawi’s workers in December 2012, erupted in several Sunni provinces such as Anbar and Diyala, and even in Shi’i provinces (led by Sadr). Earlier in 2012, Sadr, who is still divided from Maliki, allied himself with Alawi and Barzani to address the protestors’ concerns with Maliki’s alleged track towards dictatorship. A ‘no-confidence vote’ campaign emerged and proved very strong, coming close to ousting the Prime Minister. However, after consultation with Iran, Iraqi President Talabani decided that the motion was not fit to stand. This alliance, between Shi’i, Sunni, and Kurd dominated groups, each with their own incentives to get rid of Maliki, could be the very workings of a trans-communal Iraqi polity, where politics move beyond ethnic lines and towards addressing citizen grievances.
Taking Back the State (2013-present)

Provincial elections of April and July 2013 were set up to be the ultimate test for the several assumptions on Maliki’s over-centralization of power. The PM’s hope was for these elections to pave the way for his further consolidation of power in the 2014 general elections. On the contrary, and although his State of Law won, its victory was not as dominant as had been hoped for in the Shi’i strongholds of the southern provinces. Iraqi voters again transcended the sectarian-based incentives that the incumbent was offering by not granting him the majority that he wished for. As a result, Sadr and Hakim were granted enough of a mandate to shut Maliki out in the south. Thus, the latter’s vision of becoming the single Shi’i leader in Iraq has quite blatantly been rejected by the electorate. In July of 2013, voters from the Sunni provinces Anbar and Ninawa went to the polls after an electoral season marred by sectarian attacks. Similarly, the favoured party there, the Mutahhidun bloc led by Usama al-Nujaifi, did not do as well as expected. In Ninawa, for example, Nujaifi lost approximately 300,000 votes from the 2009 provincial elections, as despite the ethnic-based identity politics that dominated the campaigns, the voters decided that some form of dialogue with the Shi’i in Baghdad was needed to address their social and economic woes (Visser 2013). These elections, in summation, presented an alternative to countless pieces on sectarianism in Iraq. Although the sectarian motive cannot be totally eliminated from voter preferences, Iraqi citizens have signalled their intentions via the ballot box and they are not only driven by sectarian incentives, but have the ability and are willing to use polling booths to address social and economic woes, even at times when violence is heading toward civil war levels.

Measuring Citizenship in Iraq

Many have argued that citizenship, which is the vehicle for achieving a vibrant civic society within a democratic political culture, must include a participatory public that is informed (Dahl 1998; Almond and Verba 1989; Marshshall and Bottomore 1992). Although weaker at times, it will be argued that Iraqis do hold a strong sense of citizenship duty, that is, public participation is strong, particularly during election seasons. Thus far, this chapter has illustrated swings in Iraqi participation, by either elections or protests, in the post-war period. The key is in separating citizenship from sub-national identities. For Iraq, these identities (ethnic or religious) lie at the core of the national community and are
the primary determinants for the state-citizen interaction under a consociational model. This is the main obstruction to the emergence of democratic citizenship. Unlike the Lebanese model, consociational roles in Iraq are not enshrined in any codified agreement, and more importantly, are not defined simply along religious lines, but rather along a combination of religion and linguistics.

The theme inherent in this analysis is a sense of civic duty among the Iraqi street. There is no doubt that Iraqis are eager to participate in the political process, as evidenced with high voter turnouts during elections. Chart 4, a survey completed by Asharq Research Center in 2012, revealed that a majority of Iraqis (67.2%) planned to participate in the 2013 elections. In fact, other than three provinces, the ethnically mixed Tamim, the Sunni-dominated Anbar, and the majority-Shi'i Babil, there is a solid majority of Iraqi citizens that have expressed their desire to remain active in the electoral process.

Figure 4: Will You Vote in the Upcoming Elections (2013)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi Qar</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misan</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiya</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthana</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninawa</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamim</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the end, the turnout in April 2013 was closer to 50 percent, similar to the 2009 provincial elections during the good citizenship period. Although this number is lower than the finding from the Asharq survey, in terms of provincial elections, it does indicate a participatory public. The problem is with the political process itself. When politics is defined by identity, then the citizens will participate along those lines. If, however, the system is transformed into a cross-communal entity based on territory, the citizens will participate just as much, but within the new confines. A survey conducted in the University of Babil, for example, asked respondents whether one has a duty to his/her country. As Chart 5 displays, overwhelmingly, 85 percent answered yes. However, with the same set of students, almost half held no desire to enter into political life. Bearing in mind the methodological issues with this survey, namely that the sample population was restricted to Iraqi students in one part of the country, the point to take is that an overwhelming majority of Iraqis share a sense of political activity, but are increasingly wary of the process. This belief in duty is dwindling, as Baghdadi politics continues to disenfranchise the citizenry. The aforementioned protest movement may signal a wave in Iraqi politics where citizens take to the street to voice their grievances. Finally, as Chart 6, based on survey conducted by the Iraqi Institute for Strategic Studies, exemplifies, Iraqis do hold the government accountable for enacting laws based on the democratic will of the people. So, the expectation of good governance is there.

Figure 5: Citizen Duty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you have a duty towards your country?</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Don’t Know</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Asharq Research Company 2012
The most common thesis emerging from the Iraqi failed state question is the saliency of sectarianism. Indeed, as this paper has discussed, the identity politics that became the name of the game in Baghdad led all social, political, and economic activity to necessitate an ethnic or religious driver. The problem of sectarianism in Iraq, therefore, is not that each community seeks independence but rather, that each political community is fighting to control the myths and
symbols of the Iraqi nation-state. This allows Iraqi nationalism to remain high, whereas the sectarian battles remain at the sub-national level.

**Conclusion**

The upcoming national election in 2014 will be a test of several assumptions. The most important is whether Maliki can maintain his premiership based on identity-politics, or whether the voters, dealing with multiple incentives that now include socioeconomic grievances, can reduce his mandate. Can any cross-ethnic alliance akin to the Sadr-Barzani-Alawi partnership emerge as a popularly-elected reaction to overcentralized power? Will the protest movement's voice be heard and affect voters? If the 2013 elections are any indication, then the answer is yes. The PM has built a wide coalition of several major Shi’i parties, but neither the Sadrists nor ISCI are part of the coalition. Another question is whether the recently passed legislation limiting the Prime Minister to two terms can be legitimized. Iraqi tribes, on the other hand, regained their autonomy during the *Sahwa* (Awakening) and pose an additional check against an overcentralizing Baghdad. A trans-ethnic/communal citizenry and a strong middle class can provide the sociological basis for democracy, which is currently impeded by a multitude of factors, among them, oil rentierism and the detachment of social wealth from society at large. Only when the government is able to provide economic opportunities, education, health care, and other necessary services, will Iraqis regain trust in the political system to continue along the post-civil war path and participate regularly as citizens.

Progress has been made. Sistani and the Najaf School of clerics, still have the legitimacy of the Shi’i Street and can influence a large portion of the electorate, if they deem. Sadr and Hakim can present major checks against Maliki’s power, as they did in 2013 in the southern provinces. There also exists an intra-Sunni conflict, beyond the differences between tribesman and those in rural areas. For instance, Salih al-Mutlaq, a Sunni Deputy Prime Minister, was forced out from a demonstration in Ramadi when the Sunni crowd threw stones at him in December 2012. Moreover, as this chapter has argued, the 2013 elections in Anbar and Ninewah proved that al-Nujaifi’s sectarian agenda is not desired by a big portion of Iraqi society, which on the contrary, prefers to address social and economic problems and move away from the identity politics that plagued the post-conflict Iraqi state-building project. Through elections, Iraqi citizens have been able to signal to the elite their preferences. This all begins when the voter is
incentivized enough to risk his or her life and wait in a line to cast one ballot in hope of change and to proudly show off the ink.

References


Early optimism that the Arab spring would lead to democratization of at least some regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has given way in many quarters to pessimism that the uprisings have instead spawned crackdowns on dissidents (Bahrain), renewed dictatorship following a military coup (Egypt), states on the verge of failure (Libya and Yemen), a rise to power of forces with an uncertain commitment to democracy (Tunisia) and even a tragic civil war (Syria).

Much of the recent western literature on democratization in the MENA region has emphasized that the Arab revolts, though drawing inspiration from one another, have very different social bases in different countries, and operate within countries that pose very distinctive challenges in terms of pre-existing social and political divisions and the extant level of social trust without which democratic interactions are extraordinarily difficult. They differ, too, in the nature of the regimes they confronted—all were corrupt, neo-patriarchal and repressive, but in distinctive ways that created diverse challenges for successor governments. Finally, these countries also differ dramatically in terms of the

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1 The views expressed herein are Judy Barsalou's own and not necessarily those of the El-Hibri Foundation.
divisions among opponents of the old regime and the relative organizational strength of various opponents, notably various branches of political Islam and secular forces (Anderson 2011).

The literature, particularly that produced prior to the so-called “Arab spring”, has also focused on a common set of barriers to democratization. Two themes have been particularly important. One is the desire of self-interested elites to remain in power so that they continue to extract economic rents from their control both over state revenue and the broader economy (through both illegal and semi-legal means). A second set of factors often cited as acting as a barrier are religious and cultural beliefs and their influence on individuals’ behavior, notably a hostility of Islam to pluralism and popular participation in government (see for example Kedourie 1994; Lewis 1994), a weak division within the Islamic tradition between religion and politics (Lewis 1996), and the treatment of women and girls in most Muslim-majority countries (Fish 2002). Other authors, however, have disputed that notion that Islam and democracy are incompatible, noting that support for democracy is quite strong in many Arab societies while opinions on the appropriate role for shari’a law are divided (Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005; Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 2012; Braizat 2010; Roy 2012; Baker 2012; Diamond 2010).

Drawing upon examples primarily from post-Mubarak Egypt, this exploratory paper argues that analysis of democratization in MENA should consider a different focus. Instead of prioritizing attention on attitudes and beliefs, we identify specific democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors, and take a more comprehensive approach to understanding the conditions under which those behaviors are more or less likely to occur. While in no way denying the importance of attitudes and beliefs, this paper argues that they are one of several critical constraints on democratization processes that must be examined together.

In this perspective, democratization is like many public policy objectives in that it can be sustained only if a broad array of ordinary citizens and organizations behave in ways that are consistent with the enunciated objectives of the policy, and refrain from behaviors that undermine that objective. In the shorthand that will be used in this paper, widespread behavioral “compliance” with those behavioral models is necessary. Building governments based on popular sovereignty requires widespread civic participation through voting. Creating accountable and effective governments requires public access to information, as well as civic actors willing and able to serve as government
watchdogs. Tolerance of difference in societies based on majority rule requires articulation of legal standards and actual behaviors that permit free speech but protect minority rights. Indeed, for some policies, like bans on hate speech, changing the behavior of some target group of citizens is the whole point of the policy.

The challenges for Arab societies aspiring to make the transition from authoritarianism to stable democracy are daunting. In moving toward democracy, getting rid of old regimes is the (relatively) easy part; regularizing new democracy-enhancing processes and behaviors and having them accepted as normal and expected—and de-normalizing other behaviors that threaten democratic behavior—is the hard part. If most citizens do not vote, elections and newly formed transitional governments will lose their legitimacy. If citizens do not monitor governmental abuse, new governments may feel that they can rule with impunity. If political parties resort to intimidation to win elections, then the results of those elections will be questioned, and other groups will feel that they need to do the same. At best, democratizing societies are likely to be unstable if individuals and organizations repeatedly engage in democracy-threatening behaviors, if those democracy-threatenin behaviors are common and are perceived as “normal” and acceptable, and if behaviors that reinforce democracy are infrequent, or are seen as exceptional or of dubious acceptability.

The analysis in this paper proceeds in three steps. The first section develops a general conceptual framework based in behavioral economics and the analysis of policy regimes. In laying the foundations for the analysis of democratic behaviors in the next section, this section will develop four broad sets of arguments. First, it will develop a comprehensive analytical framework for analyzing factors that reinforce or serve as barriers to specific behaviors, using a common set of categories that can be used to examine a wide variety of behaviors. In this framework, individual behavior and behavioral change are seen as the product of three broad sets of factors: beliefs (including information and cognition, cultural beliefs and peer effects), inducements (including incentive and sanctioning, monitoring and enforcement) and capacity (including resources and autonomy to act free from coercion by others). Because most serious “compliance gaps” at both the individual and aggregate levels result not from a single barrier to a particular behavior but from multiple barriers, failure to think comprehensively about those barriers can lead both to an inadequate understanding of compliance problems and to poor policy design and implementation. Particular attention is
given here to resource and autonomy constraints that make compliance more difficult or costly, even for those who wish to comply.

Second, we will argue that even within individual societies, there are wide variations in the nature of compliance regimes (official rules of the game) and “enforcement regimes” (actual patterns of behavior by front-line government workers) governing specific behaviors. These compliance and enforcement regimes may provide a strong impetus to democracy reinforcing behaviors, weak reinforcement or none at all, or even make it less likely that such behaviors occur (Figure 1). The role of transitional governments in promoting democracy-reinforcing behaviors is of course critical: democratization is unlikely to occur unless governments establish compliance regimes and enforcement regimes that encourage democracy-reinforcing behavior and discourage democracy-threatening behavior. Revolutionary uprisings throughout the region have sought to sweep away governments that routinely broke the law and modeled democracy-threatening peer behaviors, such as flagrant untruthfulness, lack of accountability and illegitimate use of coercive force against regime opponents. Transitional governments quickly lost credibility when they failed to maintain security and undertake meaningful restructuring of what Egyptians call the “deep state”: the durable state institutions, personnel and policies that persist from the previous regime. If they are to become stable democracies, these societies need to focus on behaviors not just of citizens but also of government—that is, on enforcement regimes.

Third, attention is given to heterogeneity within citizenries in the barriers they face to engage in particular behaviors and their ability and willingness to overcome those barriers. Because this broad target population is so heterogeneous, specific policy instruments and the “settings” on those instruments (Hall 1993) that are aimed at modal targets may fail to secure compliant behavior from targets with different characteristics.

Finally, the boundaries of target populations, the compliance and enforcement regimes that are put in place to secure desired behavior, and levels of compliance that are considered acceptable are all socially and politically-determined constructions that reflect social views and the political power of target groups and their political allies (see Schneider and Ingram 1993). Thus these compliance and enforcement regimes may be heavily contested, and may change over time.

2 All figures are at the end of this chapter.
The second section of the paper identifies several key democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors, what is known about factors that facilitate or inhibit their occurrence and strategies to address those barriers. It also argues that while most compliance behaviors in specific policy sectors are self-reinforcing—that is, more of that behavior leads to even more of that behavior being produced—many democracy-enhancing behaviors are not self-reinforcing. However, many democracy-threatening behaviors are in fact self-reinforcing. The final section of the paper identifies specific strategies and “leverage points” that can be used to enhance democracy-building. It argues that civic education, while important, is unlikely to produce substantial increases in democracy-enhancing behavior and declines in democracy-threatening behaviors in the absence of other environmental changes, especially government compliance and enforcement regimes that are firmly committed to producing more democracy-enhancing behaviors and reducing democracy-threatening ones.

Behavioral Change and Compliance: An Analytical Overview

The first contemporary definition of “compliance” offered by the Oxford English Dictionary is “acting in accordance with, or the yielding to a desire, request, condition, direction, etc.” Compliance, in short, is concerned with behavior. The literature on compliance usually limits its purview to situations in which the target is aware of the request or expectation for compliance, even if it is not made explicitly (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). Compliant behavior may, but need not, involve willing agreement to behave in a particular way: grudging—even compelled—compliance is still compliance, though it is likely to incur higher monitoring and enforcement costs (May 2004; Alford 2009). There are substantial and diverse literatures on why individuals and organizations do or do not comply with public policies. These literatures span the fields of political science, economics, law, and psychology (see for example Bergman 2009; Cialdini 2003; Kahan 1997; Tyler 2006; Winter and May 2001; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Etienne 2011).

The nature of compliance and of government’s expectations about acceptable and unacceptable behaviors—what can be called the “compliance regime”—varies considerably across objectives and behaviors. Indeed, there may also be substantial variation across countries in terms of what behavior is expected, from
whom it is expected, and how strongly it is demanded. The behavior that is
relevant to governments’ objectives is in some cases relatively simple—e.g.,
encouraging voting—while in other cases it is much more complex, such as
permitting free expression while promoting tolerance of difference. In some
cases, governments may encourage or require very specific actions—what can be
labeled “positive compliance”—while in other cases, they may discourage or
forbid specific actions—“negative compliance”—without being highly
prescriptive about what behavior is preferred. In some cases (e.g., outlawing the
use of violence by citizens) there is both a legal obligation to comply and clear
and specific boundaries on what is acceptable behavior, while in others (e.g., civil
discourse) there is not. Some compliance demands are infrequent (e.g., voting)
while others (e.g., civil discourse) are ongoing.

A second broad set of characteristics concerns compliance expectations for
target populations. Some behaviors are required of the population as a whole,
while others are targeted at specific groups—and have particular sub-populations
that are particularly likely to be non-compliant. Even within the target
populations of specific policies, some individuals and organizations may be less
responsive to particular incentives than others. Some, like toleration in discourse,
may be hard to monitor. Some may involve less information or present greater
difficulties in obtaining information. Strategies that secure compliance from the
modal member of the target population may not work for all: admonitions to
tolerate free speech rights of others, for example, may have little impact on those
individuals and organizations who have very specific, religiously-based
conceptions of what behaviors are acceptable. An effective analysis of target
compliance should consider impacts of policy incentives, monitoring, resources,
etc., on specific sub-groups of target populations to take account of heterogeneity
with regard to each of the barriers outlined above. So monitoring and penalizing
hate speech by religious leaders may be part of a larger strategy of promoting
tolerance of religious minorities. Calculations about the opportunity costs of
compliance—that is, what the target is giving up by complying—may also vary
substantially from individual to individual.

Policy success obviously depends on aggregate levels of compliance as well as
individual compliance (Figure 2). Aggregate compliance can be thought of as the
sum of all actions (and non-actions) of compliance by individuals and
organizations whose behavior is relevant to a policy objective. Indeed,
policymakers may not care very much about a small number of individual acts of
non-compliance as long as the aggregate rate of compliance remains high. And
even fairly high rates of individual non-compliance that might be acceptable for one behavior (e.g., non-voting) are probably not fatal to a democracy, but even modest levels of political violence or coercion against parties and voters easily can undermine a democracy, especially if it prompts retaliation. At the aggregate as well as the individual level, the boundary between “adequate” levels of compliance and “inadequate” levels of compliance which indicate a “compliance problem” or a “policy failure” are often unclear, and may change over time.

**Compliance and enforcement regimes**

Government efforts to secure compliance vary substantially in how intrusive they are, and the options can be ranked roughly in order of intrusiveness (for similar categorizations, see Schneider and Ingram 1990, and Rist et al 2003). At the low end of intrusiveness, governments can simply provide information to targets about how to comply with policy without actually saying that it is preferred. Governments can also combine information with admonition to undertake or forgo particular actions consistent with their policy objectives, such as voting or reporting abuses of governmental power by low-level officials. Governments can also provide resources to help targets achieve desired behavior: aid to NGOs for civic education, for example, may facilitate democracy-enhancing behaviors. As behavioral economists have stressed, governments can manipulate choice architecture—that is, the range of choices that individuals and organizations can choose from, the nature of defaults, and how available options are framed, for example by excluding from the ballot parties with a history of corruption, hate speech and violence against their opponents. Governments can also use positive and negative incentives to try to obtain compliance with government policies, such as giving free television time to political parties that eschew hate speech. While positive and negative incentives are similar in nature, negative incentives are likely to be perceived as more intrusive by target populations, because they make targets worse off than with no intervention. Finally, at the upper end of the intrusiveness scale, governments may also require or prohibit specific behaviors and punish non-compliant behavior. What Hall (1993) has called the “settings” on specific instruments may also vary greatly, however. Very intense settings on instruments at the low end of the intrusiveness scale may be perceived as more intrusive—and have bigger effects on behavior—than low settings on more intrusive instruments. For example, tiny fines for violating hate speech laws are unlikely to dissuade that behavior as much as long prison terms.
The instrument or instruments that governments use to secure compliance, the settings on those instruments, and the targeting of those instruments can be labeled the official “compliance regime.” The compliance regime includes the official rules regarding incentives and sanctions, allocation of resources, provision of information, etc. How those rules are actually monitored and enforced can be called the “enforcement regime.”

There is wide variety in the nature of compliance regimes and enforcement regimes. Formal rules are more likely to be developed, substantial resources are more likely to be devoted to monitoring and enforcement, and sanctions are more likely to be severe and to be imposed with no exceptions in situations where even very rare acts of non-compliance pose an unacceptable risk to policy objectives: that is, where consistent and universal compliance is demanded. It should be noted, however, that the line between what formal rules state is compliant behavior and what is actually demanded—between the compliance and enforcement regimes—is not always very clear, and may not match the stated rules. In enforcing restrictions on political campaigning outside polling stations on election day, for example, implementers may be more concerned with avoiding gross violation of policy than in enforcing the letter of the law. Legal scholar Mark Edwards (2006) has labeled these legal grey areas “parameters of acceptable deviance.”

It should not be assumed, moreover, that governments’ actual compliance and enforcement regimes are consistent with their stated objectives. As shown on the vertical axis in Figure 1, governments may establish compliance regimes that are strong and consistent with particular objectives, involving strong legal mandates, intrusive policy instruments, and very specific demands for the behavior that they seek. They may also have weak or mixed compliance regimes or even (as shown on the lower part of the figure) compliance regimes that actively discourage the behavior consistent with their stated objectives. Similarly, as shown on the horizontal axis, enforcement regimes—the actual behavior of front-line government workers—may strongly reinforce the compliance regime, enforce it only weakly, or actively undermine it.

**Barriers to compliant behavior**

The social science literature has identified eight broad sets of underlying barriers that lead to a “target compliance gap” between program objectives and actual compliance levels (Weaver forthcoming). These barriers can be divided into three broad categories. First are problems with external perceived incentives to comply,
which can be decomposed into incentive and sanction problems, monitoring problems, and enforcement problems. A second set of issues involves what can be called willingness to comply, specifically information and cognition problems, attitude and beliefs problems, and peer effects. A third set of issues involves the target group’s capacity to respond, including both resource and autonomy problems (see Alford 2009). While these categories necessarily involve some overlap and ambiguity, they do provide a comprehensive set of tools for thinking about barriers to compliant behavior.

**Incentives and Sanctions:** The official set of incentives and sanctions established by government statute and regulation are the basis of the official “compliance regime” (Figure 1). High rates of target compliance are unlikely where the positive incentives and/or negative sanctions are not sufficient or certain enough to ensure compliance. For example, the practice of forging citizen signatures to register a new political party is not likely to stop unless the penalty for non-compliance obviates the possibility of the aspiring party from entering the political arena. However, it is important to have a thorough understanding of how targets themselves view those costs and benefits and to recognize that the elements of this calculus, and the weights given to various elements, may not be immediately obvious to program administrators or easy to change. In Egypt, making the judicial system more efficient and effective may not increase the number of lawsuits brought by Coptic plaintiffs if they fear mob violence, should they win their cases.

**Monitoring:** Even when incentive structures are well designed, the social science literature suggests that monitoring is an important contributor to target compliance. High rates of target compliance are especially hard to achieve, however, where compliance is difficult or costly to monitor, and where the activities involved are illegal or take place in private. Monitoring of payment for electricity and clean water to households is expensive because households are geographically dispersed across millions of sites. Monitoring is especially problematic in the case of households in “informal” slum neighborhoods (ashawiyyat), whose poor citizens have been discriminated against when it comes to the building of public infrastructure, and who tap illegally into water mains and electricity lines.

**Enforcement:** Monitoring and enforcement form the basis for what we have referred to as enforcement regimes (Figure 1). In practice, monitoring and enforcement are usually interlinked. Election monitors must detect violations before fines can be assessed, for example. But it is important to treat monitoring
and enforcement as analytically separate to highlight that detecting non-compliance with monitoring does not automatically lead to enforcement. This is especially true when both monitoring and enforcement functions are performed by frontline workers (e.g., police and intelligence officers) who have effective discretion, have incentives not to enforce uniformly in all situations, and are not themselves effectively monitored on their enforcement. In these situations, frontline workers may choose to enforce based on considerations such as the offering of bribes to "look the other way," lowering their workloads, and avoiding unpleasant or even dangerous confrontations with policy targets (Lipsky 2010).

**Information and Cognition Problems:** Information problems can be an important barrier to compliance. Policy targets may lack information that would make them more likely to comply, either by affecting their capacity to comply, or their willingness to comply—for example, by providing information that it is in their interests to do so. They may also have information that is incorrect, or that they do not know how to interpret and use. It may be unclear to targets what constitutes cooperation or compliance. Information is often costly to acquire, and individuals and organizations who are uncertain about the payoff of compliance may not make that investment. Compliance is likely to be especially problematic when technical knowledge needed to comply is high and the expertise of targets is low. Thus, while civil society watchdog organizations may be intent on making government spending more accountable, they cannot play this role effectively if the government does not produce and share detailed, reliable information about government budgeting and spending, and if the civil society activists lack basic analytic skills in budget analysis and impact evaluation.

In recent years, a growing literature in behavioral economics has highlighted a number of cognitive and decision-making limitations of individuals, including loss aversion, procrastination and inertia, myopia (discounting of future relative to current benefits), impulsiveness, satisficing, anchoring effects, fatalism, and susceptibility to variations in the way that options are framed (see for example Kahneman 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). These limitations may skew decisions away from what a rational individual would choose, including decisions to comply with or deviate from government policies.

**Attitudes and Beliefs:** Attitude and beliefs constitute a very broad set of influences on and differential responses in target compliance. Previous research suggests that "[c]ompliance is brought about through trust, mutual regard and respect" (Braithwaite 1995: 229) between those from whom compliance is
expected and those who are designated to secure compliance. Transitional Arab governments that promised deep reform of authoritarian systems but failed to make meaningful progress suffered serious credibility gaps. As an expression of frustration with a government that has disappointed them, Egyptians participating in the January 2013 demonstrations marking the second anniversary of the 25 January Revolution deliberately started their protests after a nine PM curfew set in three of the most troubled cities.

A first belief-based barrier to compliance is where there is a wide chasm between those who set compliance expectations and deeply-held cultural beliefs of those who are expected to comply. In some Arab societies, for example, gender bias affects school enrollment rates of girls and leads to lower female literacy, making it more difficult for them to exercise effective citizenship rights. Second, belief that the policy itself is not fair or not administered equitably is likely to inhibit voluntary policy compliance (Rothstein 2005; Tyler 2006; Levi and Sacks 2009). Finally, a generalized mistrust of a government among specific segments of the population—if, for example, it is dominated by members of another ethnic, religious or linguistic group—may lead to increased levels of non-compliance.

**Peer Effects:** The analysis to this point has assumed that actions of individual policy targets are independent—that the actions of one target do not affect the behavior of others. But a very broad array of evidence suggests that this is not the case: perceptions that other similarly situated targets are complying generally make program targets more likely to comply, while high rates of non-compliance by peers lead to non-compliance.

Simply knowing non-compliers may signal that non-compliance is unlikely to be detected and punished. But there is also a potential normative effect. Compliance is likely to be higher when non-compliance is seen as socially unacceptable. This can cut both ways, however: an individual (or corporation) in a society where tax avoidance is rife may say: “No one else pays taxes, why should I?” In these situations, there is a conflict between what Robert Cialdini (2003) has called injunctive norms (what people in a community or society generally see as “the right thing to do”) and descriptive norms (what people usually do). Under former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the minimum wage for public sector workers remained unchanged for 26 years, throwing millions into poverty. As many openly failed to perform their assigned duties efficiently, in part because they were forced to work multiple jobs, the work ethic was subtly undermined, reflecting the prevailing mentality, “You pretend to pay me and I pretend to
work.” Getting people to obey the injunctive norm when the descriptive norm suggests a very different pattern of behavior is very difficult.

In addition to normative aspects of peer effects, there may also be a competitive aspect, particularly with respect to compliance by businesses. Business managers may fear a loss of competitive position if they comply with a regulatory requirement (e.g., withholding payroll taxes from employees or instituting a smoking ban in restaurants) unless all of their peers do so as well. As with the purely normative aspects of peer effects, publicizing high rates of non-compliance may actually raise non-compliance rates as previous compliers change their behavior to avoid perceived competitive disadvantage. In the case of democracy-threatening behaviors, competitive effects are a major risk: if it is perceived that one’s election opponents are gaining an unfair advantage by intimidating candidates or voters, for example, then, the perception that survival depends on adopting the same tactics will be strong.

**Target Resources:** Target populations may also lack the resources that they need to adapt to a policy, even if they want to comply and recognize the incentives to do so. This is especially true when compliance costs are very high. Resources in this context refers not just to financial resources, but to a broad array of context-specific assets. Information, clearly an important resource affecting compliance, is addressed separately above. But other resources can also be critical: in addition to financial assets, resources such as good health, human capital, strong social networks, and physical proximity to existing public infrastructure can be important.

**Autonomy Issues:** Targets may also be non-compliant because they lack autonomy over their decisions or outcomes resulting from them, even if they would prefer to comply. Autonomy problems may be of several types. Persons suffering from physical addictions are the most obvious example of targets lacking autonomy. In case of democracy-threatening behaviors, the over-centralization of government, the lack of a clear organizational management structures and the failure to delegate authority undermine the ability of local government officials to respond to the needs of citizens they are meant to serve. The appointment, rather than election, of key local authorities also undermines autonomy. In Egypt, citizens may resort to informal neo-patriarchal networks or neighborhood “toughs” rather than local government officials to solve basic problems, such as breaches of neighborhood security or poor garbage collection.
Complex roots of non-compliance

The argument so far has argued that a comprehensive framework for understanding target compliance and non-compliance is necessary to explain why non-compliance occurs. But the primary focus has been on examining specific barriers separately for individual targets. In addition to specific barriers to target compliance, relationships between those barriers and the characteristics of target populations may also inhibit policy compliance.

Multiple Barriers for Individual Targets: It is often necessary for multiple barriers to compliance to be overcome if a target is to comply, especially when the targets of policy are heterogeneous. Looking at only a single barrier means that many phenomena of non-compliance are likely to be poorly understood. Multiple barriers may cause non-compliance in several ways. One is where a single behavior (or a series of similar, repeated behaviors) of compliance is required, but where several barriers to compliance exist. The second is where multiple, distinct behaviors are needed to produce the desired outcomes, with distinctive barriers to non-compliance for each of those behaviors.

Multiple Targets: Achievement of many policy objectives requires the simultaneous compliance by multiple sets of program target populations, with distinct behaviors. Governments may be much more insistent on compliance by one target group than another, even if action by both is required to achieve program objectives. Potential secondary targets are likely to resist any efforts that define them as a policy target if that means that they will be subject to intrusive, insistent and specific demands for compliance. In a democracy-inhibiting example, cracking down on police and intelligence officials who torture suspects will not be effective if an unreformed judiciary fails to prosecute them because of a lack of political will, weak forensic investigation abilities or the limited capacity of a system overwhelmed with cases.

The social and political construction of compliance and enforcement regimes

The compliance and enforcement regimes— instruments, settings and targeting—that emerge with respect to a particular behavior are likely to depend both on the political resources of competing interests to influence the policymaking process and on what Schneider and Ingram (1993) have referred to as the “social construction” of real and potential target groups—whether those groups are seen as generally valued and important or as groups to be disapproved
of and feared. In general, more intrusive mechanisms are likely to be used when (a) there is a high degree of societal and elite consensus that a very high level of aggregate compliance is necessary, but (b) significant barriers to compliance exist for at least some of the target population—i.e., it is not likely to occur without government intervention. In many cases, however, the precise nature of the behavior that is expected, the boundaries of the potential target group, the levels of individual and aggregate compliance needed, as well the appropriate compliance and enforcement regime for attaining better outcomes, are contested. Interests may compete in putting forward claims that social benefits can be produced if their group is left alone—not considered a target—and compliance with a specific behavioral standard is not demanded. Alternatively, they may argue that social benefits can be produced if their narrowly-targeted group is given specific resources or positive incentives. Providing resources or positive incentives to a target population is likely to be more problematic, however, when (1) the resource needs of clients are heterogeneous, (2) compliance is costly and complicated for targets, (3) the target group is unpopular and lacks political resources and allies, and (4) resource barriers and compliance requirements are not “one-shot” but stretch over time.

Democratic Behaviors: Identification and Analysis

The distinctive analytical arguments laid out in the previous section can be summarized in four broad propositions. First, there are multiple barriers to compliance in many behaviors. Resource and autonomy barriers can be an important impediment to compliance, but they are often under-examined. Second, the existence of multiple barriers to compliance is likely to lead to low levels of aggregate compliance, even when individual targets confront only some of those barriers, because it is difficult to design and implement compliance and enforcement regimes that address the distinct barrier profiles of individual targets. Third, when target populations are heterogeneous, particularly low levels of individual compliance are likely to be concentrated among targets with multiple, and very serious, resource and/or autonomy barriers to compliance. Fourth, more intrusive compliance and enforcement regimes—including both the instruments used and the settings on those instruments—are more likely to be imposed: (1) where there is a strong elite and popular consensus that something close to 100 percent aggregate compliance is necessary, (2) where the target population lacks political resources, and (3) where the target population is
negatively constructed in the dominant political discourse. Under these conditions, strong evidence of compliance failure—i.e., a low level of aggregate compliance relative to targets or expectations—is likely to lead to a shift to a more intrusive compliance and enforcement regime when a population is negatively constructed and politically weak, but to a weakening of compliance expectations and goals when the target population is positively constructed and powerful.

This section takes the general lessons about behavioral change and compliance and applies them to democratization more explicitly. Most of the elements of the analysis of behavioral change and compliance analyzed in the previous section of the paper and summarized in the paragraph above carry over very substantially to an analysis of democratization. First and most obviously, democratization clearly involves multiple behaviors, many of which are very complex and need to be carried out (or in the case of democracy-threatening behaviors, avoided) frequently, over a long period of time. Each behavior has a distinctive set of barriers and a distinctive target population, both in terms of the breadth of those from whom compliance is sought and particular sub-groups of the population that are particularly at risk of non-compliance. Democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors also vary in compliance regimes, notably in how consistently individuals and organizations must comply to work toward stable democratization. Empirically, there is very strong variation across regimes in the MENA region on the nature of compliance and enforcement regimes (though most are not particularly favorable to democratization) and in the nature and size of target populations who are likely to engage in democracy-threatening behavior. It is also important to consider multiple barriers for each behavior, and to assess both the importance of individual behaviors and the probability of addressing them successfully—the most serious barriers may also be the most difficult to address. It is important to think about target populations as heterogeneous—strategies that work for one segment of the target population may not work for others. Several strategies can be utilized to address each behavior that is sought; which strategies are employed depends on factors such as what specific barriers exist, whether or not universal compliance is required. Finally, it is important not just to prioritize specific behaviors depending on their importance to democracy promotion but also to consider multi-stage strategies within specific behaviors, beginning with less-intrusive instruments and moving to more intrusive instruments as public support for those strategies increases.
We begin by identifying a small number of important democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors by the public: voting, monitoring government abuse, tolerance of diversity and respect for the rule of law. Although these behaviors are heavily influenced by the actions of government officials, as discussed below, we emphasis how behaviors by the public are influenced by resources and autonomy as well as by information and attitudes/beliefs. Second we identify key barriers to each of the democracy-enhancing behaviors and reinforcers of democracy-threatening behaviors. We then identify specific strategies for addressing the most important barriers and reinforcers of specific behaviors, including both short- and long-term approaches and potential “leverage points” where modest investments may have big payoffs in terms of democracy-enhancing behavior. Conditions that are likely to facilitate or limit the success of specific strategies are also discussed. The examples cited are drawn from Egypt, which has passed through three distinct stages of government since Mubarak was removed from office following 18 days of massive demonstrations throughout the country: a transitional government led by the Supreme Council of Military Forces (SCAF) between February 2011 and November 2011; the Islamist-dominated government resulting from parliamentary elections held between November 2011 and January 2012 and the election of President Mohamed Morsi in June 2012; and a second transitional government that followed a military coup overthrowing the Morsi government in July 2013.

**Voting and Elections:** Some of the key barriers to voting in post-Mubarak Egypt. During the Mubarak era, citizens 18 years and older were required to register to vote. In fact, voter registration was low among the adult population, resulting in elections determined in some cases by single-digit voter turnouts. Disincentives to vote included a widespread perception of elections as the window dressing of a sham democracy. These perceptions were based on manipulation of vote counts, including ballot stuffing; under-the-table payments, or threats, aimed at government employees and others to cast their ballots for particular candidates; interference with the registration of candidates seeking election, including detention of potential candidates and the highjacking of their applications to miss registration deadlines; and high barriers to the registration of opposition political parties (Blaydes 2008). Some opposition candidates who dared run for office, notably presidential candidate Ayman Nour, later faced long periods of detention based on trumped up charges and a slew of civil lawsuits lodged by “concerned” citizens seeking to curry favor with the regime.
Accordingly, Egyptians who bothered to vote in elections generally were considered by their peers either to be weak-minded tools of an autocratic regime or corrupted by illicit incentives. Moreover, the voting requirement was not enforced.

Then and now citizens inclined to participate in elections have been affected by conditions directly affecting the voting experience. Judges have supervised vote casting in polling places, because many view them as the least corruptible government institution. This has resulted in elections occurring over multiple days, rather than a single day, because of the limited number of available judges, and contributed to long lines at the polls. Another factor is the fear of violence at polling places, or aimed at the candidates themselves, which could be improved by stronger security measures.

Information deficits about the issues and candidates at stake are a critical issue affecting voting behavior. These have resulted both from restrictions on or interference with media coverage, and the limited scope of fact-based, investigative journalism. The latter has been hampered, in part, by the deliberate opacity of government operations and the lack of laws or policies ensuring citizens’ “right to information”.

In the years following Mubarak’s removal in February 2011, transitional authorities organized several elections that reflect the country’s dynamic and evolving political culture. With many Egyptians voting for the first time in their lives, turnout for the first constitutional referendum in March 2011 was relatively high (41 percent), despite complaints from some quarters about the short period to formulate the issues placed on the ballot (a process controlled by SCAF); the limited timeframe to educate the electorate about the ballot issues; and the simple “yes” or “no” vote permitted on the several issues bundled together. Voters were allowed to participate using their national ID cards, rather than voter registration cards required for previous elections, eliminating an important barrier to voting.

The successful passing of that referendum established new rules relating to the registration of political candidates, among other issues, creating a positive incentive for Egyptians to view elections in a more favorable light. Voter enthusiasm remained relatively high, as measured by turnout (55 percent), in the parliamentary elections that followed (held in stages between November 2011 and January 2012), with voting hours extended to accommodate long lines of voters. But turnout waned for the presidential election, held in May and June 2012 with 46 percent casting ballots, and for the second constitutional
referendum in December 2012, in which only 33 percent of the electorate voted. Cynicism about the political process deepened when President Mohamed Morsi issued a decree to stifle legal challenges to the constitution drafting process, and when that process was rushed to completion even after many members of the Constitutional Assembly, which was selected by a parliament dominated by Islamists, boycotted the meetings. Nearly a quarter of the Constitutional Assembly quit in protest before the constitution was finalized—mostly persons identified with liberal or secular viewpoints, and members of the Coptic minority.

Throughout this period one important policy that reinforced democracy were changes in the rules regarding the formation of political parties and registration of political candidates, enabling a wide spectrum of new parties to emerge (IFES 2011). Another was enabling citizens to vote with their national ID cards, encouraging more to participate in elections. Other government actions reinforced barriers to electoral participation, however, notably a failure by SCAF to organize a broad national dialogue about the constitution drafting process, including whether parliamentary and presidential elections should be held before or after the Constitutional Assembly completed its work. Once Islamists were elected to more than 70 percent of parliamentary seats and an Islamist president led the government, their failure to ensure sufficient participation in the Constitution drafting process by women, religious minorities and those representing more secular or liberal political beliefs significantly degraded the democratic political culture. In short, while the Morsi government was brought to power through parliamentary and presidential elections that were reasonably democratic, and it implemented a constitution drafting and referendum process, the flawed and exclusionary nature of the latter, coupled with declining electoral participation as cynicism grew about the new government, underscored poor democratic modeling behavior by the government.

**Monitoring Governmental Abuses:** A key arena of democracy-enhancing behavior involves participation both by citizens playing a wide variety of roles as government watchdogs, political party activists, investigative journalists and community organizers, and by government to be transparent and accountable in its behavior. Many citizens in Egypt and other transitional Arab countries view civic activism as a means of “taking back” their states and societies from parasitic, unaccountable governments. Governments, however, continue to view civil society activism largely as a threat, even though some NGOs focus primarily on
filling important social gaps in health and education created by inadequate government services.

Some important barriers to government monitoring in Egypt, are the links between government performance, restrictions on civil society activism and the challenges of implementing internal bureaucratic reforms. Civic activists focused on creating a leaner, more efficient and accountable government through government monitoring face enormous challenges. The Mubarak government "bought" citizen loyalty in part by creating millions of unnecessary and poorly supervised civil service jobs and by heavily subsiding the cost of basic commodities, such as bread, water and gasoline, not just for the poor but the entire population. Civil service salaries were not adjusted to keep up with the cost of living, and burgeoning government bureaucracies often lacked even the most minimal managerial structures to monitor performance and assure maximal use of resources. A newly imposed performance based budgeting requirement for government ministries was largely ignored because of a lack of internal knowledge about how to implement it and other resource constraints. Corruption in the civil service increased dramatically, as workers sought to supplement inadequate salaries, and labor unrest was fed by any attempts to lay off unneeded workers. In the post-Mubarak era, wildcat strikes became a signature activity throughout the economy but especially in government departments, as workers clamored for more secure work contracts and higher pay.

In the years since the onset of the January 2011 uprising, throughout all three stages of government, authorities have largely maintained and, in same cases, extended controls initiated by the Mubarak regime that amount to democracy-threatening activities designed to limit the mobilization of citizens working to monitor and improve government behavior. Controls on civic activism that restrict civil society ability to monitor government abuses include restrictions on media independence, the tight regulation of the NGO sector, and limitations on political organizing. Indeed many analysts argue that the July 2013 coup created repressive conditions exceeding even those suffered during the Mubarak regime. Civic activists engaged in human rights, labor and political activism, and the journalists who cover their work, have been characterized by authorities as undermining national security at the behest of foreign interests. Intrusive regulation of the NGO sector as well as long-discussed plans to tighten the already onerous NGO law, especially limitations on foreign funding, continue to hamper civil society. Activists seeking to expand their freedom of operation have
challenged these restrictions in creative ways. For example, most Egyptian human rights organizations have registered as civil companies (the same registration used by for-profit law firms) to avoid the restrictions incumbent on registered non-profit organizations. Some have also created branch offices in other countries to side-step limitations on foreign funding.

Monitoring government behavior depends upon access to information, whether sourced by the media or released by the government about its activities. Citizens can hold governments accountable for performance only if they have detailed information about the budgeting and spending of public resources and the design and implementation of laws and policies. On their part, activists must develop advanced skills to assess public budgeting and spending information if they are to fulfill the role of watchdogs, skills that few Egyptian NGOs possess.

Overall, the three governments in place following Mubarak’s removal have not modeled a commitment to transparency and accountability. This includes a failure to convincingly investigate outbreaks of violence resulting in thousands of deaths, share information about perpetrators with the public, and uniformly prosecute those believed to have broken the law. Other signs that democracy is not well entrenched in Egypt include restrictions on face-to-face survey research, which can be conducted only following approval by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, a government entity traditionally run by an army general; and unofficial control by the National Security Agency over access to the National Archives, which routinely denies entry to scholars and others. While the Morsi government was readying a right to information law scheduled for release in March 2013, critics noted that the draft gave executive and legislative authorities significant control over access to information, which opposition leaders outside government viewed as highly problematic. Perhaps most emblematic of the failure of democracy to take hold in Egypt is a lack of transparency about military budgeting and expenditures, including information about the military’s extensive income generating activities that rely in part on soldier and prison labor and benefit from state subsidies of energy. It also reflects the larger problem of poor civilian control over the security sector—the police, intelligence and military forces.

Tolerance of Diversity: Respect for diversity and protection of minority rights lie at the heart of democracy, a system of government designed to promote liberty and the pursuit of happiness within reasonable constraints. Even highly homogeneous societies encompass diversity based on religion, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, etc. Established democracies strike different balances between
values and political principles that can be at odds with each other, such as support for free expression versus regulation of hate or libelous speech, and the right of access to information versus the right to privacy. Emerging democracies are challenged to find their own balances, and how they handle these issues reflects deeper social values. So, for example, conservative democratic societies may choose to outlaw public nudity, but do they go too far if they mandate specific dress codes in accordance with one interpretation of religious prescript? They may decide to criminalize public drunkenness, but should they tolerate the sale and responsible use of alcoholic beverages? And what about freedom of conscience—the right to choose one’s religion or embrace atheism—or of sexual orientation? Are minority rights adequately protected through affirmative action or application of personal status laws according to religious faith, even when the minority in question is consistently outvoted in parliament? And how should an emerging democracy regulate the expression of opposition to mainstream views? Should demonstrators be free to organize a protest without a permit or to block traffic on a busy roadway at will? These and other knotty issues are typical of dilemmas confronting young democracies. Ironically, authoritarian governments sometimes “solve” such problems through administrative fiat or repressive force. Advancements in women’s rights, hard fought for by Egyptian activists and pushed through by the Mubarak regime, were in danger of being rolled back by the Morsi government.

Another issue are the barriers conditioning tolerance of diversity and expression of minority viewpoints. In the first two years of the post-Mubarak transition, authorities failed to pass laws that would protect many basic freedoms. Instead, the constitution drafted by the Morsi government represented a step backward from the 1971 constitution because it couched rights in the context of vaguely defined family and social values, making it easier for the government to rule against minority groups and political opponents.

Defining criticism of public figures or institutions as a crime is a democracy-threatening behavior aimed at suppressing political opposition. Yet, legal action has become a common tool to suppress freedom of expression of diverse views in Egypt. Expressions of intolerance of difference by politicians and activists from nearly all political parties and movements are commonplace, and those who behave otherwise not only fail to gain political traction; they may face severe sanctions. Former Deputy Prime Minister Mohamed El Baradei was referred by Egypt’s Prosecutor General for investigation on charges that he was an agent of the U.S. and had colluded with the Muslim Brotherhood after El Baradei...
resigned following the violent breakup of the Muslim Brotherhood’s July 2013 sit-in in Cairo by the government. Other secular opponents of the July 2013 military coup were roundly denounced in the media as pro-American or pro-Morsi even though many had been equally opposed to the undemocratic behaviors of the Morsi regime. Under the Morsi regime, approximately 18 persons were charged with defaming the judiciary, while 17 were charged with defaming the president. Others were put under investigation, including Bassem Yusuf, accused of maligning President Morsi on his popular TV show featuring Jon Stewart-style political satire. Some were charged with defaming religion, including one of the region’s most famous comedians, Adel Iman, who was convicted for insulting Islam, although that was overturned on appeal. Before his overthrow, President Morsi used his powers to close one TV station, ban issues of newspapers and investigate journalists.

The air of growing insecurity is fed both by religious extremists, who issue incitements to violence against political opponents, and by government action. The military coup against the Morsi government significantly raises the stakes for Islamists. The military’s use of force to violently break up sit-ins and demonstrations organized by Islamists, and the possible banning of the country’s biggest political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, as a legal organization, has convinced many Islamists that cooperation with the new government is impossible. It increases the threat some will retaliate violently, and in the weeks following the July 2013 coup the number of actual and attempted bombings by unknown attackers has risen significantly.

At the same time, thin skins are in wide evidence throughout the political spectrum as expressions of opposing viewpoints are interpreted as personal insults. The Morsi government frequently characterized opponents as thugs and criminals, while the secular opposition described the Morsi government as Nazi-like. The general absence of peer modeling behavior in which political leaders consistently expressed their views in measured terms and articulated respect for those who disagree with them has undermined democracy. Clearly it will take time and visionary leadership to transform the Mubarak-constructed political culture from one in which political opponents are denounced as threats to national security to one that tolerates the give and take of democratic politics.

Internal weakness and political divisions among the secular parties and movements opposed to the Morsi government has also undermined democracy. Secular party leaders engaged in democracy-threatening behavior when they advocated the overthrow of a democratically elected president, after they lost
parliamentary and presidential elections and two constitutional referenda. Their inconsistent responses to attempts by the Morsi government to initiate a “national dialogue” reflected well-founded cynicism about the government’s intentions while sending mixed signals to their own followers. Support by organized secular parties and movements for the overthrow of the Morsi government paved the way for the July 2013 military coup and had a chilling effect on democracy. Poorly trained and controlled security forces facing furious mobs of demonstrators added fuel to growing instability, while the media contributed to the atmosphere of fear and insecurity when they served as mouthpieces for extremists. Morsi government officials appealed to ordinary Egyptians tired of civil unrest by arguing that dissent would lead to the breakdown of the state and perhaps even civil war, while the post-Morsi government has characterized Islamists as terrorists. Active suppression of any demonstrations—organized by furious Morsi supporters and by youth activists dismayed by the return of the military following the July 2013 coup—and the banning of TV stations has deepened the crisis of democracy in Egypt.

**Respect for the Rule of Law:** Recent research suggests that Egyptians strongly endorse the rule of law, want to see wrongdoers held accountable and believe that continued impunity will contribute to lawlessness and unrest (Barsalou and Knight 2013). It is no surprise, therefore, that Egyptians were riveted by the first sight of Hosni Mubarak and his sons in the dock in August 2011, along with other leaders of his regime. Many were disappointed, however, by the limited scope of the charges against them and were critical of an unconvincing legal process when the Ministry of Interior’s noncooperation forced the judiciary to undertake their own inadequate forensic investigations of charges relating to the use of violence against demonstrators.

Clearly there is strong appetite in Egypt for justice for victims, but the unreformed judiciary continues to disappoint. Following the downfall of Mubarak, the transitional SCAF and Morsi governments conducted approximately 35 trials of police charged with injuring or killing demonstrators; only two were found guilty and imprisoned, while the rest were acquitted or given suspended sentences. Civilians have strongly advocated for an end to military court trials for civilians (following the arrest and rapid judgments in military courts against some 12,000 civilian demonstrators during the SCAF transition), and for the accountability of members of the armed forces in civilian, as opposed to military, courts. The widespread failure to achieve justice through legal means for victims has contributed to rising tension and lower confidence in
government. Following the July 2013 military coup, the summary “justice” dispensed through quick trials of Islamists protestors and leaders in military courts has evoked memories of military trials operated during the SCAF transition.

Research has demonstrated that those who engage in mob violence do so only when they are certain they will not be punished (Varshney 2002; Horowitz 2001). Mob violence against Christians has occurred not only when Islamists headed the government but also during the SCAF transition and following the July 2013 military coup. The growing divide between Muslims and Christians and violent attacks against women are signs that the Egyptian experiment with democracy prior to the 2013 coup is not going well. Although Muslim-Christian tolerance was widely expressed by millions of demonstrators as a basic moral value during the 18-day uprising that led to Mubarak’s removal, Christians increasingly view themselves as a persecuted minority at risk of mob violence, and emigration has risen sharply. The formation of vigilante groups to protect women from attacks during earlier demonstrations signals the weakness of security forces and has further undermined the rule of law.

In a recent survey, Egyptians prioritized security sector reform to bring police, intelligence and military forces under the firm control of civilian authorities (Barsalou and Knight 2013). Efforts by civil activists pushing for security sector reform have been largely ignored. Post-Mubarak governments have not adopted a variety of strategies that could address widespread mistrust of their willingness to undertaking meaningful reform, such as the purging and criminal prosecution of the worst perpetrators of torture and violence against civilians and the overhaul of educational strategies of the National Police Academy. The inadequate performance of the police to deliver security has encouraged vigilantism. Perceptions that the security sector remains above the law caused activists and victims to invade police stations and secret prisons in March 2011 to interrupt the shredding and burning of incriminating documents.

Weaknesses in the judiciary have also undermined efforts to transform Egypt into a democratic state and society. While elements of the judiciary strongly resisted efforts by Mubarak to bring them under his control, internal divisions within the judiciary widened during the Morsi government, and the system remains overwhelmed by more cases than it can handle and by unrealistic public expectations. The weak forensic investigative capacity of the judiciary is a critical gap in an environment in which the Ministry of Interior refuses to undertake, or actively undermines, investigations.
Conclusions and Lessons

This paper has sketched out a general framework for examining compliance with government policy and provided a very preliminary test of the framework's implications for democratization by looking at several specific democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors. These behaviors differ substantially in the breadth of their target populations, the degree to which high rates of aggregate compliance are required, and the complexity of responses that they require. What is striking is that democratic stability requires that a complex set of behaviors be carried out frequently and consistently by broad populations, including the government itself.

These cases suggest a number of conclusions about constraints on policies that seek behavioral change to achieve democratic stabilization. A first conclusion is that the lines between democracy-promoting and democracy-threatening mechanisms are often unclear, such as the wavering line between promoting free expression and suppressing hate speech.

Second, a comprehensive analysis of barriers is necessary even with "simple" behaviors because most compliance problems involve multiple barriers. Moreover, which barriers are critical in inhibiting democracy-threatening behavior can differ substantially across sectors and behaviors and over time. Some barriers have been understudied as sources of non-compliance with behavioral change objectives. In particular, while attitudes and beliefs are an important constraint on democracy enhancing behavior, other constraints—notably resource and autonomy constraints and peer effects—need to be given more attention both by researchers and by policymakers.

Third, the cases suggest that heterogeneity among targets can be an important source of non-compliance. Compliance and enforcement regimes aimed at the "modal" target, or at the easiest targets to reach, are likely to be ineffective at reaching those who have distinctive resources, information levels, autonomy, peer groups, etc. But governments are often not very effective at differentiating among heterogeneous target populations, and differentiation through increased monitoring and enforcement may require a high degree of intrusiveness.

Fourth, analysis needs to pay at least as much attention to democracy-threatening behaviors as to democracy enhancing behaviors, especially in societies attempting to make the transition from authoritarian government to democracy. In such settings, the absence of established democratic institutions, traditions and behaviors, in some cases compounded by weak government capacity and the unleashing of extremists who were effectively marginalized or controlled by the
former government, raises the likelihood that democracy-threaten

Fifth, the cases suggest very starkly—and consistent with prior work by
Schneider and Ingram and others—that compliance and enforcement regimes
established by governments are critical constraints on democracy-enhancing
behaviors—and often important sources of and facilitators of democracy-
threatening behavior. Government is a huge part of the problem in transitional
states, so focus of the literature on changing citizen behavior must be expanded
to also focus on changing government behavior.

Finally, this analysis suggests that proponents of democratization will need to
think about multi-stage strategies that vary over time in the key behaviors they
address, the barriers to those behaviors, and the intrusiveness of the instruments
that they employ. In a relatively “benign” environment in which governments
and mass beliefs are both supportive of democracy, government could begin with
relatively unobtrusive measures to promote behavioral change and then proceed
to more intrusive and controversial ones as public support for democratization
grows and democracy-threatening behaviors are “denormalized” (see Figure 3).
Such a sequence can be seen in other areas of behavior change such as efforts to
reduce tobacco consumption, where relatively easy steps such as providing
information about the dangers of smoking were provided first, followed up later
by more intrusive measures such as stronger admonitions in cigarette pack
warnings, bans on advertising and smoking in public places.

What is at stake in most of the MENA region is a much broader set of
changes that essentially transform political and social culture in environments
that are much less benign. These changes are unlikely to be accepted universally
and least of all by those with the greatest access to coercive power. In changing
behavior, coercive strategies often work best, but coercive strategies to increase
democracy-enhancing behavior undermine the very objectives they seek to
advance. Some potential intervention steps to change compliance and
enforcement regimes and individual and group propensities to engage in
democracy-enhancing behaviors are summarized in Figure 4. Necessary if
insufficient strategies include bringing under control violent elements of the
security apparatus and “spoilers” operating outside of government, establishing
the rule of law, and launching credible, transparent investigations of the former
regime to re-establish public trust—activities that must be performed early in the
process. Constructing new legal frameworks (compliance regimes), including
writing a constitution that clearly protects basic rights, ensures the protection of
minorities and permits tolerance of diversity and freedom of expression, are also essential. These challenges are daunting, consisting of nothing less than transforming the “Arab street”—a subject population controlled and manipulated by an unaccountable government—into an Arab public in which the social contract between the governed and the governors includes mutually reinforcing rights and obligations incumbent on citizens and authorities.

In view of these complex challenges and historical precedents, it is clear that transformation of authoritarian Arab Spring countries into societies governed by democratic norms and governmental institutions will be a long-term process. Moreover, it is unclear in which order the interventions should be undertaken, but it is unlikely that starting with less intrusive measures would be a recipe for success. Civics and peace education programs operating at the community level and in schools should be given a role to play but their limitations should also be recognized (Saloman 2006). The values they promote are unlikely to take hold if they are not reinforced by civil and political behaviors and institutional developments that promote and sustain democracy.

References


Weaver, R. Kent. Forthcoming. “Compliance Regimes and Barriers to Behavioral Change,” *Governance.*

Figure 1. A Typology of Democracy-Enhancing and Democracy-Undermining Compliance and Enforcement Regimes

ENFORCEMENT REGIME:
Consistency of Government Monitoring and Enforcement Actions with official policy

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Figure 2. A Model of Target Compliance and Non-Compliance

Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4

- Determinants of compliance regime (e.g., elite objectives, culture)
- Determinants of enforcement regime (incentives and sanctions)
- Determinants of implementation (e.g., bureaucratic capacity, corruption)
- Determinants of enforcement regime (monitoring & enforcement)
- Determinants of target capacity and willingness to comply (e.g., income distribution, NGO capacity)
- Non-regime constraints on individual target capacity and willingness to comply (e.g., resources, attitudes, peer effects)

Feedback loop
Aggregate levels of target compliance
Individual target compliance behavior
Enforcement regime (monitoring & enforcement)
Figure 3. Multiple States for Democracy-Strengthening Initiatives in a “Benign” Environment

- Information about risks of democracy-threatening behaviors
- Reductions in democracy-threatening behaviors
- “De-normalization” of democracy-threatening behaviors
- Public support for stronger policies restricting democracy-threatening behaviors
- Stronger democracy-reinforcing compliance and enforcement regime

Figure 4. Strategies to Improve Prospects for Democratization

- Potential Interventions
  - Determinants of compliance regime (e.g., elite objectives, culture)
  - Civic education
  - Provide financing to pro-democracy NGOs
  - Improve monitoring of bureaucratic behavior
  - Purge and control security apparatus
- Proximate determinants of democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening behaviors
  - Compliance regime, e.g.:
    - Strong protections of individual rights
  - Enforcement regime, e.g.:
    - Fairness of judicial proceedings
  - Individual target compliance behavior
  - Aggregate levels of target compliance
  - Individual target capacity and willingness to comply, e.g.:
    - Resources, autonomy, attitudes
    - Observed frequency of democracy-threatening behavior

Feedback loop
CHAPTER 6
End of Exile: Returning Diaspora Members and Political Leadership in the Arab World

EMMA LUNDGREN JÖRUM

Introduction

Although returning diaspora members have played important parts in many political processes following the fall of authoritarian regimes, neither transition studies, nor research on diaspora contribution to the development of states of origin, have paid attention to this phenomenon. This chapter addresses this lack of attention. Empirically focused on the Arab World, the chapter’s aim is to suggest how we might widen our knowledge of the political leadership of returning diaspora members with regard to two specific questions: 1) What facilitates returnee political leadership after the fall of authoritarian regimes? 2)

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1 The term “diaspora” is contested and debated (see for instance Saffran 1991 and Cohen 1997). In this chapter, following Walter Connor’s broad definition, it denotes “that segment of a people living outside their traditional homeland” (1986:16). This is also the case in most policy documents on the migration-development nexus where diaspora is, in effect, used interchangeably with migrants.

2 The author wishes to thank the participants of the Citizenship Discourses in the MENA Region workshop for valuable comments on the original version of this chapter and Åsa Arbjörk for checking the language.
Do diaspora members bring new political norms and values when returning home?

The chapter begins with seeking to situate the topic within the context of transnationalism and diaspora contribution to homeland development. It then discusses four hypotheses that can help us understand when returning diaspora members are able to assume political leadership roles. The question of whether or not returning diaspora members bring new political norms and values back home will not be discussed in depth. A limited empirical pilot study on institutional diaspora inclusion/exclusion in political processes following the fall of long standing authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 will follow. The chapter ends with a discussion of the results.

Migration: From a Narrative of Exit to Transnational Spaces

In an increasingly globalized world, migration is no longer seen as a factor that only impacts receiving states. It is clear that it also affects the states of origin. Migration studies have therefore largely abandoned the narrative treating migration as a process whereby migrants leave their states of origin and settle permanently in another state, with integration or assimilation as the final stage. Although this is certainly the case for some, this view of the migration process has been challenged on two grounds. Firstly, large numbers of migrants return to their states of origin (King 2000,7, Cassarino 2004, 253) and, secondly large numbers of migrants maintain strong ties to their states of origin (Morawska 2003, Basch et al 2008, Al-Ali & Koser 2005). These ties to their states of origin have been described as “transnational spaces” and can be further divided into two categories: social ties to families and friends who stay behind and institutional ties to authorities and organizations in the country of origin (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004,1009).

The transnational ties maintained are not only the choice of the migrants themselves but also depend on the diaspora engagement policies (Gamlen 2006) the states of origin have adopted. As noted by several scholars, towards the end of the twentieth century an increasing number of sending states took a notable interest in their diasporas abroad. This became evident in changes made in citizenship legislation and the creation of institutions shaping diaspora-home state relationships. The latter includes the creation of specific diaspora ministries,
the establishment of language training centres or cultural organizations abroad as well as the extension of voting rights to overseas nationals (Brand 2006, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). This development has been referred to as both “political transnationalism” (Brandt 2006, 11) and the “globalization of domestic politics” (Koslowski 2005).

Several reasons for diaspora engagement policies have been suggested. They can roughly be divided into two categories: policies for financial mobilization and policies for political mobilization. The first category includes policies encouraging financial remittances helping poverty reduction and economic growth. The second involves policies supporting homeland domestic politics, creating an overseas political lobby in support of the homeland or increasing legitimacy for homeland political processes. It can also, especially in the case of highly authoritarian states, be used to control opposition abroad.

**Diasporas as Part of Homeland Development**

Diaspora resources and their utilization in homeland development have received attention by both policy makers and researchers. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (since 2007) as well as the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration (since 2006) are international initiatives launched in order to address the interconnections between migration and development. While the bulk of attention has been given to the diaspora financial contributions there is an increasing awareness that the skills possessed by diaspora members may be of use. Addressing the “brain drain” resulting from the emigration of skilled citizens, large scale international programs such as the UN sponsored TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals) program and the MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa) have been launched with the aim of assisting qualified migrants in temporary or permanent return in order to assume positions in administrative, health care or educational institutions. Even “virtual return” is being experimented with in contexts where skilled diaspora members can contribute expertise, for instance via video conferences (Brinkerhoff 2012, 77).
Returning Diaspora Members as Part of the Political Elite: A Research Proposal

While research documenting and evaluating “skilled” contribution to administrative, health care and educational institutions is still scarce but underway (Brinkerhoff & Taddesse 2008, Shindo 2012), the role of returning diaspora members as part of the political elite has rarely been subjected to research. The only existing study on this topic (Skulte 2005) deals with returning diaspora members as part of the political elite in post-communist Latvia and Lithuania. Theoretically partly based on Skulte’s study, End of Exile seeks to broaden our knowledge of the political leadership of returning diaspora members by widening the scope to include an additional geographical region.

What facilitates returnee political leadership after the fall of authoritarian regimes?

Skulte’s study on post-communist Latvia and Lithuania concludes that returning diaspora members assume political roles depending on the new political system, citizenship laws and whether the national identity is understood to include or exclude the diaspora as part of the nation (Skulte 2005, 181). The first two working hypotheses for the proposed study are based on these conclusions and hold that returnee leadership is facilitated when 1) the national identity is understood to include members of the diaspora and 2) citizenship laws permit holders of dual citizenship to run for office. This is partly examined with regard to Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in the pilot study which constitutes the second part of this chapter. For broader research on the topic the implications of Skulte’s conclusions can be developed into further hypotheses, for instance in states where there is no organized opposition and thereby no possible counter elites it is difficult to replace the outgoing elite with a domestic alternative. This suggests that returning diaspora members are more likely to assume political leadership roles where there is no organized domestic opposition. This in turn largely depends on the outgoing political system as this has shaped the possibilities for oppositional forces to emerge in the first place. The third hypothesis of this chapter is therefore that 3) the more repressive the outgoing regime, the more likely it is that returning diaspora members will assume positions of political leadership. Connected to this is the hypothesis that 4) time matters. If the existence of internal opposition affects the possibilities of returning diaspora
members to enter the new political elite, their ability to do so would be expected to decrease with time. As the domestic political arena opens up, it will be increasingly filled by those who never left but previously did not have the possibilities to act. A fifth hypothesis is that (5) the way a regime falls will influence diaspora members’ prospects of entering the new political elite. For instance, an international intervention (Libya, Iraq) may create different opportunities for returning diaspora members compared to a context where a domestic uprising (Tunisia, Egypt) led to the fall of the regime.

It is also conceivable that it is not structural factors that are decisive but rather individual characteristics of the returnees. Therefore, returnee characteristics such as level of education, networks maintained and activities abroad will also be included in the larger research project.

Returning diaspora members as norm diffusers

Ever since Levitt coined the term “social remittances” in 1998, several anthropological studies have concluded that socialization by migrants in their host societies results in the adoption of new ideas and values that may later be transferred to their home societies, either through the transnational ties maintained or as a result of the migrants’ return to their state of origin. Such ideas and values can involve new perceptions of fashion (Levitt 1998) or ideas on gender equality (Ge, Resurreccion & Elmhirst 2011, Wong 2006, Plaza 2007). A more recent development of the idea of extra-financial remittances is the suggestion that migrants from authoritarian states living in democratic societies could adopt norms that, through norm diffusion, would lead to the democratization of the states of origin (Goldring 2003, Rother 2009, Kapur 2010, Peralta 2012, Pfütze 2012). This is a hypothesis so far studied only quantitatively and with regard to labor migrants (in some cases temporary labor migrants who are perhaps the least likely to integrate into their host states). Results are inconclusive. Obviously, this hypothesis should be studied further, for instance through interviews with returnees in political leadership positions as well as by focusing on the issue of norm diffusion through qualitative methodology with a focus on elites, through the study of norms and values as expressed in political preferences.

Skulte concludes that the experience of democratic politics gained by former diaspora members influenced their political leadership and set them apart from colleagues who had never left (2005, 175-176). In the case of Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya former diaspora members have returned from decades in liberal democratic Western societies but also from authoritarian and more conservative states in the Gulf region. This fact suggests that quite different sets of norms are brought back with former diaspora members. Diaspora participation in the Egyptian referendum of 2012 is indicative of this as the constitution was accepted by a majority of voters based in the Gulf region but rejected by a majority of those based in Europe, North America and North Africa (Samaha, 2012). It is, however, important to note that it is not self-evident that time spent in liberal democracies automatically leads to liberal values and norms. A prominent feature of the Tunisian case has been the return of Islamist political leaders previously exiled in France and in the UK.

Inclusion or exclusion of the diaspora in the regime change process? Tunisia, Egypt and Libya

The end of an era was marked when President Zine Ben Abidine Ben Ali went into exile in Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011. Not only did his exile put an end to his 15 year long reign in Tunisia, it also created repercussions in other parts of the Arab World. The fall of Ben Ali has been pointed to as the final spark needed to create mass movement in Egypt (Ghonim 2012) where President Mubarak resigned less than a month later. It also inspired protests in neighboring Libya, where a NATO intervention beginning in March 2011 supported the armed opposition through the implementation of a no-fly zone. In August 2011, the capital Tripoli was captured and in October Muammar al-Qadhafi was hunted down and killed. Although the events leading up to the regime change processes that these three North African states have embarked upon have differed, the basic post-regime fall trajectories have been the same: the fall of the president (or in the case of Libya, formally the “Brother Leader”) was followed by the creation of a transitional body/government which announced a temporary constitution. Based on the temporary constitution, elections for an assembly with the task of writing a new, permanent constitutional charter were held. Once adopted, new parliamentary elections would be held but at the time of writing these had not yet taken place in any of the three states.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss a limited empirical study of the post-regime fall inclusion/exclusion of the diaspora in the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan regime change processes. The study will examine to what extent the
outgoing, the temporary and the final (where applicable) constitutions and the election processes have explicitly or implicitly included or excluded overseas nationals with regard to voting rights and the right to run for office. It will also shortly briefly discuss the phenomenon of returning diaspora members as part of the new political elite in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Conclusions regarding the case of Egypt may need future revision as this part of the study was made prior to the July 2013 developments.

Tunisia

The fall of President Zine Ben Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 was followed by the creation of a national unity government. Interim president Fouad Mebazaa stressed that all Tunisians “without exception or exclusion must be part of the political process” (Fallon 2011) and declared that elections for a Constituent Assembly (majlis ta‘īsī), charged with writing a new constitution, would be held the same year (Al-Jazeerah 4 March 2011). After the October elections a temporary constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly. In August 2012, the Tunisian newspaper al-Chorouq published the first draft of the permanent constitution (al-Chorouq 8 August 2012). Subject to heated discussions and several revisions, the Constituent Assembly debate on it finally began 1 July 2013 (Al-Jazeerah 2 July 2013). According to Prime Minister Ali Larayedh, the adoption of the constitution would be followed by both parliamentary and presidential elections before the end of 2013 (Al-Arabiyyah 1 June 2013). Following the withdrawal of more than 70 deputies from the Constituent Assembly in protest of the assassination of Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi at the end of July, the debate on the constitution was suspended. At the time of writing it is unclear when it will resume.

The Constitutions

A comparison of the three constitutions (the outgoing one adopted in 1959, the temporary one adopted in 2011 and the final draft in 2013) shows that none of them explicitly mention the diaspora or Tunisians abroad. Because the temporary constitution of 2011 is meant to serve as the basis for the work of the Constituent Assembly - itself a temporary creation - and because elections to parliament will take place after the assembly has adopted the final constitution, regulations concerning voting and candidacy rights to parliament are not
specified. However, as one of the tasks of the Constituent Assembly has been to elect a president, regulations regarding presidential candidates are specified. Table 1 below gives an overview of changes relevant to diasporas made between the three constitutions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959 constitution</th>
<th>2011 temporary constitution</th>
<th>2013 final draft constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voters</strong></td>
<td>Citizenship for at least 5 years (article 20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>all citizens (article 52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Members of Parliament** | citizenship for at least 5 years  
• Tunisian mother and father (article 21) | - | citizenship for at least 10 years (article 53) |
| **Ministers**          | - | - | - |
| **Presidents**         | • Tunisian citizenship only  
• Tunisian mother and father  
• Tunisian maternal and paternal grandparents (article 40)  
• Muslim (article 38) | • Tunisian citizenship only  
• Tunisian mother and father  
• Muslim (article 8) | • Tunisian citizen by birth  
• No other citizenship at the time of candidacy  
• Muslim (article 73) |

*Table 1. Regulations regarding voting and running for office in the 1959 constitution, the 2011 temporary constitution and the 2013 final draft.*

Although Western media reporting on the Tunisian constitution has mainly focused on debates between Islamists and secularists, a comparison of the first draft of August 2012 and the last one of June 2013 suggests that issues of citizenship and thereby diasporas have also been discussed. The first draft of the final constitution, presented in August 2012, holds no less than five different versions of requirements for presidential candidates (article 46). According to these five different formulations, presidential candidates must: not hold any other citizenship; be a Muslim and have Tunisian parents (version 1); be Tunisian by birth and be a Muslim (version 2); be Tunisian (version 3); have Tunisian citizenship and no other (Version 4) or must be a Muslim, born to Tunisian parents and Tunisian maternal and paternal grandparents (version 5). All five versions thus, logically, agree on “Tunisianness” as a basic requirement
for presidential candidates but differ on how this "Tunisianness" should be defined. As seen in table 1, the 2013 final draft settled with a combination of versions 2 and 4, stipulating that a presidential candidate must be a Muslim, a Tunisian citizen by birth and hold no other citizenship at the time of his/her candidacy (article 73). None of the constitutions mention voting abroad, this is instead regulated in the electoral law (see below).

The October 2011 Constituent Assembly elections

In April 2011, decree no 27 stipulated the creation of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). Its task was to guarantee all Tunisians the right to vote (article 4). It would consist of a central commission with 16 members out of which one was to be a representative of Tunisians abroad (article 8). It would further consist of local commissions where those serving Tunisians abroad would be based in embassies and consulates (article 5, Decree no 27). The website of the IHEC (www.isie.tn) has a special section for expatriated Tunisians with information on how to apply for membership in election committees and on how to register and vote from abroad.

The previous electoral law (of 1969) gave Tunisians abroad the right to vote in presidential elections only. In order to vote they needed a registration card issued by the Tunisian embassy or consulate in the state of residency. The electoral law adopted for the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, changed this as it 1) gave overseas citizens the right to vote for the Constituent Assembly and 2) allowed them to vote using only their passports (Petit 2012, 20). The passport only requirement was an exception made in order to facilitate the participation of Tunisians abroad and voters inside Tunisia who showed up at polling stations with their passports only were not allowed to vote (instead they were required to present their Tunisian ID card, Wolf 2011). Expatriated Tunisians were able to register in diplomatic missions (Petit 2012, 30) and once registered it was not possible to vote anywhere else (obviously a surprise to the Tunisians who had, after having registered abroad, decided to vote in Tunisia instead). Out of the 217 seats in the Constitutional Assembly, 18 seats were reserved for Tunisians abroad (Wolf 2011). The Tunisians who voted abroad thereby formed a constituency of their own. The 18 seats were divided accordingly: Tunisians in France had 10 seats, Italy 3, Germany 1, the rest of Europe and the two Americas 2 and the rest of the world, including the Arab World, 2 (Al-Ablawi 2011a). For security reasons, voting was cancelled for Tunisians in Libya, and it was not
possible to vote in states with less than 50 registered Tunisians or in states where Tunisia does not have embassies or consulates (Al-Ablawi 2011b).

Egypt

When Hosni Mubarak resigned as President 11 February 2011, he turned power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The constitution was suspended, the parliament dissolved (a move that was later ruled unconstitutional) and the military announced that it would rule until elections could be held. In March 2011, the SCAF made a constitutional declaration, which was approved by a referendum the same month. Elections for the lower house (majlis an-nuwwāb) of the bicameral parliament were held in November 2011-January 2012 and for the upper house (majlis ash-shurā) in January-February 2012. The parliament then elected the Constituent Assembly which was in charge of writing a new constitution. Presidential elections were held in May-June 2012 and a referendum on the new constitution was held in December 2012. New parliamentary elections were initially scheduled for spring 2013 but were delayed. With the Egyptian army’s deposal of President Muhammad Mursi in July 2013 it is at the time of writing unclear when parliamentary and presidential elections can be expected. The constitutional declaration of July 8, 2013 does not include regulations for voters or candidates but makes clear that a referendum amending the 2012 constitution will be held before any other elections take place (Al-masry al-yawm July 9, 2013). The conclusions below may therefore need future revision.

The Constitutions

The replaced 1971 constitution does not mention the diaspora or Egyptians abroad. Nor did the original version of the temporary constitution of March 2011, but in November an article allowing Egyptians overseas to vote in elections and referenda was reportedly added as the result of a Supreme Administrative Court ruling (Egypt Independent November 7, 2011). The permanent constitution, approved by referendum in December 2012 makes a very specific reference to the diaspora: “The State shall safeguard the interests of Egyptians living abroad, protect them and protect their rights and freedom, help them perform their public duties toward the Egyptian State and society, and encourage their contribution to the development of the nation. Their participation in
elections and referendums is regulated by law” (article 56). Table 2 below gives an overview of the changes made between the outgoing 1971 constitution, the constitutional declaration of 2011 and the constitution finally adopted in 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971 constitution</th>
<th>2011 constitutional declaration</th>
<th>2012 constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>Egyptian citizenship</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Egyptian citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(otherwise regulated by electoral law, article 62)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(article 113, 129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of parliament</td>
<td>(regulated by electoral law, article 62)</td>
<td>(will be regulated by electoral law, article 38)</td>
<td>no dual citizenship beyond the age of 19 (article 156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents</td>
<td>Egyptian citizenship</td>
<td>Egyptian citizenship</td>
<td>Egyptian citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egyptian mother and father</td>
<td>Egyptian mother and father</td>
<td>Egyptian mother and father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(article 75)</td>
<td>not married to non-Egyptians</td>
<td>not married to non-Egyptians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no other citizenship in the past</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>parents can not have held any other citizenship in the past</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(article 26)</td>
<td>(article 134)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Regulations regarding voting and running for office in the 1971 constitution, the 2011 constitutional declaration and the 2012 constitution.

As seen above, although the Egyptian constitution explicitly mentions Egyptians abroad and their rights and duties, conditions laid down for ministers and presidential candidates are more limiting than the Tunisian ones. The Egyptian requirements concerning single citizenship effectively stops diaspora members who have naturalized abroad, or who were born abroad, from running for president. Individuals with a non-Egyptian parent or spouse are also disqualified and these rules are likely to affect many diaspora members.
The referenda, parliamentary and presidential elections

While Tunisia has had one election and no referendum since the fall of Ben Ali, Egypt has had two referenda, elections for both the upper and lower houses of parliament and one presidential election since the fall of Mubarak. Egyptians abroad could participate in all of them except for the first referendum (on the Supreme Council’s constitutional declaration of March 2011). Following the above mentioned ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court in November 2011, previous legal obstacles to overseas voting were removed. As explained on the website of the High Elections Commission (HEC), the Supreme Military Council had issued a decree whereby participation in the referendum would require a national ID card and it had not been administratively possible to distribute these to Egyptians abroad (HEC February 2012). Following the Supreme Administrative Court ruling, the HEC proposed that Egyptians overseas should be able to vote using their passports in the November 2011-January 2012 lower house elections as well as the January-February 2012 upper house elections (Ahram Online 2 November 2011) and this seems to have been the case. For the May 2012 presidential elections a special website allowing Egyptians both at home and abroad to register for elections, change their voting districts and find general information on the elections, the electoral law etc was launched (Ahram Online 7 March 2012). This website was then transformed into a “general” elections website with information on all elections and referenda held so far. Like its Tunisian counterpart it has a special section for Egyptians abroad with information on how to register and vote and with possibilities to register online. According to its online count of registered voters abroad, 637 472 Egyptians abroad had registered as of February 13, 2013; the majority of these in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Intikhabat.Masr February 12, 2013). Eligible voters who did not register for the presidential elections in May-June 2012 were not able to vote in the referendum on the constitution at the end of the year (Samaha 2012).

It is not entirely clear at which locations Egyptians abroad could vote but for the presidential election of May 2012 postal voting was an option. For the referendum on the constitution in December 2012, Egyptians could vote at all embassies and it was also possible to vote via email (Egypt.com 2 December 2012). Egyptian voters abroad do not vote for specifically reserved seats in parliament.
Libya

The creation of the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) was announced at the end of February 2011. Ruling from the western part of Libya, at the time outside of government control, it declared itself the sole representative of all of Libya a few days later (NTC March 5, 2012). In August 2011 the NTC issued a constitutional declaration replacing the 1969 interim - but still in place - constitution. In July 2012 parliamentary elections were held for the General National Congress (al-mu’tamar al-watani al-`ām), to which the NTC formally transferred powers in August the same year. The Congress assigned an interim government which would be in place until elections could be held based on a new constitution (Tripoli Post 2 August 2012). According to the constitutional declaration of August 2011, the General National Congress would appoint the Commission in charge of writing the new constitution. However, in February 2013, the General National Congress decided that general elections for this Commission would be held instead (Libya Herald 6 February 2013). It is, at the time of writing, unclear when these elections will be held.

Constitutions

Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, a draft for the final constitution has not yet been produced. A comparison between the 1969 constitution and the constitutional declaration made by the NTC in August 2011, both of which are interim, shows that neither of them specifies who can vote, run for office or president. The 1969 constitution does not mention the political system at all (apart from stating that Libya is a “democratic state”, article 1) and the 2011 constitutional declaration only declares that members of the NTC may not run for office or appoint candidates for public office (article 29). In conclusion, neither of the two constitutions regulates political rights according to roots or citizenship. This is instead covered by Law no 4 for the Year 2012 for Election of the General National Congress, which declares that Libyan citizens registered as voters who do not form part of the military forces are allowed to vote (article 9). Like in Tunisia there was obviously a debate on dual citizenship regulations. While a draft version of regulations set up excluded holders of dual citizenship from both the right to vote (Holmes 2012) and the right to run for office (Lamloum 2012), the final version did not. The law also states that polling stations would be arranged for Libyans abroad where logistically and security wise possible (article 29).
The General National Congress elections

Like Tunisia, Libya has held one election since the fall of the former regime. According to electoral law no 3, 2012 the body authorized to conduct the elections was the High National Election Commission (HNEC) (IOM 5 June 2012). Its initial stance was that expatriated Libyans would not be permitted to vote as there were no reliable records of their identities and as there would be no possibility to compile such a registry in time for the elections (Libya Herald 24 April 2012). Several Libyan embassies had started registration of voters to prepare for the election but these were declared invalid (Khan 2012). In response to pressure from Libyans abroad as well as Libyan embassies and the UN mission in Libya, in May the HNEC decided that as a compromise Libyans in certain states would be allowed to vote (Libya Herald 6 May). On May 8, 2012 an agreement was signed between the HNEC and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), whereby the IOM would assist in the implementation of the process of voting abroad. In the end overseas Libyans were able to vote in six states; USA, Canada, UK, Germany, Jordan and UAE. Libyans residing in other states who wished to participate in the elections had to travel to one of these six states (IOM 5 June 2012). There was one polling station in each state and Libyans who wished to vote had to appear in person (Presutti 2012). This led to complaints and several letters from disappointed Libyans in the US were published in the English language Libyan press prior to the elections. For instance, there were complaints that US based Libyans who did not live in the Washington D.C. area would need to take time off work and spend a considerable amount of money travelling as no electronic voting options were available (Suayah 2012, Mahfud 2012, El Mayet 2012). Like in Egypt, there were no special seats in the Congress reserved for representatives of Libyans abroad. Instead, they could choose in which domestic constituency to cast their vote (IOM June 5, 2012).

The HNEC website has no specific section for Libyans abroad. Under the Q & A heading of the Arabic version of the website, there are no instructions or information for this group of citizens. On the English version of the website there is, however, a press release which declares that democracy can not be achieved without “the participation of all Libyan people living inside Libya and abroad” in free and fair elections. It also specifies that the HNEC considered all Libyans, whether inside or outside of Libya, “on equal footing” as far as elections entitlement is concerned. Further, “given the great contributions of Libyan expatriates in supporting the February 17 revolution and their enthusiasm and aspirations to take part in the elections” it was, accroding to the press release,
important to allow Libyans abroad to vote. The task given to HNEC had been to conduct national elections and it had been up to the HNEC to decide whether it had the capacity to include overseas Libyans (HNEC 27 June 2012). In the end the HNEC had obviously decided that it had that capacity in part.

Returning Diaspora Members in Governments?

Returning, finally, to the main focus of the research proposal, it has not been possible to get a conclusive overview of the number of returning diaspora members who have entered the new elite emerging after the fall of the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. This requires, among other things, access to biographical data on all members of government and parliament for all three states. However, a quick overview based on biographical data readily available on the internet shows that:

In the case of Tunisia, at least 6 ministers (out of 19) are returning diaspora members. So is the President of the Republic. In the case of Egypt, out of 37 ministers none have been confirmed as returning diaspora members (information lacking on 14 ministers). In the case of Libya, at least 2 ministers (out of are 34) are returning diaspora members, including the Prime Minister (biographical information lacking on 29 ministers). The first President of the NGC and thereby Libya’s de facto head of state was also a returning diaspora member.

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to theoretically and empirically explore diaspora inclusion/exclusion in legal frameworks and electoral processes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya after the 2011 fall of their authoritarian regimes. The argument has focused on the fact that although returning diaspora members have often played a significant part in the political processes following the fall of authoritarian regimes, neither transition studies nor research on diaspora contribution to homeland development have paid any attention to this phenomenon. Five hypotheses on factors that facilitate political leadership roles for returning diaspora members were developed. The first two hold that returnee political leadership is more likely when the national identity includes the diaspora as part of the nation and when legal frameworks allow diaspora participation in the political processes that follow the fall of an authoritarian regime. These two
hypotheses were then partly tested in the pilot study which showed that diaspora participation – and, indeed, possibilities for diaspora participation – differed between the three cases.

Although the Egyptian 2012 constitution was the only one that specifically mentioned Egyptians abroad, including their right to vote, it also had the strictest limitations with regard to dual citizenship and the right to run for office. The Libyan temporary constitution had the least requirements and conditions with regard to the citizenship(s) of political candidates. Regulations were instead specified in documents outside of the constitution, indicating that constitutions alone are not enough to establish the extent of diaspora inclusion/exclusion and dual citizenship regulations with regard to voting and candidacy rights. Tunisia was the state that clearly took its diaspora into consideration from the start. The central committee of the Independent High Electoral Commission, the body authorized to conduct the elections, was specifically instructed to include a representative of Tunisians abroad and it was made clear from the beginning that these would be allowed to vote. Conditions for voting were eased in order to facilitate their participation and Tunisia was the only state where voters abroad formed their own constituency. With approximately 8% of the Constituent Assembly Seats, diaspora Tunisians were slightly underrepresented (a common estimate of Tunisians abroad amount to at least 10% of the total population) but were allowed to participate in the formulation of the new constitution in a very direct way. The ambition to include overseas Tunisians in the political process and adapt the Constituent Assembly to the idea that the Tunisian nation is not limited by the state borders was made clear.

Unlike in Tunisia, the participation of Egyptians abroad in elections and referenda was not self evident from the start as they were not able to participate in the first referendum of March 2011. The reason for this could be that it was held almost immediately after the fall of Mubarak with no time to register voters abroad. Given that constitutional amendments in order to stress their right to participate in the December 2011 parliamentary elections was made only in November, it is also likely that the issue of voting abroad was not put on the agenda until autumn (possibly as a result of the Tunisian elections).

In Libya, there was an initial decision not to include Libyans abroad in the voting process. This was due to reasons of logistics and when the agreement was signed with IOM in order to conduct out of country voting only two months prior to the elections it had been decided that there would be polling stations in six states outside of Libya. Libyans residing in other states were not completely
excluded as they could travel either to these six states or Libya in order to vote but considering the time and money required to do so it can be concluded that their participation was not facilitated. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan website of the body authorized to conduct the elections had no special section for nationals abroad.

A comparison of outgoing, temporary and final constitutions showed that with regard to the diaspora, restrictions for voters had eased in the Tunisian case as a minimum time period of Tunisian citizenship had been removed. For candidates to parliament, restrictions had increased as a minimum time period of Tunisian citizenship had been raised from five to ten years. The fact that requirements for Tunisian roots (at least one parent) had been removed was, naturally, not of any help to diaspora members but possibly to immigrants of non-Tunisian descent. Requirements for presidential candidates had been eased as candidates no longer need two Tunisian parents and four Tunisian grandparents. This makes it possible for someone with only one Tunisian parent to run for presidency, which makes entirely new groups within the diaspora eligible.

In the Egyptian case, outgoing and temporary constitutions do not specify candidacy rights. The final version however has restrictions likely to impact diaspora members; ministers can not have held dual citizenship beyond the age of 19 and presidential candidates can not have held dual citizenship at any point in time. Nor can they be married to non-Egyptians. With regard to the Libyan electoral law holders of dual citizenship can both vote and run for office. It thereby did not pose obstacles to diaspora participation although, as it turned out, logistical circumstances did. As Libya’s final constitutional charter is yet to be formulated it remains to be seen whether it will specifically include or exclude diaspora members.

As for the basic research question of *End of Exile*, returning diaspora members as part of the new political elite, it can be concluded that at least Tunisia and Libya have returning diaspora members as members of government and the first post-election heads of state in both were also returning diaspora members. While the regulations laid down in the Egyptian constitution may explain the non-visibility of Egyptian diaspora members in government, there may also be other explanations. Returning to the hypotheses discussed above, one such explanation could be the fact that domestic oppositional forces had to some extent been able to function and therefore had candidates to promote once democratic elections were held. Further research will have to conclude whether these, or other factors,
best explain differences in returnee representation in political leadership in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Voting from abroad</th>
<th>Diaspora represented in parliament</th>
<th>Run for parliament</th>
<th>Ministerial appointment</th>
<th>Running for presidency</th>
<th>Nationals abroad mentioned in the constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• At least one Tunisian parent • Citizenship for at least ten years • Dual citizenship allowed</td>
<td>• Dual citizenship allowed</td>
<td>• Citizenship by birth • Muslim • No other citizenship at the time of candidacy</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Yes(^{3})</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• Dual citizenship allowed</td>
<td>• No other citizenship beyond the age of 19</td>
<td>• Egyptian parents • No other citizenship since birth • Not married to non-Egyptians</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Partly (6 states)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• Dual citizenship allowed</td>
<td>• Dual citizenship allowed</td>
<td>• Dual citizenship allowed</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Summary of diaspora inclusion/exclusion in the final draft of the Tunisian constitution, the 2012 Egyptian constitution and the Libyan 2012 electoral law.

References in English and Swedish:


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\(^{3}\) apart from the first referendum.


"NTC to transfer power to newly-elected Libyan Assembly August 8," Tripoli Post August 2, 2012. Available at


References in Arabic:


The last decades in Turkey have been marked with the globalization and Europeanization processes, as well as the rise of Islamic identity and the Kurdish identity demands. The country, in the last couple of years, has also experienced the landslide electoral victories and single-party governments of the Justice and Development Party, weak opposition parties, accession negotiations with the European Union (EU), reform measures directed at the democratization of its laws and polity, and proactive foreign policy towards the Middle East and Africa. Turkey, on the one hand, has attained an increasing global visibility and a strong economy, and become a crucial regional actor, yet on the other hand; the country continues to face serious problems of democratic deficit, a confrontational political climate, societal polarization, and human rights violations. Within this context, the discussions on citizenship increasingly gained ground, and its restructuring has become a politically charged issue. The parliamentary talks about the making of the new constitution in 2012 have also come to a stalemate around this issue. This chapter aspires to analyze how the ‘citizen’ is historically constructed in the educational discourses in Turkey, as well as the changes and the continuities in the configurations of citizenship since the beginning of the decade. In doing so, it focuses on the site of education; i.e. on the education policies, educational documents, curricula, and the textbooks used in compulsory schooling from the 1920s onwards. It involves discourse analysis
of the steering documents, curricula and schoolbooks concerning primary education, and also interviews with the teachers, educational specialists, and bureaucrats.¹

Public mass education, a mechanism for political socialization, and disciplining of the populations, has also been used worldwide as an instrument for creating social change and realizing the process of nation-building (Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Foucault 1991). It has historically been state-sponsored and regulated. National curricula and textbooks, as the transmitters of selected and organized knowledge, are the result of these state-imposed guidelines (Young 1971; Goodson 1987a, 1987b; Meyer et al. 1992; Popkewitz and Brennan 1998; Ball 1990). In countries such as Turkey, where state-centric curriculum development and textbook production or authorization is the practice, textbooks can be considered among the major carriers of the state’s discourses.

In what follows, first, the formation of the citizenship regime in Turkey will be discussed by focusing on the nation-state building process. Then an analysis of the citizenship regime in Turkey will be provided by concentrating on the site of compulsory public education, and specifically on the textbooks, in the early Republican era. In fact, nation building, rather than being a one-time event, is a process that requires rounds of restructuring (Walby 1992; Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002). National identity and citizenship regimes are defined along these rounds, and are not frozen but change over time; thus I will also put forth the changes and continuities in the years following the transition to multi-party politics. Then the years in which globalization and Europeanization processes started to affect Turkey and have become intensified, that is the years after 1980 to the present, will be analyzed in detail, and the analysis of the textbooks will be carried to the recent years.²

¹ Part of this research is being supported by the Swedish Research Council under the project Future Citizens in Pedagogic Texts and in Educational Policies – Examples from Lebanon, Sweden and Turkey (project number: 2010-37261-78644-41). In this comparative project, the substudy on Turkey is conducted together with Assoc. Prof. Marie Carlson from University of Gothenburg.
² The analysis of the textbooks starts with the books written under the 1926 curriculum, and covers the Turkish readers/Turkish language, and history/social studies textbooks that are officially designed and authorized to be used in primary education (from grades one to five), which by virtue of being compulsory reflects mass education. Turkish readers for the language courses existed from grades one to five, and history courses were in grades four and five. With the 1968 curriculum reform, the fourth and fifth grade primary school history courses were merged with the geography courses forming the social sciences courses. The lower grades of secondary school (from grade six to eight) were made
The Making of State-Centric Modernity and Citizen in Turkey

The studies that analyze the nature of citizenship in the Republic of Turkey by focusing on the constitutive texts, i.e. constitutions of the early Republican era, generally argue that it adheres to a civic-political citizenship regime as opposed to an ethno-cultural one. However, as revealed by various studies focusing on nationalism, nationhood and citizenship in Turkey, ambiguities and discrepancies exist between how citizenship is approached and conceptualized in the constitutive texts, and the practice and implementation of citizenship (Kadioğlu 1998; Yeğen 2004). These ambiguities have been embedded in the historical construction and unfolding of citizenship discourse and regime in modern Turkey.

Brubaker, presenting a typology of “state-led nationalisms” versus “state-seeking nationalisms,” argues that different forms of nationalisms resulting from specific historical conjunctures led to differing conceptions of nationhood and citizenship regimes in Europe (Brubaker 1990, 1992). He argues that citizenship has historically been defined along national identity, and as belonging to a specific nationhood (Brubaker 1990, 386). Brubaker analyzes the historical trajectories of nation-building in France and Germany, in order to compare the conceptions of nationhood and the citizenship regimes that are founded upon them. The temporal distance between the processes of state formation and nation-building, as well as their sequence, has determined the distinct nature of nationhood and citizenship in these two countries. Brubaker considers France as a “state-nation.” Nation as a category of practice came into being in France temporally after the state; it was defined by political unity designated along the institutional and territorial frame of the state. These developments resulted in a state-centered, assimilationist, unitarist, universalist and secular conception of nationhood defined in “political” terms. However, the historical experience of Germany with nationalism led to a different conception of nationhood. As Brubaker states, the German nation was first constituted as a cultural unity. “This pre-political German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived

(compulsory and became a part of primary education in 1997. Thus the analysis from this date onwards focuses on both the lower and upper grades of primary school, but specifically on the social sciences textbooks, and is carried to the education year 2011-2012 covering the textbooks written after the most recent curricula reform.)
not as the bearer of political values, but as an organic, cultural, linguistic or racial community -- as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft” (Brubaker 1990, 386). German intellectuals, influenced by the ideas of Romanticism, played a significant role in the expression of German nationalism in ethnic and cultural terms, which led to the emergence of an “ethno-cultural” conception of nation. Due to this “state-seeking nationalism”, the German conception of nationhood and the citizenship regime acquired a Volk-centered, differentialist, particularistic and organic nature.

When compared with the actual historical experiences, any typology is bound to be reductionist. Typologies are indeed simplifications made through abstraction, and at best approximations to real processes; however, following Weberian lines, they can be used as heuristic devices for analysis of the ambiguities that lie at the heart of the citizenship discourse and regime in modern Turkey. Kadioğlu in her works on Turkish nationalism and citizenship regime points to the paradoxical nature of Turkish nationalism and the conception of nationhood, and argues that they display the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms and nationhood. (Kadioğlu 1996). The paradox stems from trying to achieve a balance between the (Western) Civilization and Culture -- between modernity and tradition. In other words, Turkish nationalism embraces the characteristics of both French and German nationalisms in an “attempt to combine the missions of both French and German models” (Kadioğlu 1996, 179). As Kadioğlu argues, besides the paradoxical nature of Turkish nationalism, the sequence of the emergence of state and nation in Turkey is also important in defining the nature of national identity and citizenship; such that “In the case of modern Republican Turkey, one can refer to a state preceding a nation (i.e., “a state in search of its nation”). Hence, state-political unity ... contrary to the case in Germany — constitutes the cornerstone of Turkish national identity” (Kadioğlu 1998, 31).

The success of the nineteenth century reformers of the Ottoman Empire was in fact “in producing a well-trained, knowledgeable bureaucratic elite guided by the interests of the state” (Mardin 2006, 308). This Western-educated elite was followed by the succeeding generations that were much more radical and impatient with respect to the reform measures, and they were much more influenced by the diffusion of nationalist ideologies throughout Europe. By the end of the nineteenth century, the aim of modernization in the Empire increasingly became the realization of a nation-state in the image of the West for the purposes of “saving the state.” Republican Turkey was both the outcome of
the modernization efforts and a response to the developments that took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; i.e. nationalism movements, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and the First World War, the end of which brought military occupation of the lands of the Empire. These developments triggered a nationalism that embraced a discourse of territoriality based on stressing the existence of enemies and the necessity to safeguard independence, which in turn shaped the nation-state building process. In this context, modernization, nationalism, and security became inextricably linked to each other.

This nationalism of the interwar years and the citizenship regime that was built upon it had other significant characteristics besides territoriality: their Muslim and modernist character. Analyzing the final years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic, Zürcher conceptualizes the existing hegemonic nationalism as “Ottoman Muslim nationalism” (Zürcher 2000). The nationalist movement occurring during this time tried to create solidarity within the Muslims living on the lands of the Empire, and pursued the creation of a political space for this Muslim community. The loss of the lands and (mainly Christian) populations that were under Ottoman rule, and the influx of Muslims from the lost lands, as well as from the Caucasus, led the ruling elites to adhere to such a nationalism. Zürcher stresses that “the movement was political, not religious,” and “that is why the Muslim nationalism of the Young Turks could go hand-in-hand with secularist modernizing policies” (Zürcher 2000, 173). It was after 1924, as the Kemalist leadership of the Republic opted for far-reaching secularization moves, the character of the nationalism, and the national identity it sought to formulate changed. As the Muslim character of the national identity was officially set aside, its modernist character through Westernization moves, and within time, its ethnic character came to be emphasized. Yıldız, analyzing the following years, argues that in the years between 1924 and 1929, nationhood was not defined in terms of religion, but had become secularized; and after 1929, an ethnic axis was incorporated into the national identity (Yıldız 2001, 16-17). As the Muslim character of the national identity was officially set aside, its modernist character through Westernization moves, as well as its ethnic character came to be strongly emphasized. However, it should also be noted here that despite the abolishment of Islam from the public sphere, it implicitly continued to delineate the borderlines of the national identity and the citizenship regime that is built upon it (Cizre 2001, 230, 233), and it became increasingly conflated with the ethnic elements from the late 1970s onwards.
Formation of the Citizenship Regime in the Site of Public Education

Üstel, analyzing the formulation of the notion of citizenship in the late-Ottoman Empire argues that with the Second Constitutional Period, the citizen became the major actor in the political discourse. This discourse focused on the “invention” of the citizen (Üstel 2004, 73). The constitution formed the legal background of the transition of subjects into citizens; however, the community of citizens was yet to be formulated, mainly through education. A new subject, civics [Malumat-ı Medeniye], was introduced into the curriculum in this period as a result of these attempts to create citizens. Starting with the Second Constitutional Period, Üstel analyzes the civic textbooks used in the primary and secondary schools, and shows that, following the French example of political citizenship, citizenship was defined by the territory of the state. Special emphases were placed on patriotism, morality, and on being civilized. This citizen was at the same time an individual who was guided by reason. The aftermath of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) brought changes to this formulation. The citizen was re-invented with a focus on ethnic/cultural factors. An emphasis on sacrificing lives for the homeland was also a part of this re-invention (Üstel 2004, 105-112). These changes were indeed carried into the early Republican times.

The analysis of the language and history textbooks used in primary public education in the early Republican era points to a similar picture. In the textbooks of the late 1920s¹, in fact, the main emphasis was on territory, and it acted as the focal point of the Kemalist discourse. The citizenship discourse was structured with patriotism as its main axis. Patriotism, as shown in the textbooks, included awareness and love of the land, and also notion of loyalty, sacrifice and debt. Anatolia was called “the homeland of martyrs” through presenting narratives about the battles and self-sacrifices done in the War of Independence (Emre 1928, 172).² The existence of enemies was underlined, the preservation of territorial borders attained utmost importance, martyrdom was applauded, and

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¹ These are the textbooks written under the 1926 curricula. The 1924 curricula was mainly a continuation of the 1914 curriculum.
² For instance, the passage titled “The Child of the Homeland” narrated the story of a little child sacrificing his life to protect the homeland (İçsel and İçsel 1929b, 213). In another language reader published in 1929 for third grade students, a passage entitled “A Brave Child” told a story of self-sacrifice at the time of War of Independence (Emre 1929, 35-36).
shedding of blood became a frequently used imagery. The emphases on self-sacrifices made all the living, and all who will be born indebted to the martyrs, and to the homeland. Death was glorified in this context with a view to mobilize the society for self-sacrifices.

In this Republican formulation of citizenship, specific emphases were put on duties, defined primarily as military service, internalizing a protestant work ethic, and paying taxes. Yet there was no mentioning of rights; instead duties were linked to the feelings of love and indebtedness to the territory of the new state. The design of citizenship was such that duties existed not in relation to rights but because of love and indebtedness towards the homeland. As in the passage “Little Soldier” narrating the story of a child who had joined the army during the War of Independence, citizens were indebted with the duty of serving the homeland, and the most fundamental service to the homeland was military service (İçsel and İçsel 1929a, 205-207).

At the same time, besides patriotism, special emphases were placed on morality and being civilized. State-endorsed production of an imaginary middle-class nuclear family was part and parcel of this making of the modern Turkish nation-state. The nation was imagined through an analogy between the family and nation. The constituting unit of the modern nation-state was not the citizen-individual but set as the nuclear family. With the nuclear family constituting the micro-cosmos of the nation, public identities were attached to and realized through family identities. This was the means by which equality among men was established, and the old hierarchies of the Empire were toppled. Men as husbands were defined as legally the sovereign powers able to enter into a formal relation with the state.

Let me note that the ideal citizen was defined not as any man. It was the middle class husband-father who was designated as the citizen ideal (Kancı 2008). This man formed the basis of the nation-state, and was configured as the hegemonic element. While defined as an enlightened and economically productive subject, he was made the head of the family and empowered as the primary citizen. Other men were set in a relationship of complicity\(^5\) with the

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\(^5\) For the term complicity see R. W. Connell, *Masculinities* (1995). Here Connell provides an examination of intra-gender relations; hegemony and domination versus subordination and complicity. He argues that hegemony is "a historically mobile relation," and hegemonic masculinity can only be established if there is a correspondence between the cultural ideal and institutional power (Connell 1995, 77).
middle-class husband-father through the embrace of similar values, and through the practice of military service.

These particular constructions of modern men relied on specific constructions of femininity. The primary aspect of these new constructions of femininity was motherhood. The ideal women, the ‘civilized’ female subjects, were presented in the textbooks as fashionable yet plainly dressed, educated middle-class women-mothers, and primarily defined in relation to the private sphere. The middle class wife-mother has been located in a dependent, at best, in a helpmate position in relation to man. With the modern woman constructed along the limits of a skilled modern mother and housewife, a new division of labor was put forward. Women were treated as both biological and cultural reproducers.⁶

Although sparingly used, the schoolbooks of the late 1920s were not without ethno-cultural references. At times, the words generation, nation and race were used interchangeably (İçsel and İçsel 1929b, 44-48). However, it is in the mid-1930s, that the ethnic axis of the nationalist discourse was solidified in the textbooks. After the introduction of the officially formulated Turkish History Thesis to the textbooks, the history textbooks argued that the Turkish nation was one of the oldest nations on earth — originating in Central Asia, migrating to different parts of the world, and bringing civilization along (Kültür Bakanlığı 1936, 11, 12, 69). As stated in the fourth grade history textbook published after the introduction of the Turkish History Thesis to mass education:

_Today we live in our genuine homeland called ‘Turkey.’ Turkish is our genuine language. We are called Turks. Every people living around, in every corner of our homeland are our real brothers/sisters. ... Because their ancestors are also Turks, they think the same, they feel the same. They are similar to each other, they fight together against the enemy, and they die together. When these are considered, shouldn’t they be regarded brothers/sisters of each other? Thus we call the brothers/sisters living in the Turkish Homeland and who has consciousness of his/herself, who knows his/her friends and enemies, all together, the Turkish Nation. This nation is the oldest and greatest nation of the world._ (Kültür Bakanlığı 1936, 12)

The definition of nation was now made by referring both to the ethnic origins and the territory of the Republic. These references were reinforced with a

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⁶ Women, carrying out professional jobs in the public space, were those without husbands — usually presented as widows who were in need of money.
discourse on enemies and homogeneity—consciousness about the existing enemies, fighting and dying in this respect, and unity in feelings and thoughts.

As the history textbooks of the time argued, Anatolia was populated by Turks migrating from Central Asia since the pre-historical times (Kültür Bakanlığı 1936, 67-68). Citizenship was defined increasingly ethnically, and the geographical territory of the Republic was discursively constructed as ethnically Turkish. This re-writing of history was an attempt to create an identity divested from the Muslim and Ottoman aspects. Besides duties and modern behavior roles, a myth of origins and ethnic attachments were put forth as the basis for citizenship in this nation-building project.

The arguments of the History Thesis culturalized warriorship, war, self-sacrifice, and soldiering. The emphasis that is seen in the textbooks of the late 1920s on the War of Independence did not decline. Yet now the textbooks were also full of the narratives about the wars of ancestors. Sacrificing lives for the protection of the homeland became a highlighted theme with recourse to the primordial ancestors. The children were told that, as stated in a language reader published in 1934, “Ancient Turks were a nation who loved to make war... who depended on nothing but their swords. ... They wanted to die in war by giving their life and blood; they considered dying at home a disgrace. As they have said: Man is born in the house, dies in battle” (Çığıraçan 1934a, 217). The nation was indeed presented as having enemies since time immemorial (Çığıraçan 1934a, 215). It was now argued that “the Turkish nation is a soldier nation by birth” (Çığıraçan 1934b, 26-27). Soldiering was set in the textbooks of the mid-1930s and the following years not only as a citizenship duty, but also as the main ethno-cultural defining characteristic of Turkish citizenship, discursively opening a channel for transgressing of the line between the civilian and military spheres. It was further argued that, “Even the language Turks used was a short soldierly language” (Çığıraçan 1934a, 218).

The Changes and Continuities in the Citizenship Regime in the Aftermath of World War II

The years from mid-1940s onwards in Turkey were characterized by transition to democracy. However, this transition from one party-rule to parliamentary democracy did not bring any significant change to the nature of citizenship in Turkey. The dynamics of Cold War brought the notion of geopolitics to the
foreground, which indeed fed into the concerns about state’s security. The 1936 curriculum, the main curriculum of the single-party era, with the six Kemalist principles of the party incorporated, was set as the main focus of education until the late 1940s. The new curriculum was prepared in 1948, and there were no curriculum changes until 1968. With this new curriculum of 1948, the Kemalist historiography of the immediate past -- the narrative of the late-Ottoman times, the independence movement, and the early Republican years -- was not challenged, yet the narratives about the Ottoman and the Islamic past were restored.

In this context, the citizenship discourse of the textbooks continued to be inextricably linked to nationalism, modernization and security, and worked to articulate the primacy of the state. The basis of this Republican duty-bound citizenship regime, as in the former textbooks, was set as “serving the homeland.” While men were to serve primarily through military service, the primary duties of women were still child rearing and doing housework. The focus on territory and patriotism, with emphasis on self-sacrifice, formed the main axis of citizenship. Self-sacrifice for the homeland, nation, and state was considered an ethnic attribute of the Turkish nationhood. The emphasis on ethnic elements in the reconstructions of citizenship discourse and regime decreased with the abandonment of the most extreme claims of the Turkish History Thesis. The focus on ethnic origins of national identity, the narratives on the origins, and the myths of warrior ancestors persisted, and the geographical territory of the state continued to be imagined as ethnically Turkish from time immemorial (Oktay 1958, 32, 103; Unat and Su 1954, 86). The discourse of military-nation continued to be a hegemonic one; in the wording of a history textbook for fourth grade published in 1954, “Turks are first of all a military-nation” (Akşit and Eğilmez 1954, 60).

The military coup of 1960 is followed a year later by return to civilian politics and restoration of parliamentary democracy. However, the institutionalization of military’s tutelage over the political system, mainly with the newly formed National Security Council and the Armed Forces Union, left the country prone to future military interventions (Parla 1998; Cizre 2002, 2004). The beginning of the 1970s was marked by another military intervention. The 1971 intervention was followed by the incorporation of the far right into the politics and government coalitions. Political terrorism and assassinations set the scene leading to the 1980 military coup. During these interim years, the textbooks continued to highlight the same themes, and tried to provide linkages between
the so-called national characteristics and citizenship duties. They presented being hard-working as an intrinsic element of Turkishness, and explained it with the motto "being useful to the society is Turk’s main goal"; thus they underlined the duty to adopt a protestant work ethic, and pointed to the primacy of society over the individual (Sanır, Asal, and Akşit 1978, 227). Another national characteristic, being brave, referred to the duty of protecting the homeland. While explaining this characteristic of Turkishness, it was argued "For the homeland, nation, flag and rights, the Turk knows how to die willingly and without hesitating" (Sanır, Asal, and Akşit 1978, 227). Sacrificing lives for protecting the homeland, nation and its symbols was not only a highlighted duty, but in fact a defining feature of being a Turk.

In these years, the Primary Education Act, established in 1961, defined primary education as “the basic education that serves to develop all women and men mentally and morally, and to raise them in line with the national goals of Turks” (Binbaşoğlu 1999, 164). The Basic Law of National Education, first formed in 1973, stated the raison d’être and basic principles of Turkish national education in more detail; “providing children with “basic knowledge, skills and habits necessary for good citizenship, and national morality,” as well as “the development of interests, aptitude and talents and preparing for higher education.” The Law defined the “Turkish National Education Goals” as follows:

The overall objective of the Turkish National Education is to raise and train all the individuals of the Turkish nation all the individuals of the Turkish nation as citizens who are loyal to Atatürk’s reforms and Turkish nationalism as defined at the beginning of the Constitution; who adopt the national, moral, humanistic, spiritual, and cultural values of the Turkish nation; who love and try to exalt his/her family, homeland, nation; who know his/her duties and responsibilities with respect to the Republic of Turkey, which is a national, democratic, secular, social state governed by the rule of law and based on human rights and on the fundamental principles laid out at the beginning of the Constitution; and who behave accordingly. (Kaplan 1999, 265-266)

The Citizenship Regime of the Schoolbooks and the Globalization Process

The 1980 military coup in Turkey brought a wholesale political and economic restructuring. Civilian rule was restored, yet the new constitution of 1982 strictly limited the political rights and liberties of individuals, as well as social and
economic rights. It was also in this period that the processes of globalization started to affect the country. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in line with the global rise of the New Right and neoliberal economic policies, the discourses of minimal state and free market rationality have increasingly gained strength in Turkey. The unpredictable post-Cold War international context—i.e. the fall of the Eastern European block and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by the formation of new states in the former Soviet territories and in South-eastern Europe, as well as the Gulf War (1990-1991)—accommodated the concerns of securing the state. These years were also marked by the growth and strengthening of civil society, the revival of Islamism, and the escalation of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

What we also see in this era is a new history writing that glorifies Islam, and presents it openly as the innate characteristic of Turkishness. This religious-ethnic rewriting of history existed in the textbooks together with the residues of the Turkish History Thesis (Copeaux 2000). The 1983 Basic Law of National Education was almost the same as the one issued in 1973. The main change was the replacement of “Turkish nationalism” with “Atatürkist nationalism”, the latter found its place in the introduction and the general principles of the new constitution, and was introduced into all curricula and schoolbooks by the mid-1980s. Patriotism formed the main axis of citizenship, and besides using the notions of love and indebtedness, in the schoolbooks of the 1980s, it is emphasized by utilizing the conception of “threat.” Special significance was attributed to the concept of national security; the ethno-religious minorities and neighboring countries were treated as being dangerous, and the citizen was strictly limited through the national security discourse. The need for “strength, awareness, unity, and solidarity” was stressed (Sanır, Asal, and Akşit 1988, 243). The state discourse utilized nationalism to counter the effects of globalization, and to make the ideal of “saving the state” the primary motive of all citizens as against the strengthening societal actors. The increased connection between

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7 In 1986, a list of subjects, issues, and attributes were listed under the title of “subjects pertaining to Atatürkism” and added as required subjects, first, to the curriculum, and then to the textbooks, by a special decision of the National Board of Education and the High Council on Education (Eğitim ve Öğretim Yüksek Kurulu), the latter founded after the 1980 military coup. The issue of threat was among these newly introduced topics for both the fourth and fifth grade Turkish language and social science courses. The main reasons for its existence were stated as the “geopolitical significance of Turkey”, and the other countries’ “dislike of a strong Turkey” (MEGSB 1988, 165, 167, 225.)
security and nationalism was coupled with an increase in the ethnic references in the definitions of national identity and citizenship regime.

In the 1990s, a new chapter entitled “Homeland and Nation” was introduced into the social sciences textbooks (MEB 1991, 237-46), and it stressed Turkishness and security concerns. The definition of nationhood put emphasis specifically on common language and culture:

For a society of people to be a nation it should have various characteristics. The major ones of these characteristics can be listed as the following: Unity of language, unity of history, unity of homeland, unity of culture and unity of ideal [ülkü]. The people living in the Turkish homeland have these characteristics. These people form the Turkish nation. As we see, a society which has among themselves unity of language, culture and feeling is called nation. The Turkish people founding the Republic of Turkey are called the Turkish nation. (MEB 1991, 239)

This chapter, “Homeland and Nation”, was maintained with minor changes as the last chapter of the fourth grade social sciences textbooks of the succeeding years (Şahin and Şahin 1995, 226-31); and in 1999, the space allocated to the chapter increased as it was made into the first unit of the fifth grade social sciences textbooks (Şenünver et al. 1999, 9-23).

The other new chapter of the social sciences textbooks was on family. Family was presented as the basis of society, and it was argued that society was formed by the joining of families (Kolukisa et al. 2006, 27; Tekerek et al. 2005, 134). Citizenship regime was still set around a sexually gendered division of labor, where men formed the protectors and tax-payers with women being the protected, and having the duty to realize the reproduction of men, culture and nation.

The concept of minority was introduced to the discourse of textbooks in these years. It was used in the textbooks of the 1990s to refer to the members of the non-Muslim millets living under the Ottoman Empire; specifically with respect to the Armenian and the Rum (Greek) communities. These non-Muslim groups were treated as the internal others of the nation; they were not defined among the

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*The phrase “Turkish people” was changed to “the people of Turkey” in the following statement: “The people of Turkey [Türkiye halkı] founding the Republic of Turkey are called the Turkish nation” (Şenünver et al. 1999, 12).

*The millet system consisted of the organization and governance of the people living under the Empire along ethno-religious axes.
borders of nationhood and citizenship regime. Muslim groups such as Kurds were never named; they were treated as non-existing. Until the 1970s, the textbooks referred to the Armenians and the Rums in the parts that narrated the Independence War. It was argued that some of these “citizens” had acted treacherously and collaborated with the external enemies (Oktay 1961, 121). However, in the textbooks of the 1970s, they were generalized as “traitors”, and presented as historical enemies. They were the collaborators of the foreign enemy states. The textbooks of the following years adhered to this line of argument (MEB 1993, 144). The term minority acquired a pejorative meaning as both the Armenians and the Rums were blamed of treason.

**Education and Citizenship in Turkey in the 21st Century**

The new century marked the beginnings of a new process in Turkey – Europeanization (Delanty and Rumford 2005). Although the relations between Turkey and Europe have a long history, Europeanization process has become effective in the last decades, and it has been shaped by the exchanges between the EU and Turkey, which indeed seemed to take a definitive form with the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 (12-13 December). The summit set 2004 as a conditional date for the beginning of accession negotiations, which led the governments of the early 2000s to undertake various legal and administrative reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The reforms included measures such as the civilian control of the military institutions, the abolition of state security courts, and the freedom to teach and broadcast in such previously forbidden languages as Kurdish. The amendments and changes acted as positive reinforcements for strengthening the human rights and democracy. A new interest on citizenship emerged with the Europeanization process and it opened up spaces for democratization. A discussion on citizenship --whether or not it would be possible to consolidate democracy through the redefinition of the citizenship regime-- has been voiced by different societal groups in their attempts to articulate their claims to identity/difference with equal rights.

Despite these developments, the schoolbooks used in the beginning of the decade were identical to the ones used in the 1990s. It was the end of 2003 when a comprehensive curricula reform was initiated, and for “the first time since 1940s, curricula were considered as a whole by comparing them internationally”
Pilot implementation of the new curricula of the lower grades of primary school took place in 2004, and in 2005, they were applied throughout the country. Meanwhile the rewriting of the curricula of upper grades continued on a phasing basis, and the curricula for the grades six to eight were implemented throughout the country in 2007. With the reform, education was considered with a more comprehensive approach, with an emphasis on learning rather than only on teaching: such that teaching requirements were revised, new textbooks and new teaching guidebooks have been produced, in-service education programmes were developed, and an interactive web-site providing training support for teachers was formed.

The initiatives for the curricula reform included “the need to keep up to date with developments in science, technology and pedagogical approaches, and to increase relevance to the economy and democracy.” As briefed by a senior member of the National Board of Education “the changes also aim to ensure the integrity of the compulsory education curriculum, with conceptual integrity on both vertical and horizontal axes, and to align with EU practices” (OECD 2007, 56). Among the reasons for the changes, besides the need to meet modern standards, integration with the EU norms and objectives, and conformity to its education practices were also specified in the curricula. The necessity to pay attention to the EU’s 2020 educational objectives was specifically underlined (TTKB 2004; TTKB 2005). The EU practices, and the assessment and analyses of the existing programs were in fact taken as the reference points in the new teaching programs (MONF 2005, 65-66).

The government’s will to comply with the EU norms was indeed a major catalyst for these changes in education. However, the ongoing efforts of the intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s) and civil society organizations (NGO’s) should also be underlined because they have opened up spaces for democratization, and created an interest for human and citizenship rights. Since the 1990s, the NGO’s in Turkey started to conduct critical studies on the education system, arranged conferences and made publications. Some of these efforts were also supported by the international and/or supranational organizations. The efforts at textbook research, first and foremost, focused on the history textbooks. In the mid-1990’s, the Turkish Institute of Philosophy and later the History Foundation of Turkey conducted analyses of the history textbooks used in Turkey with the goal of re-writing these books with a world history focus. The Improvement of Balkan History Textbooks Project, completed in 2002, was undertaken by the History Foundation, and supported
by UNESCO. Upon its founding in 1946, UNESCO acknowledged that history textbooks have been used to generate atrocities between the states. Since then, various international, bilateral and/or national studies on textbook research have been conducted under the auspices of UNESCO or with its support. The Council of Europe (1949) has also been a promoter of the educational analyses and textbook studies across Europe, and most of the research it supported has been translated into Turkish.

The NGO’s in Turkey have come to be defined as actors in the site of education, and their works have created a concern and demand in the public for educational reform. They have publicized the discourse of rights and gender equity in education in Turkey, conducted research and analysis in such matters, and organized local and nationwide campaigns. A major project involving the analysis of textbooks that were in circulation from Fall 2001 to Spring 2002 was conducted under the auspices of the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) [Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi] by the History Foundation, in cooperation with the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) [Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı], and Eğitim-Sen (the teachers’ union). The project, entitled “Human Rights in Textbooks Project,” was supported financially by the European Commission and also by the Open Society Institute. It focused on the analysis of textbooks with respect to a set of human rights criteria determined by taking the UN Declaration of Human Rights as the basis. The History Foundation and TÜBA, in 2003, publicized the findings of this research, and also published the articles written by various scholars analyzing these findings (Ceylan and Irzik 2004). The project also included a series of national and international conferences, surveys about students’ and teachers’ evaluations of textbooks with respect to human rights, and formulation of guidebooks for teachers and textbook writers. A report, which made recommendations for curriculum reform and revision and re-writing of textbooks was also prepared, and presented to the Ministry of National Education (MONE), and to the public. Also among these research and campaigns are the pre-schooling and gender equity campaigns of IGO’s and NGO’s like UNICEF, Mother Child Education Foundation (AÇEV), and Education Reform Initiative (ERI).

Although what seems to mark the second half of the first decade of the 21st century in the site of education in Turkey is change --i.e. a comprehensive curricula reform was realized, teaching requirements were revised, new textbooks were produced, schooling of girls and preschool education became issues, and there have been specific work on these issues to increase such schooling, the
structure and organization of the MONE was changed— the main laws concerning education and designing the whole site stayed as they are. In fact, the Primary Education Act, first established in 1961, is still in place with a number of minor additions (MEB Mevzuat 2013a). The Basic Law of National Education (first formed in 1973) keeps its main lines of argument despite a number of changes that were made (MEB Mevzuat 2013b). These laws of education in Turkey continue to express the importance of the nation and state rather than the citizen, and put emphasis on the good of society rather than the good of the individual/child.

A similar picture can be seen in the social sciences curriculum for grades six and seven. The curriculum starts with an introduction in which the objectives of the Basic Law of National Education, Law 1739, stressing the importance of nationalism, providing a trilogy of family-nation-homeland and their primacy over the individual, underlining the necessity of exalting them and the need to fulfill the duties and responsibilities toward the state, are presented as among the overall goals of education. This is followed in the next page by the introduction of the objectives of the social sciences program. In the first objective, education’s major task is defined as encouraging all children, referred as “free individuals”, to discover their own uniqueness. The second objective includes an emphasis on patriotism; it states that “As a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, [the student] grows as a citizen who loves the homeland and nation, who knows and uses his/her rights, who fulfills his/her responsibilities, and who has national awareness.” The third objective underlines the importance of Atatürk’s principles and reforms, and adds that the students “should want to cherish the secular, democratic national and contemporary values.” Democracy and respect for human rights are underlined in the fifteenth objective, and the need to develop understanding for others, and developing a consciousness of humanity are emphasized as the last, seventeenth objective (TTKB 2005).

The curricula reform process of 2003-2005 included analysis of the curricula and the educational materials of other countries; these were taken as examples, but were not adopted as models. Among these countries we can name the United Kingdom, the United States, South Korea and Sweden. The new curricula have been enriched with activities, and instead of being teacher-centered and involving classroom work dominated by frontal teaching—i.e. “the teacher in front of the class, working with the one textbook in hand, making students memorize and reproduce”—it is student-centered. It aspires to displace the attributive approach with a cognitive and constructivist approach. It is argued that the term
"acquisition, including knowledge, skill, understanding and attitude" is now used instead of "behavior" (OECD 2007, 52-53). A change from highly centralized and detailed curriculum to curriculum guidelines has been realized. As argued in the Background Report prepared by the MONE on basic education in Turkey, the new curricula aspire to emphasize the individual, human rights, democracy and rights, sustainable development. The importance of society, as well as importance of duties and responsibilities is also underlined, as they are listed among the first items. In fact, the introductory booklet published in 2007 by the MONE, which explains the new curricula and tries to create publicity, and the Strategic Plan of the Ministry place specific emphasis on democracy. However, the main reference points of Turkish education are defined in these documents primarily as Atatürk’s principles and reforms, along with Turkish history and culture (İGM [2007]; SGB 2009). Democracy and respect for human rights are not prior to these, but follow and complement them. As the experiences of some of our interviewees who took part in the committees designing the new curricula show the outcome of this restructuring of the curricula was the result of negotiations and power dynamics within the MONE and upper levels of the state. Among the most controversial ones were the history and social sciences (which also introduces history for grades six and seven) curricula. Although a new history re-writing without ethnic emphases was an issue, and although it was widely discussed in the committees that were to redesign the curricula, it was not possible to realize it.

The new curricula and textbooks were in fact challenged in various ways; mainly for ardently embracing the neoliberal ideology and global capitalism ("İlköğretimde Neo-Liberal Müfredat Geliyor" 2005), and not paying enough attention to the subjects pertaining to Atatürkism. In the face of the fervent criticisms related to Atatürkism, the MONE founded a commission in September 2007 in order to revise the textbooks (Öztürk 2007; Demirkaya 2007; Kozok 2007). The commission was formed from the experts of the National Board of Education and the military personnel, the latter were invited to the commission by the Ministry ("Ders Kitaplarına Askeri Denetim" 2007). The revisions were concluded by the commission, and the schoolbooks have been revised and re-written accordingly. The Ministry also formed other revision committees, such as gender committees, and further revisions were introduced to the textbooks.

The new textbooks in the overall seem quite different from the earlier ones; rather than demanding that the children think, speak, act, and feel in specific
ways, and expecting them to fulfill various expectations obediently, the new books focus more on activity and research. However, it should also be noted that the new textbooks bear limitations, and contradictions. Their underlying discourses are similar in many respects to those of the previous textbooks. The new textbooks underlie the existence of rights, and being an active citizen aware of his/her rights (Altun, Doğan, and Uzun, 2011, 157; Polat et al. 2011, 38). The students are asked “Why is it important that the solutions brought to a problem be based on the basis of rights, obligations, and freedoms?” (Komisyon 2011, 31) The fundamental rights, “the rights that human beings must have because they are human beings, the inviolable and inalienable rights and freedoms,” are given in the sixth grade social sciences textbook as “the inviolability of residence, the privacy of private life, health, the right to education, the right to organize meetings and demonstrations, freedom of communication, freedom of settling and movement, the right to live, the inviolability of individuals, freedom of religion and conscience and freedom of thought,” and explained by using the articles of the 1982 constitution (Komisyon 2011, 156).

The Republican formulation of citizenship, in the earlier textbooks, was along the love of homeland and nation, and specific emphases were put on the duties and responsibilities, defined primarily as military service, internalizing a protestant work ethic, and paying taxes. The same formulation can be seen in the new textbooks, with the introduction of the notion of rights. The major citizenship duties, as specifically noted in the seventh grade textbook quoting Atatürk, are again underlined as military service and paying taxes: “Just like military service being a duty for homeland, tax is a liability of the citizen that is needed to be strictly fulfilled” (Polat et al. 2011, 147). The sixth grade social sciences textbook, in the chapter “The Journey of Democracy” puts forth the struggle for and the campaigns of political rights in the Western Europe and the US. However concerning Turkey, it is argued that democracy was already practiced by the ancient Turks, and yet there was a hiatus afterwards; the nation reached all the necessary rights and freedoms by the foundation of the Republic. Some developments with respect to the political rights in the Ottoman times are also mentioned, but again the emphasis is on the sultan as the actor. This top-down approach of the textbooks undermines the search for political --and also economic and social-- rights both in the Ottoman and in the Republican times. The citizen is presumed to be active not in seeking and acquiring her/his rights, but only in realizing and fulfilling the already defined ones. In fact, the problems
related with the rights and freedoms – specifically, the ones concerning the ethnic and religious minorities and gender issues-- are not mentioned at all.

The definitions of the nation in the current textbooks are similar to the earlier definitions of the term. As in the definitions formulated in the 1990s, the emphasis is (in the given order) on language, history, feeling, ideal and culture (Polat et al. 2011, 183; Altun, Doğan, and Uzun 2011, 180). Apart from this definition, which was taken from the dictionary of the Turkish Language Association, one can also come across such definitions as “Turkish nation is a state that is governed by a republic, which is the government of the people” (Polat et al. 2011, 144). Here the concepts of nation and state are indeed conflated. The definition of citizenship is formulated in the new textbooks not as a status; but what is underlined in the definitions that are presented is belonging to the land, homeland, and having specific feelings toward it. Citizenship is explained as “being a citizen; the status of being born, growing up and living in a homeland” (Polat et al. 2011, 185); whereas the citizen is defined as “each and every person having the same homeland or the same feelings about the homeland” (Arslan 2011, 220).10

In the current textbooks, patriotism again forms the main axis of citizenship with self-sacrifice, dying and killing in the name of the homeland being extolled. Turks are identified as “great warriors” (Polat et al. 2011, 85), and soldiering still forms one of the main cultural characteristics of Turkishness. The Turkish nation is regarded as one of the best examples of military nation; yet this construction, which in the earlier textbooks included only men, now redefined as also including women (Komisyon 2011, 72-73; Altun, Doğan, and Uzun 2011, 69). In a sixth grade social sciences textbook, in the chapter “Turks on the Silk Road”, under the part subtitled “Soldier Nation”, it is argued that:

_The steppes of Central Asia in which we live, necessitated that all the people, at the same time, be soldiers. In the management of the commanders, men, women, the elderly, and the young, all the people, were in a military structure. Soldiering not was a special profession. All the people were ready to fight at any moment. For this reason, the army-nation tradition was the general character of our people._ (Altun, Doğan, and Uzun 2011, 69)

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10 The Article 66 of the current Constitution (1982 Constitution), titled “Turkish citizenship,” states “anyone connected to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” Both of these definitions given in the textbooks are same as the ones in the dictionary of the Turkish Language Association; the Association, founded in 1932, was and still can be regarded as the official regulatory body of Turkish language.
Another cultural practice that is presented in the new textbooks, which supposedly goes back to the historical origins of the ethnic group, and which makes it possible to retain its identity is nuclear family:

*Although we migrated to different places, we maintained the culture and values because we give importance of family and kinship. According to our traditions, marriage means married girl and man establish a separate house. Our families are made up of the mother, father and children. (Komisyon 2011, 63)*

In fact, the nuclear family is still among the narratives of the textbooks along with a citizenship regime which is set around a gendered division of labor, with men forming the protectors and with women being the protected, and having the duty to realize the reproduction of men, culture and nation. Another sixth grade social sciences textbook argues the following concerning family and women:

*From the earliest days of history, no distinction was made in the Turks between men and women. ... In the pre-Islamic nomadic Central Asian Turks, the woman is a hero, if necessary, she fights alongside her husband, she has respectable place in the family, and most important of all, she is a mother. (Komisyon 2011, 155)*

Although the passage argues that men and women had been equal in the historical past of the ethnic group, it goes on providing a typical example of women providing “support” functions during wartime. As shown here, in the new textbooks women are still primarily regarded as mothers; thus being the main element of the nation’s biological reproduction and socialization. Women are also supposed to fight and sacrifice themselves, if and when the need arises, for the nation and the motherland alongside their “husbands.”

Beside this emphasis on family and motherhood, as well as on the wartime involvement of women mainly in supportive secondary roles, women’s participation in the public sphere and labor market are made visible in the new textbooks. Women role models, and women’s presence in the economic and political life can be seen especially in the subchapter titled “I am an Active Citizen”, and the chapter “The Journey of Democracy” (Komisyon 2011, 23, 168-169). Women are now in the textbooks as civil servants, directors, administrators, district governors, politicians, judges, prosecutors, farmers, doctors, university professors, entrepreneurs, engineers, machine drivers in the railways, train dispatchers, athletes, and artists.
It is possible to see in the new textbooks the traces of the past discourses especially in the narrations concerning the nation, origins, and homeland. Besides the narrative of military nation, the other elements of the Turkish History Thesis can also be discerned. The ethnic emphases, in the form of references to the ethnic origins and culture, the foundational myths, and the warrior ancestors, are still significant in defining nationhood and citizenship. The elements of the Turkish Islamic Synthesis are also evident in the textbooks. Especially the third chapter of the sixth grade social sciences textbooks, “Turks on the Silk Road”, concentrates on the historical Central Asia and the Turkish ancestors, “the first Turkish states,” and the narration of migrations. The same chapter also focuses on the rise and spread of Islam and the “First Turkish-Islamic States.” “Anatolia was made the Turkish homeland” as it was conquered by one of these states –the Great Seljuq Empire (Komisyon 2011, 78-89; Altun, Doğan, and Uzun 2011, 80-82). From the voice of a Seljuq sultan, it is stated “We struggled a lot to Islamize Anatolia and make it Turkish homeland” (Altun, Doğan, and Uzun 2011, 80). The contributions that the “Seljuqs of Turkey” (Türkiye Selçukluları) and the principalities that were established in Anatolia made in “the Turkification of Anatolia” are underlined (Polat et al. 2011, 53-57).

Despite the discourse on the Islamization/Turkification of Anatolia, the textbooks, in the narrations of Ottoman Empire, under the parts subtitled “Different Cultures Lived Together” and “Societal Tolerance and Interaction”, focus on the existence of other peoples besides Turks in Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire is called the “Homeland of Tolerance” (Polat et al. 2011, 72). This emphasis on tolerance and living together is rather important; it cannot be seen in the textbooks used before the curricula reform, in which non-Muslims was mentioned only in a pejorative way. In the new social sciences textbooks, non-Muslims are treated rather differently; the peaceful co-existence of non-Muslims in the Ottoman times is underlined. However, the term minority is not used, and other than non-Muslims, the existence of different ethnic groups are silenced. Similar to the earlier textbooks, different Muslim ethnic communities are still not mentioned in the new textbooks.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the formulation of the citizenship regime in Turkey in the site of education. The main elements of the citizenship regime are uncovered,
and its reproduction through the pedagogical texts is traced until the recent years. It is argued here that citizenship in Turkey was not defined as a status with rights and responsibilities, but by belonging to the territory of the state, which has in fact been specified ethnically. The main axis of the citizenship regime has been patriotism, and the fulfillment of duties has been the defining factor of being the "right" kind of citizen. The reference points of citizenship have been defined primarily as Atatürk's principles and reforms, and Turkish history and culture. As also discussed here, the Republican duty bound formulation of citizenship has recently changed to include the rights into this formulation.

The Europeanization process in fact opened up a manoeuvring space in favor of democratization; and it acted as a positive reinforcement for strengthening the human rights and democracy when the prospects of becoming a EU member seemed viable, and when the process was not in a stalemate. A new interest on citizenship emerged with the Europeanization process, and it has been voiced by different societal groups in articulating their claims to identity/difference with equal rights. However as it is shown above, the changes in the site of education are not comprehensive enough to answer these calls; much more comprehensive reforms embracing a discourse of citizenship based on equal rights and freedoms among diverse identities, are required. The dynamics of the educational changes involved the attempts to integrate with the EU's educational practices, the outcome being the result of process of negotiation between different societal groups, vested interests, and political, military and bureaucratic authorities. Thus even though what seems to mark the first decade of the 21st century in the site of education in Turkey is change, as seen here, a holistic change has not occurred; a new, inclusive conceptualization of citizenship, stripped of its ethnic emphasis has not arisen.

Turkey's own democratic transformation, which involves a redefinition of its citizenship regime, is in fact a critical factor in shaping its influence in the MENA region. Turkey has economic interdependences and cultural ties with the countries in the MENA region, and the country has unique attributes such as the co-existence of a secular democratic regime in a Muslim majority population and the cohabitation of Islamic values with Western life styles. Thus at a time when the regimes in the MENA region are in a process of transformation, with societal groups asking for basic rights, freedoms and democracy, Turkey's experience can be meaningful for these countries. Analyses of the shortcomings and limitations of Turkey's experience with democratic consolidation, especially in relation to how citizenship is conceptualized and how the citizenship regime is constructed,
are also significant for the democratic transformation of the region. In fact, for Turkey to act as an actor in assisting the transformation processes in the MENA region, the redefinition of citizenship, stripped of its ethno-religious, militaristic and gender-biased connotations, and based on equal rights and freedoms among diverse identities is utterly important. Lastly, collaboration between the EU and Turkey can further enhance the democratization process in Turkey, and aid transition to democracy in the region.

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CHAPTER 8
Walking the Tightrope: The Case of Swedish Civics Education

JOHAN SANDAHL

Introduction¹

In a recent editorial in one of Sweden’s main newspapers the political journalist Dilsa Demirbag-Sten complains about a shift in civic engagement during the last 40 years. What she remembers from the 1970’s is a citizenship aiming at change and engagement, whereas contemporary engagement is characterized “by a will to describe and ‘problematize’ reality”, but this approach achieves nothing but “empty talk” (Demirbag-Sten 2013). This debate on changes in civic engagement has been reoccurring in most western societies and many times from a youth perspective. In academic research there has been a growing interest to study youths’ political attitudes, values and participation, and their relationship to civic education in school (Ekman & Pilo 2012, Olson 2012). The general concern have been described by Ekman (2013): young people are becoming increasingly disengaged by politics (Cf. Dalton 2004) and that schools’ civic education in all

¹ The theoretical approaches in the conference paper have been used together with empirical studies in a later article; published in Nordidactica 2013:1, see Sandahl (2013).
western countries fail in their role to prepare young citizens for an engaged life in democracy. There are those who have contested this image by emphasizing that western democracies have undergone changes as societies and that citizens engage in new ways compared to some imagined “golden age” of democracy in the west. Some of these identified changes have been an increasing individualization with “political consumption”, rather than faithful voting, and that citizens take democracy for granted and therefore do not feel a strong need to participate (Putnam 2000, Micheletti 2010, Dalton 2004). Two major groups have been identified amongst the young in this research: the active and the passive citizens. The active are quite easy to describe, these are the ones who “live politics”, perhaps as members of youth leagues/NGO’s or in more temporary contexts such as Internet groups (Amnã 2010).

However, the active students are fewer for every year and a lot of scientific interest has been focused on schools’ impact on youths’ engagement. Many times the findings are discouraging. Ekman & Zetterberg (2011) concluded in a Swedish context that the only factor with distinct impact for the development of political citizenship was socio-economic and not what was going on in the classroom. The same results can be found in Torney-Purta’s (2002) major study of civic education in 28 countries that was based on the surveys made by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Several Swedish studies, conducted with different methodologies have come to the same conclusion (Almgren 2006, Ekman 2007, Broman 2009). But what does it mean to be passive? In recent years many political scientists have begun questioning wheather or not there are some problems in the studies of youths’ engagement, especially the international surveys that have been conducted. Is there only one way to be passive, or can we find a political interest amongst some of them? Many have tried to introduce new labels, such as “attentive” or “monitorial” citizens for those citizens that are interested in politics and societal issues, but who are not active (Geissel 2007, Dalton 2004, Schudson 1996). The Swedish political scientists Erik Amnã and Joakim Ekman (2012) have, in recent years, worked with a new typology to try to find these youths in the national surveys that try to measure political engagement. They have described citizens in four ways: as active, stand-by, disengaged, and disillusioned. The active have already been introduced above. The stand-by citizens are those attentive citizens that are not necessarily politically active in a traditional way, but they are politically enlightened and self-confident. If they would be triggered by some societal event they can go from stand-by to active citizens (Schudson 1996,
Ekman & Pilo 2012:207). The more dormant citizens can be found in the last two groups. The disengaged do not have an interest in politics, while the disillusioned are outspoken in their hostility towards politics, almost anti-political (Amnå 2010). Ekman and Amnå are now studying the surveys from this new typology and the findings show that many of the passive students belong to this stand-by category (Amnå & Ekman 2013, forthcoming).

Not underestimating the problems with declining engagement, I would say that we have to try to understand what is going on in schools with this research in mind. We have to focus our attention on teaching itself and discuss what strategies teachers could have and what that might mean for students civic engagement.

School and Civic Engagement

School have official tasks, but also unofficial ones. In Swedish school five different assignments deserve to be highlighted: knowledge, democratic socialization, general fostering, detainment and sorting for higher education (Ahrme, Roman & Frånzen 2003:177-187). The first two assignments are to be found in the curriculum while the other three are tacit. In Sweden there is a general assignment for all teachers to foster students in democracy, but Civics, History, Geography and Religious studies have a special attention on democratic content, values and attitudes. However, Civics is the assigned subject with the major responsibility for political education in Sweden and the Nordic countries (Bronäs 2000, Børhaug 2011:25, Ekman & Pilo 2012:58).

Sweden has a long tradition of civic education, dating back to the early decades of the 20th century. However, the emphasis on the ideal of fostering citizens in the curriculum has varied over time. Civic education has its roots in history education in the 1800’s where it was a part of the nation building process, focusing on God and country. With the democratic breakthrough in the first decades of the 1900’s, focus shifted somewhat towards citizenship with an emphasis on learning about the institutions within the national political system. The major shift came in the wake of World War II when the social democratic government proposed a new curriculum with a focus on both democratic fostering and preparation for the labor market. The debate on whether school should focus on fostering students or building knowledge has been recurrent since then. One of the new inventions in the curriculum was a brand new subject called Civics (“Samhällskunskap”). It was a subject meant to vaccinate youths
against totalitarian ideologies, focusing on democratic ideals and civic literacy. The heart of Civics has always been to prepare students for citizenship, but as in the case of the general curriculum there has been a shifting emphasis on knowledge and fostering (Englund 1986, Bronäs 2003, Olson 2008).

Civics is a subject quite specific for the Scandinavian countries. There has been some discussion on the best translation, but I use Civics, even though it might lead us astray. The subject’s rational in Sweden is very different from school subjects such as citizenship in terms of subject matter (a more direct translation would be “Social Science”). The academic disciplines that constitute the subject are political science, sociology, economics and human geography. It is a compulsory subject for all students from grade 1-12 and in the present curricula Civics mainly focuses on critical thinking, analysis and interpretation of contemporary society. The aim of teaching Civics is described as follows:

Teaching in the subject of social studies should aim at helping students broaden, deepen and develop knowledge of people’s living conditions based on different social issues… Students should be given the opportunity to develop a scientific approach to social issues and an understanding of scientific work on social issues. In addition, teaching should contribute to creating conditions for active participation in the life of society. A complex society with a huge flow of information and a rapid rate of change requires a critical approach, and students should thus be given the opportunity to develop such approaches. They cover the ability to search for, organize and assess information from different sources and media, as well as the ability to draw conclusions from the information. (Swedish National Agency for Education 2011)

In the new curricula there is a special focus on how social scientists approach political, economic and social issues. I will argue that that there is strength in this approach, both in dealing with content/skills and in preparing our students for citizenship. Therefore, the first balance for teachers to address is how much emphasis should be put on content/skills and how much should be put on democratic fostering?

Teaching in a Space between Critical Thinking and Legitimization

All teaching also balances on a tightrope between legitimizing society with its political institutions and emancipating the individuals through critical thinking.
(Apple, Au & Ganding 2009). This line, or tightrope, is of special interest for Civics. Legitimation or justification can take many forms in school: the most obvious are role expectations and mediating current societal norms but also how to view the world and what is considered as appropriate behavior and appropriate values (Børhaug & Christopherson 2012:14-15).

In a democracy like Sweden, schools’ civic education is about creating a common notion on how to perceive the world and its members’ identities to create a common ground for a democratic society. As Børhaug & Christopherson (2012) concluded, this is not a problem if it was not for the critical thinking aspects of Civics. Civics is not only about socializing our youths into the norms of our present society, but also to develop their critical thinking (Klafki 1998). The term has been a buzzword in Swedish curricula since the 1970’s, but it has never been explicitly explained, thus putting it in the hands of the teachers to interpret it.

Returning to the tightrope, we can imagine different kinds of positions that teachers can or will take. The legitimizing position is to present a view on society that is authoritative – i.e. everything is as it ought to be; the political institutions are functioning and problems could be seen as the “exceptions that prove the rule”. The non-problematizing view of society is perhaps hard to find in Scandinavian schools, but seems to be quite common in text books in Civics (Børhaug & Christopherson 2012, Bronäs 2000).

Critical thinking can take different forms in Civics. It could be a mild version focusing on source criticism but it could also be a method to deconstruct the narratives of our contemporary society. This pure critical thinking will address the issues of power and control that might be found in the political debate or within our institutions; this position would be a post-modern one. Both of these standpoints are problematic in civic education. Not problematizing our society in terms of political, social and economic challenges will not prepare youths for life, in fact it could be confusing for them to meet the discourse outside school (Simonneau & Legardez 2010). Problematizing the issues too much by giving them examples of the failures of society (e.g. portraying the legal system through its scandals) might give them dogmatic views. Or even worse: create a sense that they are not part of the social arrangement at all.

So, how can teachers balance this tightrope of teaching children and adolescents about contemporary society and at the same time prepare them for citizenship? How can they balance the line between legitimizing society and teaching critical perspectives? I will argue that there are two very different
approaches to this task and that both are problematic, and I will present a third approach to help teachers walk the tightrope.

**Approaches to Teaching Civics in Swedish Schools**

In a recent study Christina Odenstad (2010) studied assessment documentation and found three types of questions in Civics teaching. These made her conclude that Civics can be described through three nouns: orientation, analysis and discussion. Odenstad’s typology can be used to introduce two very different approaches of teaching Civics. The first is what we can call the *fact-based approach* where the value issues in Civics are omitted. In this approach the world is described based on scientific knowledge. Problems or challenges can be addressed only after the objective facts have been presented. Once that is done it is up to the students to have an opinion about what to do. This approach thus centers on the facts of society and its members. This does not necessarily mean that fact-based teaching only gives legitimizing perspectives. Since science is the foundation of our understanding critical perspectives can also be introduced, but focus is on factual knowledge even though teachers can focus around more complex concepts such as “power”. This approach has its problems. Facts are always important, no doubt about that. But I would argue that the “truths” science delivers, especially in social sciences and the humanities quite soon become debatable. The political scientist Bo Rothstein (2002) has, on several occasions, pointed out that it is easy to find the facts, e.g. unemployment rates, but that these facts are not interesting per se. What is interesting is how these facts are used. For Rothstein, science is about being wrong, but wrong in an interesting way so that it could be debated. Therefore, most facts are uncontested, like unemployment rates in Sweden. But other questions, like why there is unemployment in Sweden could be debated. Some would argue that this approach prepares students for citizenship in giving them non-partial facts about society, but I would say that teachers sooner or later have to address societal discourse and the different positions that you would find in various political settings (Cf. Kincheloe 2001).

In contrast, the second approach focuses on discussion and debate, thus allowing the students to learn factual knowledge at the same time as they develop democratic skills. However, focus is on discourse climate and acceptance of different views. The theory behind this *deliberative approach* is that when students listen to each other they will discover new perspectives and understand
how other people think about social issues, thus enhancing their knowledge and skills as citizens (Englund 2000 & 2006, Fishkin & Ferrar 2005). The approach has been heavily criticized for its normativity and its emphasis on generic skills, but also for lack of empirical evidence that it works (Fredriksson 2008). Most studies on deliberative learning are based on survey data and have concluded that the effects on students are low and that the best results can be found in classes with high achieving students, thus making it an elite approach (Ekman 2007). However, a recent classroom-focused study from Gothenburg University indicates that there are some effects amongst both low and high achievers. The effect is not strong, but there is no negative effect on the students’ knowledge or democratic skills (Andersson 2012). Alongside the discussion on the effects of deliberative learning is the issue of definition; what does it mean to teach in a deliberative manner? Professor Tomas Englund (2006) has a very ambitious list for teachers to follow, but it is not a farfetched guess that it is quite rare to find a deliberative classroom where all teaching focuses around deliberative discussions. As many studies have concluded, discussion is a very common practice in Civics class, but as a part of teaching and not as its center (Vernersson 1999, Odenstad 2010). Even if it is an important part of teaching it can be very different in its perspectives if we consider it in terms of legitimizing and critical thinking. Ljunggren & Unemar Öst (2010) has mapped out four different positions that teachers take on teaching controversies in school:

![Diagram](image_url)

**Figure 1: Teachers and their communicative strategies (Ljunggren & Unemar Öst 2010).**

The most common position that was found in the research was “the norm conveyer”. This position can be described as a high acceptance for controversial
issues but after the discussion the teacher gave the “correct” answer, conveying the present norms and preferred behaviors. “The moderator” was the second most common one and this position also had a high acceptance concerning controversy, but put more emphasis on the debate itself. “The fosterer” was also quite common; here the teachers did not allow students to discuss controversies in class, but had discussions after the other students had left the classroom. The last position, “the rejector” was to have a strong normative position, where teachers are outspoken when they feel that norms are being violated. Considering these positions it is obvious that a deliberative approach could be very different, depending on what position the teachers take in the classroom.

**Introducing a third approach**

There have not been many studies on what kind of teaching has the best results for students in terms of their preparation for citizenship, but Torney-Purta (2002) concluded that the best results were achieved when teachers addressed both content and skills. Based on that assumption, I would suggest a third approach, called the *disciplinary approach*, which focuses on analysis and interpretation. In my own research (Sandahl 2011), I explored and analyzed the reflections of six teachers and their teaching about globalization. Using a theoretical framework used by many researchers in history education (Seixas & Peck 2008, Lee 2005) I interpreted the content/skills in Civics and argued that it could be understood in terms of first and second-order concepts. I also discussed how these concepts relate to the teachers’ goal to teach both about society and for society.

First order concepts are all the facts, terms and concepts found in subject matter; these are closely bound to the academic disciplines (i.e. economics, political science, sociology etcetera). These concepts could be divided into two subgroups, where the first group consists of terms that are propositional, e.g. “prime minister”. The other subgroup consists of colligatory concepts such as “power”. (Cf. Lee 2005). However, the first order concepts are not enough to capture what the subject is about. To describe what it means to work in a disciplinary way we need to consider second-order concepts as well. These are ideas deriving from the social sciences on how to organize, analyze, interpret and critically review discourses in society. They are not bound to specific topics but used in all issues relating to Civics. This model of understanding, where contents and skills are seen as two sides of the same coin, have been promoted before (Newmann 1990, Case 2005, Kinchloe 2001). However, it should be pointed
out that the second-order concepts that I account for here are derived from the Swedish school subject of Civics. I am well aware that these could be used very differently in the academic disciplines of sociology, economics and political science. In contrast to second-order concepts that have been pointed out in history, the social science concepts come from school practice and not academic practice. Having said that, we can move on to the second-order concepts of Civics that I identified in my previous work: social science perspectives, social science causality, social science evidence, social science inference and social science abstraction.

Perspectives refer to the ability to take different points of views on contemporary issues; that there are, in fact, few questions that contain "truths" (Rothstein 2002). There are always different perspectives on various topics, both ideological and intercultural standpoints. Working with students in class thus includes taking and revealing ideological perspectives on different topics such as foreign aid or world trade issues. It is also about taking and revealing different standpoints that are based on different identities in nations or groups. From a Swedish point of view that might be about trying to understand the role of ethical discussions in the political debate in the US (e.g. abortion), something that Swedes do not debate before an election. So, trying to understand how people perceive the world in other places is crucial for understanding the issue. Working in class with role-play, debates or other techniques enable the students to question and scrutinize their own standpoints as well as they practice to understand "the other".

Causality in Civics education means that you work with a model of analysis using causes and consequences to explain contemporary issues. Using simple templates students can investigate different topics and sort causes and consequences in political, economic and social terms as well as consequences for individuals, groups and societies. Here, teachers also work with the (for social scientists) core concepts of agency and structure. Many issues in Civics are contemporary and causality therefore also deals with what could be done, in terms of measures. Seeing that measures could aim at either consequences or causes is an important part of this second-order concept.

Evidence and inference are closely linked. Using models for analysis, like the one above, students come to conclusions that should be based on facts and not beliefs. In short, they need to present evidence and practice how you work with different sources in social sciences. An important part of this is critical thinking and working with bias. Together with perspective taking this is a potent way of
scrutinizing political and economic issues. The last second-order concept is abstraction, which involves working with theoretical models that social scientists use to simplify complexity and create understanding of our societies. Common abstractions are used frequently in economics but can also be found when teachers work with class-related issues or differences in social order in different countries. In the last example, Robert Putnam’s theories can be used to understand the world (e.g. Putnam 2000). An important aspect in Civics is for students to learn how to understand an issue by moving back and forth between the abstract and the concrete.

Discussion

I would argue that teaching and learning Civics is not just about learning the facts pointed out in the curricula or in the textbooks. It is also about learning how to interpret, analyze and discuss society from a social science perspective. In order to reach these goals we need to understand the importance of using second-order concepts. When students work more scientifically they develop a way of thinking about society and they have to challenge the set opinions they have about different topics. Therefore, I argue that the second-order concepts are important for achieving students that are critical thinkers. Also, that critical thinking is crucial when students discuss issues in class, because learning to listen to each other and debate controversial issues is an important part of Civics (Hess 2004 & 2009), but it has to be rooted in scientific ways to analyze and interpret societal issues. If it is not; then there is really no difference in the discussions in class from the ones that students have with their friends at a café. Civics needs an explicit profile; otherwise it will lose its legitimacy and risk being reduced to a “jaw” or a conveyer of facts. Students’ opinions and thoughts are important but it is the Civics teachers’ task to qualify their discussions and their knowledge by using second-order concepts. Therefore, I would argue that these concepts could help teachers to walk the tightrope between knowledge and fostering democratic ideals.

The goal of the school system in general is to prepare students for involvement in, through and after school (Olson 2008, Lundahl 2011). In Schools’ Civics, an important goal is to prepare students for a political life; for them to grow politically. This does not necessarily mean that we should develop students to become activists or politicians; there are other platforms for that. Rather, I would argue that we should prepare them for participation by
developing their skills so that they can analyze, interpret and critically review and participate in societal discourses. The aim could be understood as teaching students for a stand-by mode, where they are armed with knowledge and skills to take on the world. The main effort of schools should be to encourage the disengaged and disillusioned students to become interested stand-by-citizens. One important skill that students need to develop is to take different perspectives on our society, thus enabling students to see the complexity that societies have to handle. This opens up for discussions that take on both critical aspects and legitimizing issues. Students need to analyze this complexity and discuss if perhaps it is crucial for societies to gather around some common principles and institutions, many of them fallible. Also, teaching needs to address issues of critical thinking and the fact that not all critical thinking is based on scientific thinking. Many "critical thinkers" in history have based their arguments on prejudices and emotions, without evidence to support their inferences. A disciplinary approach gives teachers tools to take on those kinds of contemporary narratives as well. However, in the end it is in the hands of the teachers to decide on the choices that have to be made but I believe that the current Swedish curriculum has some points in its focus on disciplinary concepts and that this approach will help teachers to tackle the challenges they face in the classroom. One such challenge is the tightrope between critical thinking and legitimizing society. If teachers see this challenge and appreciate what is at stake in their teaching every day, second-order concepts might work as tools to take on that very tightrope. Naturally, seeing what is beneath helps whilst walking.

**Some remarks on the reach of the Swedish case**

Concluding the above, we can address what we can learn from the Swedish case when trying to apply this on other countries that do not have a democratic tradition that dates back to the early 1900's. The curriculum in Sweden does not state in detail how teachers should teach Civics; it is left in the hands of the professionals. That is not the case in all countries, not even in all western democracies. Also, in Sweden very few questions in social sciences or history are politically charged. You only have to travel some 350 kilometers from Sweden to Estonia to find a setting where historical and political issues can wake dragons from their sleep. In this sense, teaching Civics in Sweden could be described as "safe". It is a completely different setting in incipient democracies around the world. Democratic processes are emerging fast in many parts of the world where people are rising to address civic affairs in the wake of an increasing economic
prosperity (Kassimir & Flanagan 2010). I would argue that this call for strategies for civic (and history) educators. They need to shape Civics into a subject on its own, with outspoken content and expressed skills aiming at analyze, interpretation and critical thinking. If not, civic education risk being the loyal voice of the current regime. In Germany, the Georg-Eckert Institute for international textbook research in Braunschweig conducted research on textbooks in the humanities and social sciences in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Oman. They concluded that the textbooks in Civics did not have a critical approach to contemporary society: “Civic Education seems to have been created as an instrument for shaping loyal citizens, defusing social conflicts, leveling off differences in the own population if taught as a subject of scattered content, blurred profile and consequently low prestige inside the educational program” (Georg-Eckert-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung 2011:92).

So, how much criticism should be taught and how much can be tolerated by governments in different settings such as the countries in the MENA-region? It would be presumptuous of me to say that I hold the answers to these questions. Every country face their own challenges and teachers working in the national schools have to balance the tightrope more carefully and tackle local and national elites. However, I believe there is something to learn from the Swedish case in terms of the disciplinary approach. Teaching second-order concepts does not need to stress critical thinking against the national government, only that these concepts are essential for how social scientists “think”. It includes factual knowledge, but also scientific know-how. If these qualities are stressed that might take some edge of a very politically charged subject. Still, it does not take away potential for developing students as interested and knowledgeable stand-by-citizens. After all, according to the old Latin aphorism, knowledge is power.

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CHAPTER 9
Learning and Teaching Citizenship

MICHELE MICHELETTI

Introduction

We learn about good citizenship in many ways, for instance when studying to take a driving test, participating in dog networks, watching televised sporting events, deciding what to buy, and from education, civic participation and political debates. “No, no! That’s the wrong answer,” said one young man to another at a Stockholm driving school. “You see, you’ve got to stop the car. You can’t just drive through a demonstration; Sweden is a democracy and street protests are protected by law.” Studying traffic regulations can, therefore, be an exercise of lay-abiding or “duty citizenship” but even a moment for learning to respect other’s political interests. Driving can also be civil disobedience (another part of democratic citizenship). Saudi Arabian women defied laws when they drove illegally to protest the ban of women drivers (with equal treatment as their goal and a central part of good or democratic citizenship).¹ Having rainbow

¹ These women have filed a lawsuit against the traffic department of the interior ministry, started the “Women2Drive campaign,” and names are collected for a petition to give women driving rights.

colored painted nails as Emma Green-Tregaros’s during the summer Olympics 2013 in Russia, the American Kennel Club’s decision to boycott World Dog Show 2016 if it is not moved from Moscow, and the boycott call of Russian vodka are just three other ways in which people exercise citizenship, in these examples to protest anti-gay Russian legislation. Using the market as an arena for citizenship practice even has long historical roots. Citizens have boycotted and boycotted (deliberate purchases) to take action against slavery, gender and racial discrimination, environmental risks, global social injustices, and have even used their pocketbook against democratic citizenship, for instance when they refuse to buy from certain ethnic, religious, or racial groups (Stolle and Micheletti 2013). An important activity and venue for citizenship is schools and educational policy; here civic and citizenship education is an important focus. But the school venue can be used in perhaps unexpected ways as well. Recently, for example, young Tunisians tore out pages of textbooks depicting former president Ben Ali as their way of protesting pre-revolutionary patriotism (Tunisia Live 2013). In the same country civic educator Zouheir Azaouzi taught pupils about good citizenship before the Arab spring and continues to work almost around-the-clock to help young people practice it daily.

These diverse examples give an indication of how citizenship is taught, learned, and practiced in a variety of learning situations. Most examples focus on the protection and promotion of equal rights and for reforms of citizenship regimes presently functioning as a “powerful instrument of social closure” (Brubaker 1996, 230). Political scientist Robert Dahl (1990, 1) proclaimed in *After the Revolution Authority in a Good Society* that the replacement of “undemocratic ideas and practices with democratic institutions requires new ideas about authority and new practices.” He wrote that even countries characterized as democracies are “a very long way from fully democratized political systems.” Analyzing how citizenship is learned, taught, and practiced is, thus, important for nurturing authority for a good society.

This paper begins with a concise review of scholarship on what democracy expects of citizens, discusses how good or democratic citizenship expectations have been operationalized in research, offers some available key results on


2 Examples of his citizenship work include film-making, “The Pupil Photographer,” and involvement in the Tunisian Association for the Advancement of Blood Donation.
countries in the MENA region, and identifies new citizenship measures reflecting current democratic theories. It continues with a discussion of the role that civic education plays and can play in teaching good democratic citizenship practice. Available information on civic/citizenship education in the MENA region is offered.

Democracy’s Citizenship Expectations

Citizenship expectations (also called ideals, norms, and beliefs in the scholarly literature) are defined as "a shared set of expectations about the citizen's role in politics." They are important for democracy because they "tell citizens what is expected of them, and what they expect of themselves. These expectations shape citizens' political behavior" (Dalton 2008, 78). Their significance has been duly noted in international conventions (with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as perhaps representing their fullest expression), national constitutional documents, and governmental documents in different public policy fields. They are used as measures in international comparative evaluations, for instance The Economist’s Democracy Index, Freedom House, and Transparency International. Civic associations fight for the rights included in citizenship expectations, and they are key elements in revolutions and civil wars. Government agencies are frequently given the responsibility of creating an infrastructure for teaching and inculcating citizenship expectations. This is, for instance, the goal of civic/citizenship education policy (Nussbaum 2002, Kontogiannopoulou-Polydorides, Kottoula and Dimopoulou 2000, Rossia and Ryanb 2006, Sim 2008, Eurydice 2012). Even corporations get involved in teaching citizenship expectations when they engage in community service (philanthropy), incorporate human rights into their corporate social responsibility platforms, and support NGO causes.

Scholarship often construes democratic citizenship in three ways: as a duty-based relationship of the political individual (the citizen) to the main political body (the nation-state), a rights-based relationship between the political individual and the state, and now as a set of non-reciprocal relationships going beyond the

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3 This paper is part of the research project “Sustainable Citizenship: Opportunities and Barriers for Citizen Involvement in Sustainable Development” funded by the Swedish Research Council. For more information see www.sustainablecitizenship.com.
The confines of the nation-state (cosmopolitan citizenship, see Delanty 2000) and concerning the future and nature (ecological citizenship, see Dobson 2003, sustainable citizenship, see Bullen and Whitehead 2005). Newer approaches view citizenship as applying to arenas and spaces not covered in the older models, which tend to have a nation-state and parliamentary sphere orientation (see discussion and examples below). They claim that citizenship must be exercised in private life and consumer society and that citizenship practice is not confined to one’s own polity and society. For instance, theorists of sustainable citizenship state that it involves “every waking minute of everyday” (Bullen and Whitehead 2005, 513). While this model builds on the duties, rights, and behavioral expectations found in earlier ones, it formulates new citizenship expectations implying non-reciprocal responsibility on the part of actors and institutions (see examples below). All citizenship models make normative claims about good citizenship. Sustainable citizenship’s normative claim is that actors and institutions have responsibility for additional spatial, temporal, and material relationships, which are more encompassing than those in the older models. In terms of the spatial claim, actors and institutions have responsibility for how their decisions and choices affect other people locally to globally, thus going beyond the nation-state orientation in older models. The temporal claim is that actors and institutions have responsibility for how they are affected by past relationships (such as colonialism, slavery, or authoritarian rule) and how these relationships are reproduced currently and can affect and be passed on to future generations. Older models focus on the present. The material claim focuses on responsibility for how actors and institutions impact natural resource allocation and what their consumption and production applies for the treatment of people and animals globally. How these normative claims can be formulated as citizenship expectations is discussed below.

In sum, this model expects citizens to assume (a degree of) temporal responsibility for historical legacies of undemocratic treatment of other people and for current global problems (climate change, trafficking, human rights abuses, world poverty, etc.). It calls for a sense of self-responsibility (or individualized responsibility-taking) for how political, economic and environmental resource allocation affects future generations. It claims that citizens have a material non-reciprocal responsibility for non-humans (animals, the environment) and for the implications of consumption choices on humans.

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4 The discussion relies highly on research with Dietlind Stolle and Daniel Berlin.
and nature globally. This encompassing citizenship model implies, therefore, expectations about attitudes, decisions, and behavior concerning (a) the relationships of interdependences between people, the environment and economy, (b) stewardship to make the world a better place to live, and (c) toleration, multiculturalism, diversity and biodiversity (Bullen and Whitehead 2005, 513, cf. Lister 2007, Stolle and Micheletti 2013, Young 2006). Scholars readily acknowledge the difficulty in living up to these expectations. Whether or how and to which degree they are reflected in value orientations and practices and if and why there are differences between countries and groups of citizens is the focus of much research.

**Formulating and Studying Citizenship Expectations**

Democracy’s citizenship expectations can be studied from different theoretical and methodological perspectives and through highly varied empirical sources. They can be philosophically appraised (e.g., Beckman and Erman 2012) or empirically studied in the practice of political participation (van Deth 2010, Dalton 2008). Empirically-oriented political science has generally focused on measuring adherence to democracy’s citizenship expectations at the individual level by asking people how they view their importance for good citizenship. Typically this is done in large national surveys investigating how often and efficiently individuals practice their granted civil, political and social rights and how they view the importance of a number of attitudes and activities associated with democratic or good citizenship (Petersson et al. 1987, Petersson et al. 1998, van Deth 2007, Dalton 2008, Micheletti et al. forthcoming).

Some survey measures probe attitudes and practices about the democratic legitimacy of states and government policy, with typical measures of so-called *duty citizenship* expectations involving questions about the importance of (1) obeying laws, (2) paying taxes, (3) military service in wartime, (4) jury duty, (5) reporting crimes, and (6) not committing welfare or benefit fraud (not cheating on the social welfare state). A few expectations have a country-specific character; jury duty and military service are part of American surveys but not Nordic ones. The expectations of duty citizenship are generally codified in laws and reflect the need for national allegiance and patriotism in order to develop democratic authority.

Surveys also frequently measure expectations reflective of civic republicanism and *solidarity citizenship*. They probe democratic community spirit, the
responsibility associated with exercising citizenship rights (e.g., freedom of expression that respects others), and civic-orientation (political engagements). Questions are asked about the importance of (1) participating in public affairs, (2) voting in elections, (3) joining voluntary organizations, (4) contacting politicians, media actors, etc., (5) putting others’ interests before your own, (6) not cheating on other people and society at large, (7) treating immigrants and other racial and ethnic groups as equals, (8) showing solidarity with people who are worse off than oneself, and (9) actively trying to influence societal issues. On occasion some of these expectations (e.g., voting) can be codified in law but are generally believed to be aspects that families, schools, and governmental and nongovernmental institutions and policy should encourage.

*Enlightened citizenship*, an important base for a good democratic deliberative climate and public sphere, is tapped in questions on (1) developing one’s own opinions independently from others, (2) staying well-informed about societal affairs, and (3) being prepared to break the law when one’s conscience so requires (civil disobedience). These expectations are to create critical citizens who are politically aware and able to evaluate the statements and actions of different political actors and institutions.

*Sustainable citizenship*, the newer model reflecting more current democratic theory and contemporary political problems, has been measured in two questions: (1) acting on one’s own initiative rather than expecting government to solve problems for you (i.e., individualized responsibility-taking) and (2) choosing environmentally friendly, ethically produced products even if they are not the best and/or cheapest solutions for you personally. The first measure was introduced in a Swedish survey and the second in a Danish one. These surveys probed transitions in citizenship thought and practice in the current lives of citizens in prosperous and stable western democracies (Petersson et al. 1998, Andersen and Tobiasen 2006).

Although several in number these measures do not cover the challenges facing citizenship today. They do not adequately take into account the blurring of the public and private spheres and our responsibility to the environment. They do not include sufficient measures of equality and toleration, for instance regarding gender equality, gays, lesbians, and transgender people (sexual orientation), and respect for other religions—all of which are central political and theoretical concerns in our world and the MENA region today. Neither do they fully address the topic of global sustainability and citizenship’s spatial responsibility—with an important exception being the survey item on the importance of
"showing solidarity with people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself.” The broader temporal responsibility for historical mistakes is not covered; neither is responsibility for future generations. The responsibility for the material world is only measured with the question on product choice. A general important weakness is that this research probes the individual level, thus ignoring the importance of various societal institutions for the teaching and learning of good citizenship values and practice (for an exception see Micheletti and Stolle 2012).

Figure 1 systematizes nineteen different citizenship expectations now found in survey research and how the question is asked. The four new expectations (in italics), first used in a very recent survey of parents with small children (Micheletti 2013), specifically measure expectations derived from sustainable citizenship theory. Item 16 — “Always try to treat people who are different than yourself in an equal way” — reflects theoretical concerns about diversity and multiculturalism, thus tapping expectations about gender and sexual orientation as well as religious toleration. The role of non-state institutions in politics, which have grown in importance due to economic globalization, is found in Item 17 asking about the importance of “actively seek information on how corporations behave in [add country] and the rest of the world.” It addresses also both the spatial and material perspective on citizenship. Item 18 reflects more directly the significance of private life in citizenship by querying about citizen responsibility for the environment and common pool resources (“be prepared to consume less to fight climate change”). Item 19 targets specifically the broadened temporal perspective on citizenship when asking about the importance of “to think about how your practices can affect the well-being of future generations.”
Figure 1. Survey Measures of Citizenship Expectations

Survey Question: There are different views on what it takes to be a good citizen. In your personal opinion, how important is it to:

1. Vote in general elections
2. Never try to avoid paying tax
3. Develop your own opinions independently from other people's
4. Always obey laws and regulations
5. Stay well-informed about what is happening in society
6. Be actively involved in clubs and societies
7. Show solidarity with people in [add country name] who are worse off than yourself
8. Show solidarity with people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself
9. Be prepared to break the law when your conscience requires it
10. Never commit benefit fraud
11. Don't expect the state to solve problems; instead, act on your own initiative
12. Put others' interests before your own
13. Try to actively influence societal issues
14. Do not treat immigrants worse than native [add country name]
15. Choose environmentally friendly, ethically produced products even if they are not the best and/or cheapest solutions for you personally
16. Always try to treat people who are different than yourself in an equal way
17. Actively seek information on how corporations behave in Sweden and the rest of the world
18. Be prepared to consume less to fight climate change
19. Think about how your practices can affect the well-being of future generations

Respondents are typically given a scale, for example from 1-5 with 1 representing not very important, 2 rather unimportant, 3 neither important nor unimportant, 4 rather important, 5 very important, and the opportunity to choose the answer "unsure/don't know." For more information on the project see http://www.sustainablecitizenship.com/
The MENA View of Citizenship

How do citizens in the MENA region view good citizenship? Unfortunately, no one study investigates in comprehensive and systematic fashion the citizenship expectations discussed above. However, various surveys, including the Middle East Value Study, PEW’s face-to-face interviews of 38,000 Muslims, and some international surveys and country evaluations give some initial idea here. It is important to keep in mind that many of the results presented below are not comparable, only offer an indirect glimpse of how citizenship is valued, and some results refer to studies conducted prior to the Arab Spring. Noteworthy also is that many of the surveys targeting individuals highly emphasize the role of religion in society, whether secularism or political Islam is better as a political system, and probe MENA attitudes on the United States. The discussion below presents some key results published in English and categorizes them after the concepts of duty, enlightened, solidarity, and sustainable citizenship.

Interestingly and perhaps unexpected, most of the expectations about duty citizenship do not figure in opinion surveys in the MENA region. However, one indirect measure is views of corruption. The second wave of the Arab Barometer (2011-2012) found, for instance, that, while respondents believed that the economic situation in Iraq and Lebanon was the most important challenge facing their country today, they indicated that the second most important challenge was financial and administrative corruption, with levels in Iraq at 25 % and Lebanon at 11.7 %. Few respondents in these countries considered the building of democracy as the most important challenge. Yet 26% of the Iraqi and almost 24% of the Lebanese respondents believed that that the most important feature of democracy was the elimination of financial and administrative corruption (Atallah 2012, Figure 1 & 4, Hoffman 2012, Figure 8 & 12). See Renad Mansour’s chapter for a detailed analysis of citizenship and elections in Iraq.

Measures that can be related to enlightened citizenship are more prevalent in the surveys. For instance, on average only 10% of the Iraqi respondents stated that they were “very interested” in politics, and about 80% stated that they were “interested” or “slightly interested.” In Lebanon 39% stated that they were interested in politics in 2010, which can be compared to 59% in 2006. However, 83% stated that they never participated or attended a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition, which is an increase of 16 % from the 2006 survey. With this result in hand, it comes perhaps as no surprise that over 70 % also believe that politics is complicated and difficult to understand. In both countries television is the basic source of political news (Hoffman 2012, Figure 20, Atallah 2012). A
very preliminary conclusion worth more research is, then, that being an enlightened citizen is rather difficult in the MENA region. How can this be improved?

Some studies have asked citizens about values clearly associated with solidarity citizenship. In one way or another, these surveys probe how MENA citizens view helping people worse off than themselves, gender equality, and the importance of political engagements. One interesting measure that reflects a good understanding of the MENA region concerns the practice of annual almsgiving (zakat), which is to represent about 2.5% of a person’s total wealth. Of the respondents from the MENA region, 79% stated that they follow this practice of solidarity (see Pew Research 2012, 10 for comparisons with other regions). Many surveys probe various aspects of gender equality: equal legal rights, women as political leaders, equal education for women, etc. A 2005 Gallup World Poll showed that 85% of respondents in Iran and 57% of Egyptians and Jordanians believed that women should have the same legal rights as men (Esposito and Mogahed 2008, 6). When only women were asked about what they like least about the Muslim world, most Muslim women cited political and economic issues, such as “lack of unity” and “high unemployment.” Interestingly, the percentage of women who cite gender inequality is 0% in Jordan, 1% in Egypt, 2% in Morocco, and 5% in Saudi Arabia (ibid. 8). In Egypt 69% believe they should have the same legal rights as men (ibid. 9). The values survey from 2004 cited above showed that citizens overwhelmingly in the studied MENA countries believed that men make better political leaders than women: 72% of Saudi Arabians, 87% of Iraqis, 60% of Iranians, 86% of Jordanians, 84% of Egyptians (Moaddel et al. 2004). However, as shown in the second wave of the Arab Barameter, university education is not considered more important for men than women, and an overwhelming majority believes that men and women should have equal work opportunities. Thus, Iraqis and even Lebanese citizens seem to consider it more important for equal treatment and conditions in the economic sphere but at least in Iraq not in the political sphere. Even Iraqi women tend to be less keen on women as political leaders. In Lebanese society, there appears, in contrast, to be strong support (over 80%) for a political or judicial role for women (Atallah 2012, Figure 13). Lebanese citizens also highly support women working outside home, rejecting a marriage partner not of her choice, and having the same rights as men to divorce. Other data not discussed here reveals that gender equality in the MENA region – as elsewhere – is a
complex matter and there are differences within the populations on this citizenship expectation.

A related aspect concerns views on participating in civil society. Even though electoral participation is high in Lebanon, citizens do not appear to participate in politics on a regular basis. They are for the most part not active in any political or civil associations: 88% are not members of political parties and over 90% are not members of charitable associations, professional associations/trade unions, youth, cultural, or sports organizations, tribal, and local development associations (Atallah 2012).

Other studies measure important aspects of democratic development at the country rather than individual level. They too reveal interesting developments regarding the citizenship expectations. The Economist’s Democracy Index (2012) has moved Egypt, Libya, and Morocco from the authoritarian to hybrid regime category, which is an indication that they in general are receiving higher scores when aspects concerning civil liberties, conduct of elections, media freedom, participation, public opinion, functioning government, corruption, and stability are weighed together. Freedom House states about its 2013 report that the

*Middle East showed ambiguous results for the year. In addition to major gains for Libya, and Tunisia’s retention of sharp improvements from 2011, Egypt experienced relatively modest progress. The country held a flawed but competitive presidential election and direct military rule came to an end, yet the elected parliament was dissolved and President Morsi pushed through a new constitution under deeply problematic circumstances. Moreover, the gains for the Arab Spring countries triggered a reaction, sometimes violent, by authoritarian leaders elsewhere in the Middle East, with resulting setbacks for freedom in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (Freedom House 2013a).*

Among its “worst of the worst” categories are Saudi Arabia and Syria, which are singled because of their performance on political and civil liberties. Freedom House have even started what it entitles Egypt Democracy Compass, which is “designed to provide a snapshot of the country’s trajectory, either toward or further away from a truly democratic system, over the preceding calendar month” (Freedom House 2013b). Its September report finds an “almost across-the-board retreat from democratic norms in Egypt” since July 2013, when President Mohamed Morsi was removed from political office. It also reports indications of anti-democratic trends within the military leadership, including the use of
violence against citizens wanting to express their political viewpoints in protests (Freedom House 2013c).

In sum, there have been some steps forward and backward on democratization and the development of democratic citizenship in the MENA region. Worries about the economy and disappointment with the emergence of burgeoning democratic institutions and practices have affected how people in the MENA region view various indicators probing good citizenship. While earlier surveys\(^5\) tended to show an enthusiasm over the function of democracy in society, the ones discussed here show mixed results. The question then becomes how the thirst for democracy can be maintained during dire economic and political times.

**Pivotal Role of Civic Education for Good Citizenship**

Education is one answer that scholars give to the questions about how enlightened citizenship can be nurtured and the thirst for democracy can survive dire political and economic challenges. Education scholars clearly declare that schools are an important way to improve the quality of citizenship (Kozhevnikova 2013, Torney-Purta 2002, Arthur and Davies, eds. 2008a) because they are a basic societal institution “at the forefront of activity in the preservation of democracy” (Burdette, 1942, 269). How schools teach citizenship is, therefore, crucial in democratization processes throughout the world, whether they occur in mature democracies or elsewhere. Education is envisioned as having the capacity to affect how people practice citizenship and, importantly, give them

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\(^5\) A 2005 Gallop survey in Egypt and Iran shows that 94% of the respondents in Egypt and 93% in Iran stated that they would want freedom of speech, as defined as “allowing all citizens to express their opinion on the political, social, and economic issues of the day,” to be guaranteed if they were drafting a constitution for a new country (Esposito and Mogahed 2008, 5). A values survey from 2004 that probed the worldviews of different MENA countries found that over 50% of the respondents believed that “democracy is the best form of government” but that there were differences among the countries: 71% Saudi Arbitians, 85% of Iraqis, 60% of Iranians, 90% of Jordanians, and 99% of Egyptians agreed that democracy is the best form of government. This latter study also showed that a majority of the Iraqi respondents also believed that implementing laws according to people’s wishes was a characteristic of good government; this can be compared to 32% who believed that good government reflects Islamic laws only (Moadell et al. no date).
a point of departure (a baseline) for understanding democratic values and their role in society. No wonder then that much education research concentrates on the role and characteristics of civic/citizenship education in school curriculum (e.g., Eurycide 2012, Sandström Kjellin and Stier 2008, Torney-Purta 2001, Crick and Lockyer 2010), student perception of this education (that is, what they think was taught and what they learned) (e.g., Finkel & Ernst 2005, Ekman 2007, Duruhan and Şad 2011), and in a few instances teacher perception and competency (e.g., Kennedy 2008, Lightfoot 2008). There is also accumulated scholarship on the challenges of changing notions of citizenship for defining civic/citizenship education (e.g., Kymlicka and Norman 1999, Roth and Burbules 2008), the goals of civic/citizenship education programs (e.g., Arthur and Davies, eds. 2008), and the effects of different such education programs on children (see e.g., Arthur and Davies, eds. 2008). Some research is cross-national (Torney-Purta 2001); some conceptional (Roth and Burbules 2007), and much involves case studies of single country, one civic education program or one school (e.g., see Sandahl in this volume, Sandahl 2011, Schweisfurth 2006, Baessa et al. 2002).

What do we know about civic/citizenship education in general and in particular in countries undergoing dire political and economic challenges? The situation of civic teachers before, during, and after regime and severe societal change appears to only have been studied in general terms, sporadically, and/or in single country cases (e.g., Faour and Muasher 2011, Dubnick 2003, Glagoleva 2005). This scholarship is calling for deepened civic/citizenship education that encompasses and nurtures three central aspects in democratization processes: 1) knowledge of civic concepts, systems, and processes of civic life; 2) skills of civic participation, problem solving, and negotiation, and 3) disposition or sense of belonging, values, and ethics (Faour and Musaher 2011, 8-9), with the goal of promoting informed, purposeful and active citizenship (Schweisfurth 2006, 43).

Faour and Muasher (2011, 18) provide a list of selected core and country-specific citizenship concepts found in most general comparative studies of citizenship education—gender equality, secularism, multiculturalism, sexual diversity freedom, human dignity, social justice, tolerance—and discuss the role of religion, citizen empowerment, and implicitly media literacy. For non-

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6 Media literacy can be defined as the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and communicate information in a variety of forms. It is seen as representing a necessary, inevitable, and realistic response to the complex, ever-changing electronic environment and communication cornucopia that
Western countries undergoing democratization processes caution is called when applying standard Western citizenship frameworks in new settings. The fear is that a standard application of Western-based civic/citizenship education might be detrimental to democratization processes because they offer "snapshots" of, for instance, the importance of human rights rather than helping students understand their importance from the point of departure of their own country's historical development, a case in point is Turkey (Çayir 2011, 25). As there are many Western-based funders desiring to support democratization processes in the MENA region, such research results need to be given serious consideration. Scholars increasingly also argue that civic/citizenship education should address the role of enhanced choice, which is a consequence of free-market reforms, new public management, and more pervasive consumer society; this insight applies to a wide variety of countries including mature democracies like Sweden and Great Britain (e.g., Glagoleva 2005; Crick and Lockyer 2010; Stolle and Micheletti 2013). In sum, therefore, there is a call for a renewed and new political commitment to developing civic/citizenship education so that students learn to become critical citizens who know how to seek and assess information from various sources, contextualize it in their lives, involve themselves in an insightful way in societal endeavors, and understand the workings of politics and governance.

What do we know about civic/citizenship education in the MENA region? Scholarship on the challenges facing civic/citizenship education teachers in before, during, and after regime change is still sporadic (for interesting studies see Faour and Musaher 2011, Dubnick 2003, Glagoleva 2005, Kozhevnikova 2013, Froumin 2004). Nevertheless, this research calls for deepened civic/citizenship education encompassing such broad aspects as: 1) knowledge of civic concepts, systems, and processes of civic life; 2) skills of civic participation, problem solving, and negotiation to counter more authoritarian citizenship views; 3) training in a disposition or sense of belonging, values, and ethics that cohere with democracy; (4) textbook revision to reflect these aspects, and (5) improved civic education teacher training (Faour and Musaher 2011, 8-9, Glagoleva 2005, Bogolubov 1999). These reforms are seen as necessary to promote informed, purposeful, and active citizenship (Schweisfurth 2006, 43) that can be applied and practiced in all societal spheres.

surround us (National Association for Media Literacy Education, http://namle.net/publications/media-literacy-definitions/).
Thus, the concern is that civic education, for different reasons, is not playing the pivotal role that it should in democratization processes. In the Arab world, scholars and policy makers point out that current education reform efforts focus on technical aspects (building more schools, introducing computers into classrooms), and improving test scores in mathematics and science rather than emphasizing a “basic human component” necessary for democratic development, namely that “[s]tudents need to learn at a very early age what is means to be citizens who learn how to think, see and produce knowledge, question, and innovate rather than be subjects of the state who are taught what to think and how to behave” (Faour and Muasher 2011, 1). While they agree that “before-the-revolution” citizenship education is “grievously outdated,” they doubt that current “after-the-revolution” educational reform will contribute to the democratization process. Similar problems have been identified in Russia, whose educational policy has been “mostly interested in the passive style of citizenship and promoted education to create a hard-working and law-abiding citizenship” (Glagoleva 2005, 3), thus emphasizing duty citizenship over solidarity and enlightened citizenship.

Similar problems are also identified in Sweden and other stable democracies, where civic/citizenship education tends to be downplayed in school policy. Public debates on school curriculum often focus on improving teaching and learning on the 3 Rs (reading, writing, and arithmetic) as a way to strengthen both national economic potential and youth employability. Some scholars argue that new public management and other neo-liberal reforms, including deregulatory policy and the growth of private or charter schools, force education institutions to teach to develop “the economically competent or adaptable worker, not the democratic or intercultural citizen” through the promotion of “lifelong learning” (Levinson 2005, 329). Some scholars go so far as to claim that “social critique is rapidly disappearing as a faded democratic dream” (Hyslop-Margison and Sears 2006, 21). Less priority given in schools to citizenship education in different democratization settings is problematic for other reasons as well. A primary one is the weakening of other socialization agents, including the family and civic associations.

In sum, considerable improvements in civic/citizenship education are needed in different parts of the world and for similar reasons. In “after-the-revolution” countries, it is essential that it keeps pace with the new democratization processes, implying also the introduction of new topics and pedagogics into classroom lessons and settings. Educators must learn new teaching frameworks
and skills to develop civic/citizenship education away from the before-the-revolution authoritarian rule culture. In stable democracies with less authority-bound and more post-materialist orientations, it is important that students learn how to evaluate the multitudes of information, fragmented expertise, and diverse societal spheres within which they engage and apply the citizenship expectations involved in making daily choices and living an ordinary daily life. Yet what seems to be missing in this discourse is a call for the systematic study and use of citizenship expectations in the teaching and learning of democratic citizenship.

Renewing and Reforming Civic/Citizenship Education

Scholars raise several concerns about education associated with the citizenship expectations discussed above. First, in order to promote enlightened citizenship in both stable democracies and “after-the-revolution” countries, they argue that media literacy must be taught more in schools. The changing and more global media landscape as well as the youth’s extended contact with digital media needs to be put more into the context of democratic citizenship. Studies not only reveal how the digital (social) media can be used in clever ways to encourage and reinforce democratic action but also to spread arguments for anti-Semitism, xenophobia, sexism, and other attitudes in opposition to good citizenship. In Sweden and elsewhere there is great public concern about how it is used to persecute and bully individuals and groups (SOU 2012:74). In order to understand how digital media can be used advertently or inadvertently in this way, a sound basis in democratic values and practices must be developed. Young (and older people) must learn to identify undemocratic attitudes and viewpoints even when they are voiced in new fashion or unanimously. They must also be able to stand up for democratic values and have the courage to say no. In this way, they can develop strengths in enlightened and solidarity citizenship.

Second, civic/citizenship education must focus more on comprehensive political literacy, that is, the ability to “read politics.” This implies broad political learning—from interpreting facts, data, and history about political institutions, political parties and political developments to, importantly, learning to see through and analyze politics by comprehending, conceptualizing, and critically evaluating the political world (Malone and Julian 2005). Such skills are growing in importance with the emergence of new authority frameworks globally and the
new media landscape. This means that pupils must learn more than objective knowledge about the workings of governments in order to mature into enlightened or “critical citizens” (Puolimatka 2002) who can reflect critically on and discriminate between three objects of political orientation: the broad political community, the regime, and the authorities (Chana and Nesbitt-Larking 1995). Given declining levels of political trust and growing levels of corruption in different countries, the ability of citizens to differentiate among wrong-doers, wrong-doings, and institutional capacities is highly important for assigning political accountability and political legitimacy. Otherwise, we run the general risk of alienated citizens who give up on politics and turn to less democratic forces in society to vent their political frustrations. Some of the results presented earlier on the MENA region show that these problems can develop into serious problems.

Third, research stresses that civic/citizenship education should teach skills in deliberative democracy and “toleration training” because “[i]n a democracy, citizens need to be able to listen to each other, understand the places and interests of others in the community, and achieve compromises and solve problems when conflict occurs” (Bringle and Steinberg 2010, 434). Young people must, therefore, receive education that helps them develop knowledge of how they should relate to others in a respectful and tolerant way and when to draw the line in accepting the legitimacy of others’ viewpoints (that is, the difference between toleration and tolerance, see Waltzer 2008). For this to happen, young people must be able to understand complex societal problems (see above), learn to listen, and train diversity skills. This might involve experience with persons from different ethnic or religious groups, and socio-economic levels. In this vein, an area identified as important is critical citizen student listening skills. Here listening is not just “swallowing” or accepting what teachers say and a teacher-driven pedagogy based on the view that “[y]oung people have no right to stand up to their elders” as has been the practice among older teachers in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere (Faour 2011). Rather it is an open and interactive relationship based on critical thinking among students and with their teachers that replaces “before-the-revolution” pedagogics. Such endeavors enhance both enlightened and solidarity citizenship.

Fourth, service learning is stressed. This pedagogic strategy intimately associated with the civic republican view of citizenship aims at promoting the involvement of young people in serving their society (joining and volunteering)
and fostering their sense of empowerment and civic-minded disposition. Service learning is, however, controversial and criticized for becoming “charity citizenship” that differs drastically from enlightened and solidarity citizenship because it does not sufficiently promote political and media literacy but rather just encourages them to volunteer (Hyslop-Margison and Sears 2006, 20).

Fifth, scholars warn against policy and policy side-effects that encourage a depoliticized vision of citizenship. This occurs when school curricula narrows and tames the notion of citizenship by delimiting its scope to pre-defined political and social structures and by encouraging civic involvement that enhances rather than critically assesses social and political institutions. In some ways, this criticism is similar to concerns about how civic/citizenship education traditionally has been used to promote patriotism, national sentiment, and merely duty citizenship. It can also be applied to efforts aiming almost exclusively at encouraging young people to go vote. Scholars also note how education on multiculturalism and ethnic relations in some countries has a negative side-effect when it evolves into promoting the goal of simple social cohesion that can make light of discriminatory talk and actions because it focuses mostly on the spirit of the community over respect for difference. In sum, the fear is that civic/citizenship education can perform the sole task of legitimating governmental efforts and restoring trust in governmental institutions (Hyslop-Margison and Sears 2006, 19-20, Froumin 2004) without stressing enlightened citizenship and political literacy.

Sixth, good public policy and public discussion on the role of schools in citizenship training is emphasized. Research points to several matters that need to be evaluated and formulated in policy documents: 1) whether citizenship is constructed as an active or passive, radical or conservative, or communitarian or individualistic role; 2) how it is defined (e.g., as only as a vertical relation

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7 Civic-mindedness is defined as “a person’s inclination or disposition to be knowledgeable of and involved in the community, and to have a commitment to act upon a sense of responsibility as a member of that community” (Bringle and Steinberg 2010, 429). Fostering depth of citizenship understanding is said to be based on: (a) active learning; (b) frequent feedback from others (e.g., faculty, service learning coordinator, students, service providers) that is provided in non-threatening ways; (c) collaboration with others; (d) cognitive apprenticeship (i.e., a mentor with whom students can discuss and learn generalization of principles, transfer of knowledge between theory and practice, ability to analyze perplexing circumstances); and (e) practical application in which students are involved in tasks that have real consequences but have a safety net for high stakes mistakes (ibid., 437).
between the state and the political individual (the citizen) or if it includes a horizontal one among individuals in society); 3) which societal spheres are involved in the citizenship discourses in public policy, and to this can be added a checklist of the nineteen items available in survey research. This point also concerns the broad topic of schools as settings for the making of citizenship which considers the character of school settings, school climate, and even schools as citizens themselves (cf. Bringle and Steinberg, 2010, 432, Cohen et al. 2009), thus also stressing the importance of the character and quality of official documents regulating teacher education, textbooks, and classroom practices. Previous research finds that educational reform in states undergoing severe societal change must pay particular attention to the institutions and policy of civic/citizenship education. Sweeping reforms to change rapidly before-the-revolution educational institutions and material has been found to be a crucial step toward more sustainable change. For if this is not accomplished before-the-revolution attitudes and practices will just be reproduced. Singapore is a case in point, with lingering differences among teachers who taught civics after independence from Britain in 1965s (Sim 2008).  

Concluding Remarks

Renewing citizenship, developing civic/citizenship education to fit the needs of democratization, as well as other institutional changes discussed in this volume are important for societal betterment and the march of democracy around the world. Teaching young people about democracy’s expectations about citizenship can lead to new ideas about authority. These ideas must also be developed and put into practice. Teaching young people good citizenship in schools is an important effort, and the hope is that they, as in the examples that began this chapter, will learn to practice it in various ways daily.

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8 Some Singaporean teachers had nationalistic orientations (and thus stressed the needs of nation-building); others had a more social orientation (thus stressing participation and involvement in community), and a third group were more "person-oriented teachers" who focused more on the private and personal and emphasized personal development as a basis to attain the common good (thus, an individualized responsibility-taking approach, see Stolle and Micheletti 2013).
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